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The Context-Sensitivity of Rationality and Knowledge
Brian Kim
My dissertation argues that the beliefs, desires, and preferences that count as rational may
change from one deliberative context to another. The argument rests on the premise that
rational deliberation requires one to identify all the possibilities that are relevant to a de-
cision problem. How does a decision maker accomplish this task? What impact does this
demarcation have on the beliefs and desires that she uses to deliberate? The answers I pro-
pose suggest changes to the way we view rational agents and what they know. Appealing
to empirical research and normative concerns, I argue that an agent’s deliberative beliefs,
desires, and preferences are “constructed” on a case to case basis and are distinct from
the agent’s stable set of background attitudes. For deliberative judgments depend upon
the ways one speciVes what is relevant for a decision problem and this may change from
one context to the next. Upon articulating a suitable context-sensitive view of rational
decision making, I develop accounts of warranted assertion, rational full belief and knowl-
edge that are similarly context-sensitive. These views criticize simple constitutive norms
of assertion, like the knowledge norm, and propose a way to connect degrees of belief and
full belief. In addition, the proUered account of knowledge explains how knowledge pre-
cludes epistemic luck, as required by Gettier cases, by appealing to the way the standards
of knowledge vary from one deliberative context to the next.
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The central long run philosophical problem facing people generally is how to
maintain a belief in progress without a belief in Utopia. And I want to argue
that that requires a change in our conception of progress.
–Hilary Putnam
My dissertation is a sustained reWection on this problem and its consequences for a
theory of rationality and epistemology. Though Putnam was making a comment about
political utopia and progress, the problem and his proposed response applies equally to
questions about how we evaluate our own lives and actions. When we deliberate about
what to do, we can assess potential actions as better or worse because they produce better
or worse consequences. And one way to coherently evaluate these consequences as better
or worse depends upon the belief in personal utopias. For if each agent possesses a coher-
ent conception of an ideal world, actions can then be assessed in terms of how close they
get one to the imagined ideal.
But what if we abandon the belief in personal utopias? What if we conclude that there
is no best way the world could be? How could we coherently evaluate our actions? How
could we assess the outcomes of our actions as being better or worse?
Working within a Humean view of instrumental rationality, I discuss what it means
to coherently evaluate the actions that we choose between. It is concluded that human
agents cannot have rational standards of evaluation that account for everything they could
care about and as a result we must give up the belief that human agents could have co-
herent conceptions of an ideal world (Chapter 1). In response, I adopt Putnam’s general
proposal that we ought to change our conception of progress, what it means to be better or
x
worse (Chapter 2). What results is a theory of rational choice, which I call a Constructive
Decision Theory, that goes beyond standard views by incorporating into the theory how
decision makers identify what counts as relevant to their decision problems and justify the
construction of a standard of evalution (i.e. a coherent set of beliefs, desires, and prefer-
ences). On the proposed view, what it means for an action to be better or worse depends
upon the goal that the decision maker adopts for a particular decision problem. The upshot
is that a rational standard of evaluation is goal-relative and does not accomodate all that
one believes or desires.
The remainder of my dissertation is an exercise in applying the pragmatist methodol-
ogy to traditional questions in epistemology. The pragmatist seeks to explicate concepts
of epistemological interest by considering the role that they play in a theory of rational
deliberation. I begin the task by articulating the role that rational belief and knowledge
play in Constructive Decision Theory (Chapter 3 and 4). The resulting view of knowl-
edge, which I call the Stability Account, oUers a distinctive version of the subject-sensitive
invariantist account of knowledge (Chapter 4). Many accounts of knowledge have had a
diXcult time identifying a principled way of demarcating the possibilities that are relevant
for determining whether or not a subject knows. The task is made all the more diXcult by
the need to avoid skepticism on the one hand and to account for Gettier cases on the other.
By explicating knowledge in terms of its role in deliberation, I hope to make some progress
by using the additional resources aUorded by the appeal to deliberation. For deliberation
is goal-oriented and goals limit what is relevant for one’s deliberative tasks. Therefore,
xi
I propose that goals oUer some help in demarcating the possibilities that are relevant for
determining whether or not a subject knows.
I conclude by using the Stability Account to explain our use of ‘knows’. This task is
divided into two steps. First, conversation can be viewed as a type of deliberation and I
show that conversation and the norms of assertion can be given a decision-theoretic anal-
ysis by adopting the richer framework oUered by a Constructive Decision Theory (Chapter
5). Second, I use the decision-theoretic account of assertion and the Stability Account to
develop a model of our use of ‘knows’. And this model is used to address and mitigate some
key objections to subject-sensitive invariantism. In the exercise of the pragmatist method-
ology, my general aim is show that by enriching our theories of rational deliberation, we





of Bayesian Decision Theory
Rationality concerns our capacity to adopt, change, and evaluate intentional attitudes.
The inquiry into the laws of rationality is typically divided into a descriptive and normative
component. While descriptive theories of rationality provide us with an account of how
our rational faculties actually operate, normative theories of rationality provide us with
rules and guidelines governing how our rational faculties ought to operate. Despite their
diUering aims, both the descriptive and normative theories of rationality can be founded
upon a theory of rational choice.
In these Vrst two chapters, I will be focused on the normative aspects of rationality
and to this end, my discussion will be focused on the dominant research program for a
normative theory of rational choice, Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT).1 My aim is
to understand what Bayesian Decision Theory tells us about the nature of rational belief,
desire, preference, and choice.
1While most of my discussion can be framed with respect to many of the non-orthodox Bayesian accounts,
it will depend upon some very general features of classical decision-theoretic frameworks.
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I will Vrst consider and reject two interpretations of BDT, that of the Practical
Bayesian and the Comprehensive Bayesian. The former views the theory as artic-
ulating what it is to be rational in particular well-deVned decision problems. The latter
views the theory as articulating what it is for all of one’s beliefs, desires, and preferences
to be coherent. This chapter will present an argument against both views, focusing on the
view of the Comprehensive Bayesian. In the next chapter, I will show that the problems
faced by these two accounts can be met by proposing a unique interpretation of BDT that
I call Local Constructive Bayesianism.2 The account is local because what counts
as rational is sensitive to a decision-making context - namely, the way that the decision
maker (henceforth, DM) frames her decision problem. The account is constructive because
the framing of a decision problem and the beliefs, desires, and preferences the DM has
about the decision problem are not assumed to pre-exist, waiting to be elicited. Rather,
both the framing of the problem and the attitudes one uses to deliberate are constructed
for that decision problem on the basis of local, context-sensitive judgments.
1 Bayesian Decision Theory
To begin our discussion, let’s specify what constitutes normative decision theory in general
and Bayesian Decision Theory in particular. Decision theories specify
2The local constructive account of BDTwill be deVned by three commitments. The Vrst two commitments
specify what it means to be local and the third commitment speciVes what it means to be constructive. The
Vrst commitment is that the theory only applies in small worlds. Second, that small worlds can’t capture
everything of relevance. Ken Binmore calls one who accepts these two commitments, a Bayesianite (c.f.
(Binmore and Street 2007)). Third, that small worlds are constructed on the basis of deliberation-speciVc
judgments about one’s decision problem.
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1. What constitues a well-deVned decision problem.
2. What counts as a rational set of attitudes that are used to evaluate a decision problem.
3. A principle of rational choice
When we specify what constitutes a well-deVned or well-formed decision problem in the
normative theory, we identify all the features of a decision problem that are relevant for
determining whether or not an agent is rational in her decision making. Call this a decision
model. We then specify a rational state of mind with respect to a decision model and the
principle of rational choice speciVes which actions count as rational relative to a rational
state of mind.
Those decision theories which can be characterized as Bayesian share views about what
counts as a rational state of mind and the principle of rational choice. BDT states that the
relevant aspects of our cognitive state ought to be representable by a unique probability
function and the relevant aspects of our conative state ought to be representable by a
real-valued utility function that is unique up to a positive linear transformation. Next,
BDT states that a rational choice is that which maximizes expected utility. There are a
number of competing ways to Vll in this account, but these diUerences will not matter for
our discussion and it will be helpful to deal with a particular Bayesian account. For this
purpose, I will use the version of BDT presented in (Savage 1972).3
3The accounts in (Anscombe and Aumann 1963), (Luce and Krantz 1971), and (JeUrey 1983) all count as
Bayesian.
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1.1 Savage’s Theory
First, let’s describe Savage’s account of decision making. Since we must account for what
we believe about the world in our deliberations, Savage’s set-up includes states of the world
that represent ways the world could be. A set S of such states provides an exhaustive and
exclusive set of answers to the questions the DM has about the world, questions that are
relevant to her decision problem. For example, when deciding what to wear for the day,
the DM may ask what tomorrow’s weather will be like. The resulting set of states may
be as Vne-grained or coarse-grained as the DM likes. She may consider a very coarse-
grained set of states by considering the possibility that it rains and the possibility that it
does not rain. Or she may be very detailed and consider every possible degree of diUerence
in temperature, humidity, etc.
Next, we must account for what we care about and so we must include descriptions
of what may happen to us given our choices.4 Descriptions of the outcomes of choices
are called consequences and the set C of consequences considered in a decision problem
provides an exhaustive and exclusive set of answers to questions about what can happen to
the DM, questions that are relevant to her decision problem. For the purposes of measuring
belief and desire, Savage’s framework also includes a σ-algebra S of events over S and a
σ-algebra C over C .
4Savage equates what can happen to us with what we can experience. In this way, there is a logical
distinction between what the world is like and what we experience. To capture this distinction, Savage
sometimes called consequences, states of the agent. “Consequences might appropriately be called states of
the person, as opposed to states of the world.” p.14, (Savage 1972)
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Finally, in decision problems, we pick between acts or choices. There are available
choices that we can actually make and available acts that we can actually perform. There
are also imaginary acts and choices that we can imagine but not actually pick or perform.5
In Savage’s framework, there is a unique consequence for every act-state pair, so acts can
be represented as functions from states to consequences and the set F of acts speciVes
every possible act. So a decision problem can be represented by a decision matrix (Table
1.1).
States
Acts s1 s2 . . . sn
A1 c11 c12 . . . c1n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Am cm1 cm2 . . . cmn
Consequences
Table 1.1: Decision Matrix
So Savage’s accounting of decision appeals to a set of states, S and consequences, C . In
addition, the DMmust identify a subset of F as the available acts for her decision problem.
It is assumed that the agent has preferences over a set F of acts. The attitudes ex-
pressed by these preferences are rational or coherent just in case:
(*) There exists a unique probability function on S, a bounded real-valued util-
ity function V over C unique up to a positive aXne transformation such that
for any two acts f , f ′, the agent prefers f to f ′ if and only if:
5Imaginary choices are important because they can help us to sort out our thoughts. “It is quite usual
in this theory to contemplate acts that are not actually available. . .Make believe is certainly involved, and
indeed it is extremely diXcult to make believe to the required extent. Yet it does seem to be a helpful goal.”
p.80, (Drèze 1990)
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∑
s∈S
P (s)V (f(s)) >
∑
s∈S
P (s)V (f ′(s))
We write U(f) for
∑
s∈S
P (s)V (f(s)), the utility of the act f.
In Savage’s theory, the possibilities over which rational beliefs and desires are respec-
tively deVned are distinct and independent.6 There is a set of states over which the agent’s
beliefs ought to be representable by a unique probability function and this is separated
from the set of consequences over which the agent’s desires ought to be representable by a
real-valued utility function. This means that rational beliefs and desires are considered to
be independent of one another. Savage’s account of decision making explicates a regulative
ideal that governs our beliefs, desires, and preferences.7 So long as a DM’s decision prob-
lem as well as her beliefs, desires, and preferences about the problem can be represented
by Savage’s account of decision making, she is free from criticism.
1.2 Savage’s Axioms
The theory can be presented axiomatically by showing that a set of seven axioms governing
rational preference are logically equivalent to the existence of the kind of probability-utility
representation given by (*) above.
Before we describe the axioms, it will be necessary to introduce some terminology.
Let f  g express the fact that f is strictly preferred to g and f ∼ g express the fact
6This is often described as the separability of belief and desire. This assumption underlies Savage’s Sure
Thing Principle.
7“All the regulative ideal demands of you is that you acknowledge that, to the extent that a state of
opinion does violate [the ideal], it is open to legitimate criticism.” p.38, (Kaplan 1983). (Pettit 2002) provides
a useful clariVcation whereby Bayesian Decision Theory is understood as providing a canon for rational
decision making rather than a calculus.
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that neither f  g nor g  f . If A is a subset of S, then let fA denote the restriction
of the function f to the set A. A is null if f ∼ g whenever f and g are elements of F
such that fAc = gAc , where Ac denotes the complement of A. Lastly, given a consequence
c ∈ C , let [c] denote the act in F that maps all s ∈ S to c. [c] is called a constant act.
The following presentation of the axioms is quoted directly from (Shafer 1986a) except for
some change in notation. Savage proved that an agent’s preferences can be represented
by a probability-utility pair as in (*) above if and only if the agent’s preferences satisfy the
following axioms:
P1. The existence of a complete ranking. All the acts in F are ranked in preference, except
that the person may be perfectly indiUerent between some acts. More precisely: (i)
The binary relation on F is irreWexive and transitive. (ii) The binary relation∼ on
F is transitive.
P2. The independence postulate. If f  g and fAc = gAc , then fA  gA.
P3. Value can be purged of belief. If A is not null, then [c]A  [d]A if and only if [c]  [d]
P4. Belief can be discovered from preference. Suppose [c]  [d], f is equal to c on B and d
on Bc. Suppose similarly that [c′]  [d′], f ′ is equal to c′ on A and d′ on Ac, and g′ is
equal to c′ on B and d′ on Bc. Then f  g if and only if f ′  g.
P5. The nontriviality condition. There exists at least one pair of acts in F , say f and g, such
that f  g.
P6. The continuity condition. If f  g, then for every element c of C there is a Vnite
partition of S such that f (or g or both) can be changed to equal c on any single
1. Bayesian Decision Theory 8
element of the partition without changing the preference.
P7. The dominance condition. If fA  gA, then fA  [g(s)]A for some s ∈ A, and [f(s)]A 
gA, for some s ∈ A.
A DM can be construed as a expected utility maximizer if and only if the DM’s pref-
erences satisfy all of the axioms. The axioms oUer a justiVcation for the theory and also
help us to understand the normative content of the theory.8 One accepts the axioms as
normative criteria if and only if one accepts the principle of maximizing expected utility.
To put it another way, one accepts the axioms of rational preference if and only if one
accepts Savage’s account of decision making as a regulative ideal.
1.3 Assessing the Theory
Like any decision theory, BDT attempts to account for some but not all decision mak-
ing phenomenon.9 So, in order to assess the theory properly, we must demarcate the
phenomenon of interest. Decision theory is concerned with the choices rational agents
make and the beliefs and desires on the basis of which they deliberate. The normative
theory is peculiar in the sense that it attempts to account only for rational attitudes and
8Of course, there are other ways of justifying the prescriptions of the theory or parts of it. For example,
dutch book arguments can be used to argue for the claim that rational beliefs are probabilities. The axioms
of rational preference simply provide one type of argument.
9In a letter to Aumann, Savage responds to some unintuitive consequences of his theory writing, “The
diXculties that you mention are all there; I have known about them in a confused way for a long time; I
believe they are serious but am prepared to live with them until something better comes along. The theory
of personal probability and utility is, as I see it, a sort of framework into which I hope to Vt a large class of
decision problems. In this process, a certain amount of pushing, pulling, and departure from common sense
may be acceptable and even advisable.” p. 78, He concludes his response to Aumann’s comments writing,
“There is certainly much in what you say. What is not clear to me is what, if anything, had best be done
about it.” p. 80, (Drèze 1990)
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choices where “rational” should be understood as that which is normatively appropriate
or free from criticism. It is important to note that the phenomenon demarcated for study
is already within the normative realm since we are dealing with normatively appropriate
beliefs, desires, preferences, and choices.
Since we are solely concerned with Bayesian decision theory and much is known about
the theory, we can provide a fairly detailed description of the phenomenon that the theory
is meant to capture. First, we will only be concerned with instrumental rationality. Instru-
mentally rational choices are those choices which provide good means toward our ends.
Next, what is “good” will be interpreted as what is ideal. For us, what it means to be ideal
is that which is best for the DM to do on the assumption that there are no costs to inquiry.
In order to focus on what is best, we must idealize our decision scenarios and there are
many ways to do this. For our purposes, we can achieve this idealization by restricting
ourselves to cases in which we idealize the DM’s resources and her decision problems.
First, we can assume that the DM has access to an unlimited set of resources.10 For exam-
ple, we may suppose that she has access to unlimited computational power and memory.
Second, the decision problem is idealized by assuming that the DM has enough time to
make her choice such that time is not a resource that needs to be taken into account. This
normative concept of ideal rationality corresponds to the unbounded optimization concept
10It is important that we do not idealize the DM herself. For we want to ensure that the theory applies to
human agents but if we idealized the decision maker, we may fail to ensure that the theory applies to us. So I
take it that there is a somewhat intuitive distinction between resource limitations and cognitive limitations.
The latter limitation is more fundamental to who we are as human beings. I am assuming that we can idealize
decision making agents in such a way that we can idealize away their resource limitations without idealizing
away their cognitive limitations.
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of rationality.11 From this perspective, rational choices are ideal, optimal, or best choices.
Since we can equivalently talk of the theory as the probability-utility representation in
(*) or as a set of axioms governing rational preference, we can talk of the DM being ratio-
nal just in case she is in accord with the axioms of rational preference or just in case her
attitudes are representable with the probability-utility representation in (*). Naturally, the
theory should be supported by and consistent with the demarcated phenomenon. Follow-
ing Ove Hansson, we can diUerentiate two ways in which the theory can be falsiVed. “A
decision theory is weakly falsiVed as a normative theory if a decision problem can be found
in which an agent can perform in contradiction with the theory without being irrational.”12
“A decision theory is strictly falsiVed as a normative theory if a decision problem can be
found in which an agent who performs in accordance with the theory cannot be a rational
agent.”13
So we can assess the theory by articulating the phenomenon that we deem as rational
and irrational and then comparing it to the dictates of the theory. However, before we
can compare the phenomenon to the formal theory, we must provide an interpretation of
Savage’s formal account of decision making. The part’s of Savage’s account can refer to
11The unbounded optimization concept of rationality can be contrasted with two important alternatives,
optimization under constraints and satisVcing (c.f. (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002), (Simon 1955), and (Simon
1978)). These alternatives explicate concepts of bounded rationality. The former retains the idea that ra-
tionality is optimality but takes into account the costs/beneVts of deliberation and computation. The latter
concept, introduced by Herb Simon, views rationality not as doing what is best, but as doing what is good
enough. Given these alternative concepts of rationality, it is important that we demarcate our inquiry as one
about ideal rationality. For a criticism that optimization implies rationality, see (Mongin 2000).
12p.8, (Ove Hansson 2005). Both the Allais and Ellsburg paradoxes may be seen as weakly falsifying the
theory.
13p.8, (Ove Hansson 2005)
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anything. The set S can represent states of the world or trees in a forest. It may be possible
to interpret Savage’s framework so that they Vt some phenomenon having nothing to do
with rational decision making. In order to view Savage framework as providing an account
of rational choice, we need an interpretation of the formal structure that connects the
phenomenon to the theory.
An interpretation of the formal structure associates some decision-theoretic conceptwith
the parts of Savage’s framework. In my presentation of BDT, I provided a fairly coarse-
grained interpretation. Elements of S were meant to represent states of the world and
elements of C represented the consequences of our actions. One can engage in a more de-
tailed analysis of these concepts and such an inquiry may prove to be illuminating. Savage
often described consequences as “states of the agent” to stress his subjective conception of
consequences.14 And he appealed to this more speciVc notion of a consequence to account
for some criticisms of his framework - namely his separation of belief and desire. Since
these concepts are meant to specify exactly what properties of our decision problems are
abstracted away for the purpose of our theorizing about rationality, the concepts provide
a bridge between the formal theory and the phenomenon of interest.
14This reveals Savage’s empiricist leaning. He writes, “to emphasize my notion that a consequence is
in the last analysis an experience.” However, this understanding of a consequence is not necessary. Savage
writes, “The insistence that consequences are experiences or sensations does not of course sweep all problems
aways. These terms are suggestive but they might defy deVnition.” p.79, (Drèze 1990)
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2 The Comprehensive Account of Bayesian Decision Theory
So far, the account of rational decision making presented by the Bayesian theory is fairly
clear. Bayesian decision theory is meant to explicate what counts as the best or optimal
choice. Since we are solely interested in instrumental rationality, only the DM’s own be-
liefs and desires are relevant for determining the evaluative framework on the basis of
which her choices are assessed. So the theory explicates a regulative ideal for a DM’s eval-
uative framework. That is, the theory speciVes what it means for a DM to have a coherent
standard of evaluation of her decision problem. This regulative ideal is articulated in two
logically equivalent ways, as the set of axioms that articulate a set of coherence constraints
governing the beliefs, desires, and preferences that make up the standard of evaluation and
as a class of models that represents every coherent set of beliefs, desires, and preferences
that one could have for that decision problem.
While this picture is accurate, it leaves some important questions about the normative
signiVcance of BDT unanswered. In particular, I want to inquire into the scope of these
coherence constraints. Which beliefs, desires, and preferences should be included in this
evaluative framework? And which beliefs, desires, and preferences are governed by the
regulative ideal? The Vrst response I want to consider is that of the Practical Bayesian.
The Practical Bayesian is silent and non-committal about the scope of theory, interpreting
the theory as providing an account of rational belief, desire, preference, and choice given a
decision model (i.e. given that the DM has appropriately described her decision problem in
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some way or other). By assuming that the decision model is given, the Practical Bayesian
may presume the DM has already determined which beliefs and desires are relevant for
evaluating her choices. Decision theory has nothing to say about how this is done and
why. As a result, the Practical Bayesian sees BDT as a somewhat restricted theory of
rational belief, desire, and preference on which BDT explicates what it is to be rational
relative to a predetermined framing of a decision problem. So, we can provide the following
characterization of the practical viewpoint:
Practical Bayesian: An agent is rational within a particular decision model if and only
if there is a probability, utility, and expected utility that respectively represents the
corresponding beliefs, desires, and preferences.
Bayesian decision theory is often presented from the point of view of the Practical
Bayesian. For the theory is typically presented with respect to well-deVned bets where
the decision problem is simply given to the agent and she must decide what is best in the
well-deVned problem. Since the Practical Bayesian limits herself to deVning rationality
in a decision model, she adopts a fairly restricted view of the normative signiVcance of
BDT. In contrast, philosophers have typically thought that BDT oUers us some insights
about rationality tout court and not rationality in a particular modeling of a decision prob-
lem. Moreover, I will argue below that the Practical Bayesian fails to answer an important
normative question about rational decision making.
In order to make sense of the broader normative signiVcance of the theory, let’s turn to
an alternative interpretation of BDT. It is natural to think that ideally all of a DM’s beliefs,
desires, preferences should be accounted for in specifying a coherent standard of evalu-
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ation. Since we are concerned with what is optimal, shouldn’t all of a DM’s desires be
accounted for in determining her ends and all of her beliefs be accounted for in determin-
ing which means are better or worse with respect to these ends? And if all of a DM’s beliefs
and desires ought to be accounted for, then DMs ideally ought to deliberate with respect to
an all-things-considered decision model. On this view, Bayesian decision theory speciVes
what counts as a coherent all-things-considered evaluative framework. This means that
Bayesian coherence constraints have scope over all the DM’s beliefs, desires, and prefer-
ences and only the DM’s beliefs, desires, and preferences. For if all of one’s beliefs, desires,
and preferences must be included in the standards of determining what is better or worse,
the coherence constraints articulated by the theory govern all of one’s beliefs, desires, and
preferences. Furthermore, if it is only one’s beliefs, desires, and preferences that determine
these evaluative standards, then coherence constraints govern only one’s beliefs, desires,
and preferences. Call the resulting view, the comprehensive account of rational deliberation.
ComprehensiveBayesian: An agent is rational if and only if there is a single probability,
utility, and expected utility function that respectively represents her beliefs, desires,
and preferences across every possible decision model.
One’s probabilities and utilities should then be used to evaluate the choices in any decision
problem such that for any acts A and B, one prefers act A to act B if and only if the expected
utility of A is greater than act B. Richard JeUrey has advocated a version of this view called
Radical Probabilism. He famously wrote, “it can be probabilities all the way down, to the
roots.”15 This means that beliefs should be probabilities and only probabilities.
15p.203 (JeUrey 1992)
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In order to assess the viability of the comprehensive account, we must provide an ap-
propriate interpretation of the formal theory. And naturally, Bayesian decision theory can
be comprehensive only if we can make sense of deliberating rationally in comprehensive
deliberations. So let us Vrst consider how to make sense of comprehensive deliberations in
the Bayesian framework. Since I described comprehensive deliberations as those in which
all of one’s beliefs and desires are accounted for, call these all-things-considered delibera-
tions.
To consider all of one’s beliefs, the DM must consider her beliefs about everything. In
Bayesian decision models, the DM considers her beliefs about the states of the world. Since
the set of states represents an exhaustive and exclusive set of answers to the questions
the DM has about the world, she must consider every conceivable way the world could
be. Only then would she be considering her beliefs about everything. Call a potential
answer to every conceivable question about the world a complete state description.16 Such a
description would provide a past, present, and future history of the world in all its detailed
glory. So, if she is to consider her beliefs about everything, we must conceive of the DM as
considering the set of complete state descriptions.
To consider all of her desires, the DM must consider her desires about everything that
can happen to her. In Bayesian decision models, the DM considers her desires about conse-
16It’s not obvious that complete descriptions even exist. For if the property of completeness is language
dependent, then one can always enrich the language. And if one can always enrich the language, then it’s not
clear that one can ever come to a description that is truly “complete”. See (Roy and Pacuit 2010). In addition
to these problems, we must also limit how rich the language can be or else a number of paradoxes will arise.
See (Putnam 1963), (Gaifman 1983), and (Gaifman 1999).
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quences. Since the set of consequences describes the relevant outcomes, she must consider
her desires with regards to the every conceivable outcome of her actions. Only then would
she be considering her desires about everything. Call an answer to every conceivable ques-
tion about what might happen to the DM, a complete consequence description. So, if she is
to consider all her desires, we must conceive of the DM as considering the set of complete
consequence descriptions.
Finally, since the comprehensive interpretation requires the DM to consider decision
models that appeal to the set of complete states and consequences, the acts over which the
DM articulates her preferences must be functions from the complete set of states to the
complete set of consequences. Call these acts, complete acts and the decision model that
appeals to complete acts, the complete decision model. A complete decision model is what
Savage called the grand world. So by viewing comprehensive deliberations as all-things-
considered deliberations and representing all-things-considered deliberations as delibera-
tions with respect to complete decision models, we have an interpretation of the decision
models that can capture comprehensive deliberation.
3 The Problem with the Comprehensive Account
The comprehensive account presents an attractive picture of ideal rationality. From con-
cerns about rational deliberation, the Bayesian is able to articulate coherence constraints
governing the whole of one’s beliefs, desires, and preferences. In doing so, BDT provides
an account of the necessary and suXcient conditions governing rational belief, desire, and
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preference. Unfortunately, the interpretation of BDT required to make sense of the com-
prehensive interpretation is untenable. While we have an interpretation of the formal
decision models that make sense of comprehensive deliberations, we must also ensure that
the prescriptions of the theory – the coherence constraints – make sense under this in-
terpretation. And it is here that the comprehensive interpretation of BDT fails. To show
this, I will Vrst articulate two pre-theoretic constraints that prescriptions of rational deci-
sion making must satisfy. The Vrst constraint, the intelligibility constraint, arises from the
maxim that ought implies can. The second constraint, the stability constraint, comes from
the intuitive idea that rational prescriptions should stay stable across consistent descrip-
tions of a decision problem. I will ague that the comprehensive interpretation of BDT fails
to meet both constraints.
3.1 Intelligibility
If the Bayesian account of rational deliberation applies to comprehensive deliberations,
then it should make sense to take the Bayesian story and apply it to decision problems
described by complete decision models. The Bayesian sees the DM as constructing a co-
herent evaluative framework by reWecting upon her attitudes in a decision model and using
the coherence constraints provided by the theory to guide her toward a rational equilib-
rium. Applying this picture to comprehensive deliberations, we must then imagine that
the DM considers her attitudes towards complete states, consequences, and acts. As she
reWects upon her attitudes, the regulative ideal can then be used to help the DM come to a
coherent set of beliefs, desires, and preferences.
3. The Problem with the Comprehensive Account 18
Unfortunately, when we apply the Bayesian account to comprehensive deliberations,
the prescriptions of the theory violate the maxim that ought implies can. The maxim
applies in this case since one ought to evaluate one’s choices coherently only if one can
evaluate one’s choices. However, one cannot evaluate complete acts. Human beings are
cognitively bounded creatures and we simply cannot reWect and consider how strongly
we believe that the world was, is, and will be as a complete state description describes.
Similarly, we cannot simply reWect and see how strongly we desire the experience referred
to by a complete consequence description. After all, we cannot grasp complete descrip-
tions. Such a task is problematic even in our idealized scenario for we have only idealized
the DM’s resources and not her cognitive capacities. Under the idealization, the DM may
have the memory resources to store a complete state or consequence description, but such
resources don’t help her identify what to think or feel with regards to them. Call intelligi-
ble propositions those propositions that could be actual contents of human thought. The
simple point is that the propositions used to pick out complete states and consequences
are so complex that they cannot be actual contents of human thought. Therefore, they are
unintelligible.17
The argument that unintelligibility undermines normativity is quite simple.
17My claim that complete descriptions are unintelligible or ungraspable is distinct from David Lewis claim
that there are unthinkable propositions (c.f. p.106-108, (Lewis 2001)). His claim is that if the content of a
thought is determined by its functional role, then there are not enough functional roles to go around. There
will be some propositions - some set of possible worlds - for which there is no corresponding functional role
that allow them to be the contents of thought. Therefore, some propositions will be in principle unintelligible
- even for cognitively unbounded creatures. I am making the banal claim that bounded rational creatures
cannot grasp propositions of suXcient complexity because they cannot diUerentiate one extremely complex
proposition from another.
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1. If a decision model is unintelligible, then the DM has no opinions or attitudes about
the states, consequences, and acts deVned in that model.
2. The demand for coherence applies if and only if there are opinions and attitudes that
the DM must make coherent.
3. Therefore, if a decision model is unintelligible, then the demands for coherence do
not apply.
The Vrst premise simply states what human DMs cannot do. For one can only have
attitudes about propositions one can grasp. Consider the following analogy. Suppose I
ask you to identify whether one or another sound is more pleasant, but the sounds are at
such a high frequency that you are unable to hear them. I may insist that you state your
opinion, but your response would reveal nothing because you simply do not and cannot
have an opinion in the matter. Similarly, presented with a decision problem that you could
not comprehend, you may state your opinions but such assertions would fail to express
any real judgment. There would have been no meaningful opinions to express in the Vrst
place.
The second premise lays out one interpretation of the ought implies can maxim by
specifying the circumstances in which the theory’s principles have their normative force.
The normative force of Bayesian coherence constraints is pragmatic in the sense that it
speciVes guidelines that govern some activity. In this case, it speciVes what it means to
have a coherent evalutive framework when one asesses a set of choices. This evaluative
framework is supposed to be coherent by one’s own lights. And since our beliefs determine
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the standards for which means are better or worse and our desires determine the standards
for which outcomes are better or worse, it is imperative that we develop a coherent set of
beliefs and desires. However, the demand for coherence makes sense just in those cases
where one has some beliefs and desires to start with. Otherwise, there will be no identiV-
able better or worse and if there is no identiVable better or worse, the pragmatic demand
for coherent evaluation does not make any sense.
To use the sound analogy again, suppose I demand that your judgments about the
pleasantness of sounds be transitive. If sound A is more pleasant than sound B and sound
B more pleasant than sound C, then one should judge that sound A is more pleasant than
sound C. However, if you cannot hear any of the sounds, the demand that your judgments
be transitive is empty since no such judgments could possibly be made. Similarly, we
should evaluate our choices coherently just in case we can and do evaluate our choices.
This just means that the demands for coherence make sense if and only if there are some
attitudes about the decision problem at hand.
We may also replace the second premise with a weaker interpretation of the ought
implies can maxim. For we may wish to retain the normativity of the decision-theoretic
prescriptions in complete decision models and the pragmatic demand for coherent evalua-
tion even if no evaluations can be made. Nevertheless, we can merely point out that there
are prescriptions only in cases where we can have some opinions. The second premise
will state that if there are no attitudes and opinions, the demand for coherence places no
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constraints on the DM’s beliefs, desires, or preferences.18
Consider the transitivity of preferences. This demand only constrains one’s attitudes
when there are at least two preferences. However, humans cannot have preferences about
complete acts. So while the principle of transitivity may retain its normative force, it can
never make any prescriptions about how one should evaluate a set of choices in complete
decision models. Since Bayesian rationality involves mere coherence and there are no
attitudes about complete states, consequences, and acts, Bayesian rationality makes no de-
mands on the DM’s beliefs, desires, and preferences in all-things-considered deliberation.
On the basis of the weaker claim, we conclude that if the decision model is unintelligible,
the coherence constraints never oUer any prescriptions.19 If principles of rationality do not
actually make prescriptions in comprehensive decision problems, then it makes no sense
to say that a cognitively bounded DM deliberated rationally or irrationally.
The comprehensive account of Bayesian decision theory supposes that the theory con-
strains all of one’s beliefs and desires because it imagines that the theory places constraints
on one’s attitudes in comprehensive deliberations and comprehensive deliberations were
understood as all-things-considered – where the DM describes her decision problem with
18The demand for a complete set of preferences is diUerent, but this demand is typically justiVed for the
reason that one ought to reWect on all the attitudes that are relevant to the decision problem. By reWecting on
all the attitudes that are relevant, one guards against arbitrary evaluations. This justiVcation is undermined
in the comprehensive case for there can be nothing but arbitrary evaluations.
19The same point can be put in a much diUerent way. The theory speciVes a class of models of rational
decision making. In order for the theory to make actual prescriptions, then given the right inputs we should
be able to identify a model of rational decision making for that problem. However, when we use complete
decision models, we can’t supply any inputs so we can’t identify a particular model of rational choice and no
prescriptions are made. Restricting the theory to intelligible choice models simply identiVes the situations
for which there are the appropriate inputs. Only when we have the appropriate inputs do we have an output.
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a complete decision model. Rationality has nothing to say about how human DM’s ought
to deliberate in complete models. Therefore, Bayesian coherence constraints cannot apply
to the totality of a DM’s beliefs, desires, and preferences.
Savage was in agreement that the demands of rationality did not apply in grand worlds
(i.e. complete decision models). He thought that the principle of rational choice would
be preposterous if “carried to extremes”. Writing about grand world decision making, he
wrote this about the principles of rational choice.
This is utterly ridiculous. . . because the task implied in making such a decision
is not even remotely resembled by human possibility. It is even utterly beyond
our power to plan a picnic or to play a game of chess in accordance with the
principle, even when the world of states and the set of available acts to be
envisaged are artiVcially reduced to the narrowest reasonable limits.20
3.2 SuXciently Detailed Models and ReVnement Stability
While the unintelligibility of complete states, consequences, and acts is problematic, a
reply is available to the defender of the comprehensive account. He can simply reject
the assumption that comprehensive deliberation requires complete decision models. This
rejection is based upon the simplicity of our everyday deliberations. While we usually
describe our decision problems quite simply, we can always complicate our deliberations
by accounting for answers to previously unconsidered questions about the way the world
might be or what might happen to us. While these simpliVcations are typically justiVed for
pragmatic cost-beneVt (i.e. economic) reasons, there may also be non-pragmatic reasons
20p.16, (Savage 1972)
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for our simpliVcations. We often use simple decision models because additional details are
irrelevant to our deliberations. For example, when asked to bet on a coin Wip, I need not
consider what color the coin might be because those details are irrelevant to what choice I
ought to make. Savage oUered a similar reply, stating that the principles of rational choice
applied by “artiVcially conVning attention to so small a world that the [principle] can be
applied there.”21
So, the intuition is that we must consider only what is relevant to a deliberation and
if we consider all that is relevant, we are still being comprehensive. Call a decision model
which has identiVed everything of relevance a suXciently detailed model. In Savage’s ter-
minology, suXciently detailed models are worlds. If we deliberate with respect to a suf-
Vciently detailed model, then the consideration of additional details should not matter to
our deliberation. So the defender of the comprehensive account may propose that compre-
hensive deliberations can be captured by a suXciently detail model. So long as this model
is intelligible and really does capture everything of relevance, our decision-theoretic prin-
ciples will oUer rational guidelines in comprehensive deliberations. We can use this notion
of an intelligible and suXciently detailed model as a way to explicate what Savage called
small worlds. And much of my discussion in what follows can be understood as a way of
trying to make sense of what small worlds are and how we can be justiVed in viewing a
decision model as a small world.
In order to explicate what a suXciently detailed model is, some terminology is needed.
21p.16, (Savage 1972)
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First, the concept of reVnement will be introduced to articulate what it is to consider more
detail and then the concept of stability, to articulate what it is for additional details to
be irrelevant. On the basis of these notions, we can describe the following property of
suXciently detailed models.
Refinement Stability: A decision model is suXciently detailed if and only if rational
beliefs, desires, and preferences stay stable under all subsequent reVnements of that
model.
To introduce the concepts of stability and reVnement, let’s consider a speciVc example.
Carl has always dreamed about climbing Mount Everest and snorkeling in the Maldives.
Recently, he has comes across a small inheritance that is large enough to Vnance a trip
to the Maldives, but not large enough to Vnance a Mount Everest expedition. A trusted
friend then oUers him an investment opportunity. If the investment works out, Carl would
have the resources to go to Everest. So Carl is faced with the following two choices. He
can invest his small inheritance for a good chance at traveling to Everest or he can use the
inheritance to go to the Maldives. As he considers his decision problem, let’s suppose that






Money Trip to Everest No Trip
Trip to
Maldives
Trip to Maldives Trip to Maldives
Table 1.2: Carl’s Simple Decision Model
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In this simple model, Carl considers a set of two states. Either the potential investment
opportunity will work out so that he can Vnance his Everest expedition or he will be stuck
with no money at home. In addition, the only consequences under consideration are those
of taking a trip to Everest, to the Maldives, or to nowhere at all.
Now, Carl can always describe his decision problem in a more Vne-grained way. In
doing so, Carl reVnes his decision problem. Let’s specify what it is to reVne or to con-
sider more detail in the decision model. A decision model is deVned by a set of states,
consequences, and choices. Since the set of states and consequences are an exhaustive and
exclusive set of answers to questions about the ways the world could be and what could
happen to the DM, one reVnes a decision model by enlarging the set of questions the DM
asks about the way the world is and about what might happen to her. In the simple model,
Carl asks whether the investment will work and considers the yes and no answers. Now
suppose that Carl decides to consider more in his deliberation and works with a more Vne-
grained decision model. He might do so by asking whether the capital markets will grow
resulting in a bull market and considers only the yes and no answers. In order to arrive
at a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of states, the reVned decision model will
take each combination of answers as elements in the set of states (Table 1.3):
This set of states is a reVnement because it supplies reVned descriptions under which
the states of the simple model would be true. In the reVned model, the coarse-grained
state in which the investment works out can occur in two more Vne-grained ways, the
investment works out and there’s a bull market and the investment works out and there is




























Table 1.3: Carl’s ReVned Decision Model 1
no bull market. States of the simple model always correspond to a union of distinct states
in the reVned model.
The reVnement of consequences works diUerently. To illustrate, let’s return to Carl’s
simple model. Just as he does in the previous case, Carl may reVne the consequences by
asking another question. This time, he asks an additional question about what may happen
to him. Suppose he asks whether he will reach the summit of Everest. By doing so, he not
only considers the consequence of taking a trip, but also considers the consequences of
reaching or not reaching the summit.
Unlike the reVnement of states, we cannot simply take every combination of answers
to produce the reVned set of consequences. First, the additional concern aUects only one of
the consequences, taking a trip to Everest. Second, while coarse-grained consequences
are similar to coarse-grained states in that they can be described to occur in multiple
Vne-grained ways, the relationship between coarse-grained consequences and Vne-grained
consequences diUers from the relationship between coarse-grained states and Vne-grained
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states. Rather than treat coarse-grained consequence as a union of the reVned conse-
quences, we will have to treat the coarse-grained consequence of taking a trip to Everest
as an act in the reVned model. The reason for this is that the occurrence of each Vne-
grained consequence will depend upon what the world is like. For example, whether a trip
to Everest results in a climb to the top or not depends upon nature’s cooperation. And
good weather is necessary to reach the summit of Everest. So when Carl reVnes the conse-
quence of taking a trip to Everest to account for whether he reaches the summit, Carl must
view it as a restricted act. This act must specify all the circumstances under which a trip to
Everest will result in reaching the summit and all the circumstances under which traveling
to Everest will not result in reaching the summit. For simplicity, let’s suppose that the con-
sequence of taking a trip to Everest corresponds with the restricted act where he reaches
the summit if the weather is good and he doesn’t reach the summit if the weather is bad.
ReVnements of consequences thereby require a reVnement of both the consequences and
states. Given this dual reVnement, Carl arrives at the following reVned decision model
(Table 1.4).
Both models are reVnements of Carl’s simple model. More generally, whenever the
states, consequences, or both are reVned, the resulting model is a reVnement of the simpler
one. To put it formally,22
22I am indebted to John Collins for helping me to clarify the deVnition of reVnement stability.






























Table 1.4: Carl’s ReVned Decision Model 2
DeVnition: M ′ = 〈S ′, C ′,F ′〉 is a reVnement of M = 〈S,C,F 〉 when there is a map
R such that
1. R maps each coarse-grained state s ∈ S to a corresponding Vne-grained event
R(s) = e′ ⊆ S ′ in such a way that:
(a) If s1, s2 ∈ S and s1 6= s2 then R(s1) ∩R(s2) = 0.
(b)
⋃
s∈S R(S) = S
′.
2. R maps each coarse-grained consequence c ∈ C to some unique Vne-grained act
R(c) = f ′ ∈ F ′
An important consequence of the reVnement relation is that every act in the coarse-grained
model corresponds to a unique act in the Vne-grained model. That is, for every f ∈ F
there corresponds some unique R(f) = f ′ ∈ F ′.23
23To show this, we must show which f ′ ∈ F each f ∈ F corresponds to. This means that for each s′ ∈ S′,
we need to identify which Vne-grained consequence f ′ assigns to s′. By (1a) and (1b), for each s′ ∈ S′ there
corresponds a unique s ∈ S such that s′ ∈ R(s). So if f(s) = c, then given (2), the Vne-grained act that
corresponds with Vne-grained consequence c is R(c) ∈ F ′ and we may then deVne f ′(s′) to be [R(c)](s′).
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Now, if Carl’s simple model is suXciently detailed, then the evaluation of his decision
problem should be unaUected by any subsequent reVnement. We can identify two types
of reVnement stability but Vrst we must be a bit more careful about what it means to
reVne a decision model. When Carl reVnes his current decision problem, he considers a
more detailed description of the way the world could be; in particular, he considers those
aspects of the world that he has no control over. This more detailed considertation will
lead to a reVnment of his decision model that depends upon two factors:
1. The new set of possible consequences that the DM now thinks is relevant to her
decision problem given the revised set of states.
2. The particular way that the DM is disposed to map the old coarse-grained conse-
quence to the new Vne-grained acts.
It will be assumed that for each reVnement of the set of states, there is some unique way
that the DM will reVne the rest of her decision problem via these two steps. Call a reVne-
ment obtained in this way a faithful reVnement. And I will assume that all the reVnements
I am considering are faithful reVnements.
So if Carl’s preferences are stable across all faithful reVnments, then if he prefers to
invest the money in the simple model (Table 1.2), he will also prefer the investment in both
reVned models (Tables 1.3 and 1.4). And if his preferences in the simple model are stable,
then the newly considered states and consequences are irrelevant to his deliberation. So we
can use the preferences in the simple model to make our choices in any faithful reVnement.
We can now state this property of reVnement stability in a precise manner.
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Weak Refinement Stability: M is a suXciently detailed model and weakly stable if
and only if for every faithful reVnementR of M and for every pair of coarse-grained
acts f, g ∈M
f  g ⇔ R(f)  R(g)
We call this weak reVnement stability because there is a stronger stability property. In
addition to the requirement that preferences be stable across reVnements, we may also
require that beliefs and desires be stable as well. It is well-known that diUerent coherent
descriptions of a decision problem may result in diUerent probability and utility functions
even though preferences remain Vxed.24 The stability of beliefs and desires entails the
stability of preferences, but the converse does not hold.
The probabilities and utilities in the simple model are deVned over more coarse-grained
states and consequences so they say nothing about each individual state and consequence
in the reVned decision model. So coherence between the probability and utility functions
across reVnements must mean that the probability and utility functions in both the simple
and reVned model should be numerically identical with respect to only the set of states and
consequences in the simple model.
Strong Refinement Stability: M = 〈S,C,F 〉 is a suXciently detailed model and
strongly stable if and only if for every faithful reVnementR ofM toM ′ = 〈S ′, C ′,F ′〉
and every s ∈ S and c ∈ C




where P, U are probability and utility functions that represent the DM’s preferences
in M and P ′, U ′ are the corresponding functions in M ′.
24See (Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane 1999) and (Shafer 1986a)
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The stability of suXciently detailed models oUers an alternative way to make sense of
the comprehensive Bayesian account. No longer do we need to appeal to complete models.
If we can identify a suXciently detailed model that is intelligible, then we can use this
model to describe everything that is relevant to an agent’s deliberation. The stability of
rational attitudes in a suXciently detailed model then plays an important role in defending
the comprehensive account. For this property can be used to resolve the problem arising
from the unintelligibilty of complete models. The problem was that the DM had no atti-
tudes with respect to complete states, consequences, and acts. However, if we can identify
a suXciently detailed model for use in comprehensive deliberations, then the stability of
attitudes in the suXciently detail model will allow us to identify some of the DM’s atti-
tudes in the complete model. This is important because it allows human decision makers
to adhere to the demand that one’s attitudes and judgments be coherent in a complete
model. To identify these attitudes, we simply appeal to the fact that the complete model
is the model arrived at when we faithfully reVne indeVnitely. Given weak stability, a set
of rational preferences in a suXciently detailed model determines the set of rational pref-
erences in the complete model. Given strong stability, a set of rational beliefs and desires
in a suXciently detailed model determines a subset of rational beliefs and desires in the
complete model. For example, since a coarse-grained state corresponds to an event in any
reVned set of states, then strong reVnement stability means that the probability of every
coarse-grained state just is the probability of the corresponding event in the algebra over
the complete set of states. In either case, since we are able to identify some of our attitudes
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in the complete model, some of the problems arising from intelligibility can be resolved.
Using our attitudes in a suXciently detailed model to identify our attitudes in the com-
plete model is simply an instance of a more general piecemeal strategy. The strategy
is to identify beliefs and desires about complex propositions in virtue of beliefs and desires
about simpler propositions. That way, we can circumvent the unintelligibility of complete
descriptions by appealing to our beliefs, desires, and preferences about simpler, intelligible
propositions.
Finally, reVnement stability can be used to articulate a pre-theoretic constraint on our
theories of rational deliberation. For there are multiple ways to describe a decision prob-
lem. In particular, one can describe a problem in a more or less Vne-grained way. However,
insofar as these descriptions are consistent with one another, rationality should not allow
a DM to have distinct incoherent attitudes across the various decision models. Since these
decision models oUer diUerent but consistent descriptions of the same decision problem,
rationality demands that our judgments remain coherent. Weak reVnement stability and
strong reVnement stability oUer two ways of articulating this constraint. We can ensure
that a DM has coherent attitudes across more or less Vne-grained ways of describing a
decision problem by demanding that the DM’s attitudes be stable across reVnements and a
DM’s attitudes are stable if and only if she deliberates in suXciently detailed models.
As noted earlier, this general constraint on rational decision making is equivalent to
Savage’s demand that rational decision making happen with respect to small world – intel-
ligible and suXciently detailed decision models. Savage defended the restriction to worlds
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– suXciently detailed models – by restricting the phenomenon that the theory was meant
to account for. He proposed that rational decision making concerns deliberations in which
the DM simply looks before she leaps. Savage contrasted the ‘look before you leap’ prin-
ciple as one of two principles of decision making. The other being the principle that you
‘cross each bridge when you come to it’. He proposed that the
‘Look before you leap’ principle is. . . the proper subject of our further discus-
sion, because to cross one’s bridges when one comes to them means to attack
relatively simple problems of decision by artiVcially conVning attention to so
small a world that the ‘Look before you leap’ principle can be applied there...In
view of the ‘Look before you leap’ principle, acts and decision, like events, are
timeless. The person decides ‘now’ once for all; there is nothing for him to
wait for, because his one decision provides for all contingencies.25
Therefore, every interpretation of Bayesian decision theory must ensure that DMs deliber-
ate with respect to suXciently detailed models. So a satisfactory interpretation must show
that there is some plausible account of why the DM is justiVed in viewing the chosen de-
cision model as a small world. It is for this reason that the Practical Bayesian’s account is
incomplete.
3.3 The Failure of the Comprehensive Account
The comprehensive account meets both the intelligibility and stability constraint only if
decision models can be both intelligible and suXciently detailed. Unfortunately, I will
argue that this condition cannot be met which means that from the comprehensive point
of view, there are no small worlds. As a result, the comprehensive account of rational
25p. 16, (Savage 1972)
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deliberation is not a viable account of rational deliberation.
The notion of a suXciently detailed model was used to distinguish two types of mod-
els. The types of models needed to make sense of the comprehensive interpretation were
models that identiVed everything that was relevant to a deliberation. These are called
comprehensive models. And on the comprehensive account of rational deliberation, every
belief, desire, and preference was of potential relevance. The initial proposal was to use
complete decision models as a way of understanding comprehensive models. And since
complete models describe everything that one can consider in a deliberation, everything
that is potentially relevant is actually taken into account. But we rejected this proposal
because it failed to meet the intelligibility constraint. Next, we turned to intelligible and
suXciently detailed models to explicate the notion of a comprehensive model. These intel-
ligible and suXciently detailed models were fairly simple decision models that are meant
to incorporate all and only the beliefs and desires that are of actual relevance to one’s de-
liberation. So if the comprehensive interpretation is to be a valid, there must be suXciently
details models that are intelligible and capture everything of actual relevance.
The problem I want to pose for the comprehensive interpretation arises from a simple
intuition. The intuition is that under the right circumstances and under the assumption
that Strong Stability is a rational constraint almost everything that could be relevant is
actually relevant. If this intuition is right, then the only suXciently detailed model that
captures everything of relevance is the complete model. To capture everything of rele-
vance, one must consider everything (or at least one must consider more than is humanly
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possible). And since complete models are unintelligible, the principles of rational choice
do not apply for comprehensive deliberations.
In order to assess this intuition, consider the instability of our attitudes in simple in-
telligible models. Our attitudes in many simple models fail to exhibit reVnement stability
because these simple models fail to account for all that is relevant to a decision problem.
Since these models fail to be suXciently detailed, the reVnements that demonstrate the
instability of our attitudes must be accounted for. Now suppose that from the comprehen-
sive perspective, every intelligible model turns out to be unstable. We would then have to
constantly reVne these decision models to account for all that is relevant. At some point,
this continual process of reVnement will undermine the intelligibility of the models we are
considering. My argument will mimic a mathematical proof by induction by showing that
for every arbitrarily chosen intelligible model, that model fails to be suXciently detailed.
To show this, let us Vrst consider the instability of Carl’s simple decision model (Table
1.2) and then identify the general sources of instability so that they apply to any arbitrary
intelligible model. In the simplest scenario, Carl only considers whether the investment
oUered to him would provide him with the resources to Vnance a trip to Everest. Supposing
that Carl prefers the investment to theMaldives trip, the model is suXciently detailed if and
only if there is no reVnement for which Carl would alter his beliefs, desires, or preferences.
However, in both of the reVnements we considered, it is easy to see why Carl might change
his mind. When considering the stock market as he does in (Table 1.3), Carl may realize
that the growth of the capital markets is correlated with the success of the investment.
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He may thereby alter his beliefs (probabilities) about the coarse-grained states, where the
investment is either a success or failure. Moreover, if he is genuinely pessimistic of the
market’s growth, he may realize that the risk is too great and Wip his preferences.
When considering the consequence of traveling to Everest but not reaching the top
as he does in (Table 1.4), Carl may realize that what he really cares about is standing on
the summit of Everest. Perhaps going but not reaching the top would be worse than not
going. By accounting for these new consequences, Carl’s desire (utility) for the previously
considered consequence of taking a trip to Everest, may be reduced. Moreover, this shift in
his desires may be large enough that he may now prefer the trip to the Maldives over the
investment opportunity.
Since Carl’s simple decision model lacks stability, these additional states and conse-
quences are relevant and must be accounted for. However, even if we accounted for both
reVnements, we are not likely to arrive at a suXciently detailed model. What if Carl con-
siders the possibility that he will run into Vnancial troubles and have to spend the invested
money or considers the eUects frostbite would have on the rest of his life. Accounting for
these possibilities may alter Carl’s beliefs, desires, and preferences for the same reasons
that the previous reVnements did.
The sources of instability present in Carl’s simple models seem completely general and
every model seems to be susceptible to instability for the similar reasons. Since intelligible
models are incomplete, there are plenty of unaccounted for possibilities and consequences.
Beliefs in intelligible models will always be prone to instability because one can always
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identify unaccounted possibilities whose likelihood is correlated with the previously con-
sidered set of states. Changes in the capital markets is correlated with the success of the
investment opportunity and the possibility of future Vnancial trouble is correlated with
having the money to spend on a trip to Everest, which is part of what it means for the
investment to be a success. If there’s a greater than 50% chance of a bull market and this
is positively correlated with investment success, then Carl’s belief in the success of the
investment will be strenghtened. If there’s a less than 50% chance of a bull market, and
this is negatively correlated with investment success, the Carl’s belief in the success of the
investment will be weakened. So long as there are possibilities and dependencies that were
previously unaccounted for, then we can always Vnd a way to destabilize our beliefs.26 So
the sources of belief instability seem to be ever present for any intelligible set of states.
Our desires are also prone to instability for a variety of reasons. I shall focus on two
of the most important reasons. In general, our desire to experience some or other con-
sequence arises from what we value and one source of instability comes from the values
we use to assess the consequences. When we evaluate a set of consequences, some values
may be unaccounted for. By reVning the consequences or states, unaccounted values may
become salient and aUect our evaluations. Carl may have Vrst assessed the consequence of
traveling to Mount Everest only in virtue of the desire to travel to Mount Everest. How-
ever, when the possibility of failing to reach the summit is considered, new values may
become salient. For instance, he may disvalue failure and while traveling to Everest may
26In fact, as we consider a more Vne-grained set of states, it will become easier and easier to Vnd possibil-
ities that are correlated in the right way.
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be desirable, failing may be so undesirable to Carl that the chance of traveling to Everest
but not making it to the top could reduce the overall desirability of traveling to Everest.27
Another source of instability concerns the ways that a DM assesses trade-oUs between
his values. Suppose that Carl values in equal measure adventure and success and he uses
both values to assess the consequence of taking a trip to Everest. When Carl reVnes his
decision problem to consider the possibility of reaching or not reaching the summit, his
evaluation of taking the trip may change. What’s important to note is that this change may
arise even if no additional values are considered. When the possibility of failure comes to
light, failure may become much more salient to Carl and he may thereby alter the trade-
oUs he’s willing to make between the two values. Whereas he valued them equally before,
he may now value success much more than adventure and he may also disvalue failure
more than before. Given the shift in the trade-oUs he would be willing to make, even a
small chance of failure may be enough to aUect his general desire to take a trip to Everest.
Since these three sources of instability are completely general, they can be used to
demonstrate the instability of our beliefs, desires, and preference in any intelligible deci-
sion model. Our original intuition was that everything that could be relevant was relevant.
And while not every state and consequence may be relevant, there appear to be enough
27The salience of new values is ubiquitous once we recognize the role of instrumental values. If climbing
Mount Everest is intrinsically valuable, then in virtue of our intrinsic value for this outcome, a large set
of instrumental values may be potentially salient. These additional values may become relevant once their
instrumental role matters to the deliberation. The structure of reVnement may help us to understand how
values change over reVnements. When considered as a consequences, we are acting as if everything is
intrinsically valuable. However, when one reVnes the decision problem, consequences are viewed as acts.
However, our value for acts is simply a type of instrumental value. This disparity may help to account for
the change in values.
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of them that must be considered such that no intelligible model will count as suXciently
detailed.28 Therefore, from the comprehensive point of view where every belief, desire,
and preference could be relevant, there are no small worlds. There are no decision mod-
els that account for everything of relevance so there are no decision models that are both
intelligible and suXciently detailed.
4 The Problem with the Comprehensive Bayesian
Before I turn to provide an alternative picture of rational deliberation, I hope to clarify
what is at the heart of the problem with the comprehensive account of rational deliber-
ation. The main point is that comprehensive deliberation is not something humans can
engage in. However, we must be careful to identify why the complexity of comprehensive
decision making causes problems for our normative theory. It is crucial to my argument
that the problem with comprehensive decision making is not the computational complex-
ity involved in computing what is optimal. Rather, the problem arises from the complexity
of the descriptions that DMs need to reWect upon in order to deVne a coherent standard of
better or worse. Since DMs cannot grasp such descriptions, there cannot be any standard
of evaluation. That is, the problem is not an epistemological one concerning whether or
not we can ever know what is optimal. The problem is an ontological one. There is no
28As John Collins pointed out to me, a grasp of the reVned model cannot be necessary to determine that the
coarse-grained model is unstable. However, we can identify a model as unstable even if we can’t completely
grasp the reVned model. All we need to know is that an unaccounted possibility or consequence has the
right relationship with the previously considered possibilities and consequences. The newly considered
possibilities must be probabilistically dependent and the newly considered consequences must have some
bearing on how we evaluate the previously considered consequences. We can do this without having to
grasp the reVned set of states and consequences.
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comprehensive standard of better or worse.
To make clear exactly what this diUerence amounts to, reconsider the problem that
arose from the unintelligibilty of complete models. Rational deliberation requires the DM
to identify the attitudes she has about her decision problem. However, if comprehen-
sive deliberation requires the DM to reWect upon her attitudes about complete acts, then
no such attitudes could be identiVed and no rational prescriptions could be made. The
piecemeal strategy attempts to show how to engage in comprehensive deliberation on the
basis of simpler models. And we attempted to show that we could identify rational at-
titudes over complete acts by algorithmically identifying our attitudes about very Vnely
described states, consequences, and acts in virtue of our beliefs, desires, and preferences
about coarsely described states, consequences, and acts. The particular stability algorithm
we appealed to was simple. By identifying those beliefs, desires, and preferences that
stayed stable through reVnement, the hope was that we could identify a set of beliefs, de-
sires, and preferences such that for any unconsidered detail, these attitudes would remain
stable. This provided one way to identify some of our beliefs, desires, and preferences in
the complete decision model.
The problem is that our beliefs and desires do not necessarily remain coherent as we
consider more and more detail. This means that our beliefs and desires in Vne-grained
models cannot be built up out of beliefs and desires in coarse-grained models. For in-
stance, how strongly we believe P ∧ Q cannot always be derived from how strongly we
believe P and how strongly we believe Q. If P and Q are probabilistically correlated, we
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must consider how likely it is that P given Q.29 Therefore, there is no way to algorithmi-
cally construct our beliefs, desires, and preferences in complete models on the basis of our
beliefs, desires, and preferences in simpler models.
The failure of the piecemeal strategy makes clear that the problem with the compre-
hensive account is distinct from the complexity of computing an optimal solution. The
optimal strategy in chess is computable even though the algorithms that compute such
strategies are computationally complex. So even though there is an optimal chess strategy,
the complexity involved makes the optimal strategy unknowable.30 In contrast, there is
no algorithm for determining either our beliefs or desires with respect to complete states
and consequence so there is no way to determine the optimal solutions for comprehensive
decision problems. Evaluative standards come from our beliefs, desires, and preferences
and in comprehensive decision making, these standards are indeterminate because of the
complexity of the descriptions and the limited cognitive capacities of human beings. Our
discussion has shown that identifying the standards that govern rational comprehensive
deliberation requires direct reWection upon extremely complex propositions. Because of
our limited cognitive capacities, we cannot grasp such propositions and as a result, there
are no determinate standards. Therefore, the complexity of comprehensive decision mak-
29As we consider more detail, our beliefs shift around in such a way that no function can represent how
they change across reVnements. We may demand coherence between our belief such that one’s degree of
belief that P is equivalent to the degree of belief that (P ∧ Q) ∨ (P ∧ ¬Q). However, coherence allows the
agent to set the left-side equal to the right or the right-side equal to the left. To suppose that the right side
must be set equal to the left is to presuppose that Q is irrelevant. Coherence alone does not provide any
algorithm to determine our beliefs in the complete model.
30Here I am following those who talk of the optimal solutions to NP-hard problems as unknowable.
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ing is problematic not because it makes it impossible to know what is best, but because it
makes it impossible to specify what is better or worse. Since comprehensive deliberation
is arational for bounded human agents, a viable account of rational deliberation must take
this boundedness into account.
In hopes of shedding some light on this somewhat subtle claim, let me conclude by
putting the point a bit diUerently using the metaphor of outsourcing. When we deliberate,
there is much that we can outsource, but we cannot outsource our opinions and judgments.
And so long as we have the necessary judgments, we can then turn to various resources
to compute an optimal solution. However, if my argument is correct, then the problematic
complexity of comprehensive deliberations is at the level of making judgments. Since these
cannot be outsourced, there is no comprehensive rational ideal from which any rational




1 The Local Bayesian
By undermining the comprehensive interpretation, we reject the view that Bayesian deci-
sion theory articulates what it means for all of one’s beliefs, desires, and preferences to be
rational. As a result, the scope of Bayesian coherence constraints must be restricted to a
subset of the DM’s beliefs, desires, and preferences. In addition, we noted that rational at-
titudes should remain stable across reVnements of a decision model, which is equivalent to
the demand that a DM deliberate with respect to suXciently detailed models. This leaves
us with a local account of rational deliberation.
Local Bayesian: For any decision problem, an agent is rational if and only if the be-
liefs, desires, and preferences that are deemed relevant are representable by a stable
probability, utility, and expected utility function.
Even though we have carved out a logical space for the local account, some important
details are missing. If we demand the use of suXciently detailed models, the subset of
beliefs and desires that the DM takes into account are all that is relevant to her decision
problem. But why should a chosen decision model be viewed as suXciently detailed?
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In what sense would that model capture everything of relevance? These questions fall
squarely within our normative concerns and to answer them, we must provide an account
of what justiVes the DM’s use of a particular decision model.1
Before we turn to address these questions, let us clarify the aims of our inquiry. First
and foremost, we will not be interested in the practical question of how to apply BDT in
every particular circumstance. I am in complete agreement with Savage when he writes,
I believe, and examples have conVrmed, that decision situations can be usefully
structured in terms of consequences, states, and acts in such a way that the
postulates of [Foundations of Statistics] are satisVed. Just how to do that seems
to be an art for which I can give no prescription and for which it is perhaps
unreasonable to expect one.2
So we are not concerned to identify principles that ensure a connection between theory
and practice. Rather, the focus will be on a question that is wholly within the scope of our
normative theorizing about rational choice. DMs do not arbitrarily decide on a decision
model. They often have good reasons for restricting their decision problems in the ways
that they do. So when I ask how a DM chooses a decision model, I am asking the normative
question of how a DM can in theory justify the use of a decision model as a suXciently
1The discussion here parallels discussions about models of data in the empirical sciences. (Suppes 1962)
argue for the importance of these models for understanding scientiVc theories. The observable data is not
always presented in a way to Vt with the theory. One must engage in some form of reasoning to go from
the observable data to a model of the data. Suppes argues that a complete understanding of science requires
an understanding of how the various models are used and constructed. He argues that there is a hierarchy
of models involved in the construction of scientiVc theories and we must understand their connections. I
am making the same exact point with respect to our normative theorizing. Decisions problems do not come
to us represented in a Bayesian decision model. It is crucial to our understanding of the general normative
theory that we understand the reasoning that goes behind the selection of a decision model. Here the model
of the “data” is a decision model of a decision problem.
2p.80, (Drèze 1990)
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detailed one.
This question is often set aside. Those who defend the normative interpretation of BDT
are often content to assume that viability of the comprehensive account or to adopt the
minimal commitments of the Practical Bayesian. By providing an explicit argument against
the comprehensive account, I hope to have challenged the pretense that BDT provides an
account of all-things-considered rationality or an account of rational belief, desire, and
preference that is independent of the way an inquiry or deliberation is framed. Moreover,
if these normative questions must be answered, then the practical account is incomplete.
Thus, given the problems with the comprehensive and practical accounts, the local account
will oUer a clear alternative.
2 The Constructive Approach to Decision Making
To answer the question of how and why DMs construct their decision models in the way
they do, I will appeal to a view of deliberation that departs in an important way from the
standard view. On the standard view, the DM has a pre-existing set of beliefs and desires
that she uses to evaluate a set of choices and then chooses one. By asking how the DM
identiVes what counts as relevant, we have already begun to depart from the standard view.
For we are supposing that the DM must Vrst identify which possibilities matter for her de-
liberation. And we can also situate this type of inquiry within a thoroughgoing constructive
view of rational decision making to develop a very diUerent picture of deliberation.
On the constructive view, there is much more constructive work that the DM engages
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in when she deliberates. In particular, many researchers have adopted a constructive view
of preferences. Fischer et al. write that from the point of view of traditional economic
theory, decision analysis, and other management science disciplines, it is “[assumed] that
people have rational preferences”; in contrast, “behavioral decision research suggests an
alternative view, according to which people construct preferences as they are needed.”3
The constructive approach has also been applied to the beliefs and desires that determine
one’s preferences and has become more inWuential in descriptive and prescriptive research
about choice behavior.4 For our purposes, I will focus on two questions that arise for the
constructive approach:
1. How does a DM construct her decision models for a decision problem so that they
are suXciently detailed?
2. How does a DM construct her beliefs, desires, and preferences in a decision model
so that they are stable across reVnements?
Before I address these normative concerns, I want to summarize the empirical reasons for
adopting the constructive view. While the behavioral research is primarily focused on
providing a descriptively adequate account of choice behavior, the experimental data will
nevertheless help to justify and guide the development of a constructive theory of decision.
3p.1057, (Fischer et al. 1999)
4(Shafer 2008) and (Kyburg and Teng 2001) oUers examples of the constructive approach in normative
theorizing. See (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006) for its use in descriptive theories and (Keeney 1996) for its use
in prescriptive theories.
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2.1 Preference Reversals
Beginning in the late 1960’s, Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichenstein conducted a series of ex-
periments that purported to demonstrate the context-sensitivity or procedure-variance of
preferences.5 Using simple two-outcome bets, they showed that diUerent elicitation pro-
cedures resulted in distinct and incoherent sets of preferences. The phenomenon was
described as a preference reversal (henceforth PR) because the subject would Vrst express
a preference between two bets that was reversed when her preferences were elicited in a
diUerent manner.
To provide an example of the phenomenon, consider the following study where college
students were asked to express their preferences between pairs of job oUers.6 The subjects
were asked to imagine that the oUers were identical except with respect to two attributes,
the annual salary and the number of vacation days. Their preferences were then elicited
using the CHOICE task. In CHOICE, pairs of job descriptions are presented and the subject
is then asked to choose the oUer that they prefer. In one example, the students were
presented with Job A, which oUered $31,500 and 15 vacation days and Job B, which oUered
$36,500 and 5 days. The subject was then asked to specify whether they preferred Job A or
B.
Later on, the subjects’ preferences were elicited using the MATCH task. In MATCH,
each subject was presented with both attributes for Job A, but only provided with the
5(Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971)
6This example is found in (Fischer et al. 1999)
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number of vacation days for Job C. They were asked to specify the annual salary for Job C
(Table 2.1) so that both options would be equally attractive (i.e. they would be indiUerent
between the two options).
Salary Vacation Days
Job A $31,500 15 days
Job C x 5 days
Table 2.1: MATCH Task
The missing value for Job C can be used to infer a subject’s preferences between Job A
and B.7 If x = $36, 500, then the subject should be indiUerent between A and B since the
description of Job B would be identical to that of Job C. If x > $36, 500, then A would be
preferred to B since B has the same number of vacation days but a lower salary than C.
Lastly, if x < $36, 500, then B would be preferred to A since B has the same number of
vacation days but a higher salary than C. The results of the experiments showed that the
majority of subjects expressed a preference for Job B to Job A in CHOICE while at the same
time specifying a value for x that entailed a preference for Job A over Job B in MATCH.
Thus, many subjects reversed their expressed preferences from CHOICE to MATCH.
The phenomenon has been subjected to rigorous testing using diUerent types of choices
and modes of elicitation in both artiVcial laboratory settings and real-life betting scenar-
7This requires a minimal assumption of rationality since it assumes that subjects do not prefer a dom-
inated choice. In (Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer 2004), a very small number of subjects violated dominance
which means that PRs cannot be accounted for by this type of error.
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ios.8 The results have been found to be replicable across a wide variety of circumstances.
An important feature of PRs is that the results do not depend upon one’s view of ratio-
nality. (Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer 2004) show that any context-free representation of
preferences will fail to account for the expressed preferences of subjects across diUerent
modes of elicitation.9 Thus, PR experiments are quite diUerent than the heuristics and
biases experiments made famous by Kahneman and Tversky.10 These latter experiments
have been used to argue that human agents systematically violate the dictates of rational-
ity. But this conclusion requires one to Vx what it means to be rational. In contrast, PRs
demonstrate that DMs lack context-free preferences regardless of one’s view of rationality.
Another prominent feature of PRs is that in tasks like CHOICE, the vast majority of
subjects express a preference for the option that is superior on the prominent attribute.
The prominent attribute is identiVed simply by asking subjects which of the two attributes
is more important. In this case, the salary was the prominent attribute and the experi-
menters found that in CHOICE, 75% of all subjects preferred the option with higher salary.
In contrast, when the subject’s preferences are elicited using MATCH, subjects tended to
place much less signiVcance on the salary since only 25% of the subjects expressed a pref-
erence for the higher salaried job. This feature of PRs has been dubbed the prominence
eUect.11
8For example, these experiment were done with real gamblers in Vegas (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973).
9They conclude that “explanations of preference reversals which retain the postulate of context-free pref-
erences can explain neither of [our] Vndings.” p. 724, (Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer 2004)
10(Kahneman 2011)
11(Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988)
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2.2 The Goal-Relative Construction of Preference
Much of the contemporary research on PRs has focused on providing an explanation of
the prominence eUect. What about tasks like CHOICE cause subjects to weigh the promi-
nent attribute so heavily and what about tasks like MATCH cause subjects to place much
less signiVcance to the prominent attribute? And how can this explanation be generalized
to all the ways we can elicit preferences. In their attempts to explain the prominence ef-
fect, most researchers have abandoned the standard view that DMs have a standing set
of preferences that are stable from one deliberative context to the next. Summarizing the
importance of these results, Glenn Shafer writes, “Trite as this may be, it is the most funda-
mental result of three decades of empirical investigation. The preferences people express
are unstable. They depend on the questions asked.”12 Since the various hypotheses iden-
tify diUerent context-sensitive features of a decision problem that trigger the prominence
eUect, most researches have adopted the constructive view whereby DMs construct their
preferences for a given choice task. There are number of well-known hypotheses regard-
ing the construction of preference, but for our purposes, I will not consider the descriptive
adequacy of these views. Instead, in hopes of addressing our normative concerns, I will
focus my attention on the proposal that preferences are constructed relative to goals. This
goal-relative account of preference construction has been quite successful in explaining
much of the experimental data.13 Fischer et al. propose the task-goal hypothesis according
12p.464-465, (Shafer 1986a)
13For criticisms of this account, see (Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer 2004). I’m not particularly concerned
with the descriptive adequacy of the task-goal hypothesis because I will be solely concerned with normative
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to which:
perceived task goals play a central role in the construction of preferences.
SpeciVcally, we propose that the prominent feature is weighted more heavily in
response tasks whose perceived goal is to diUerentiate between alternatives than
in tasks whose perceived goal is to equate two alternatives.14
On this account, preferences are constructed relative to goals and preference reversals
can be explained by the fact that diUerent elicitation procedures suggest that the subject
deliberate with respect to diUerent task-goals.
In elicitation procedures like CHOICE, the subject is asked to diUerentiate between
alternatives. In other elicitation procedures like MATCH, the subject is asked to equate
alternatives. While they considered four diUerent elicitation procedures in order to dif-
ferentiate their hypothesis from others, we can simply consider CHOICE and MATCH to
illustrate their predictions. The task-goal hypothesis predicts that subjects tend to weight
the prominent much more heavily in diUerentiation tasks than in equating tasks. So this
predicts that subjects should be much more likely to prefer the alternative that is superior
with respect to the prominent attribute in CHOICE than in MATCH. And the experimental
data supports the hypothesis. In our example, the subjects were three times more likely to
prefer the option that was superior on the prominent attribute in CHOICE than in MATCH.
questions about preference construction.
14p. 1059, (Fischer et al. 1999)
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2.3 The Normative SigniVcance of Preference Reversals
The phenomenon of preference reversals is of normative signiVcance because it under-
mines the standard view of deliberation that has underwritten the non-constructive ap-
proach of the Comprehensive Bayesian. There is a widely held assumption that DMs al-
ready have beliefs and desires that are suXciently discriminating and well-deVned to use
in their deliberations. Meaning that independently of a deliberative context, the DM’s be-
liefs and desires are discriminating enough to be used to evaluate any set of choices. Call
beliefs and desires that are suXciently discriminating for deliberation, deliberative beliefs
and desires. And more generally, call these judgments our deliberative judgments. I use the
term ‘judgment’ simply to highlight the fact they are being used and expressed when one
deliberates.
PRs suggest that DMs do not have a set of deliberative judgments that they use from one
deliberative context to the next. They are not pre-existing features of the agent’s mental
state, waiting to be elicited. Instead, it appears that a subject’s deliberative judgments are
sensitive to features of the decision making context. They are constructed on a case to case
basis. So PRs undermine a view of deliberation that has implicitly justiVed the restricted
scope of our normative decision theories. Traditionally, the decision theorist’s job is to
provide coherence constraints that the DM can use to adjust her attitudes until they reach
a rational equilibrium. The role of the normative theory is restricted to this minimal type
of coherence because it is typically assumed that the DM has a fairly rich set of pre-existing
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deliberative beliefs, desires, and preferences. Given this rich starting point, it makes sense
that the prescriptions of rational deliberation only need to supply coherence constraints
on these pre-existing attitudes.
As the PR phenomenon suggests, the DM’s deliberative judgments are not well-deVned
outside of a particular decision problem so a theory of rational choice that only articulates
coherence constraints over these judgments is incomplete. It is not particularly informative
to insist that the DM have coherent deliberative judgments if the DM has not yet made any
deliberative judgments. If we adopt an empirically appropriate view of human decision
makers, it will be crucial to understand how these judgments ought to be constructed.
The goal-relative explanation of preference reversals oUers some more speciVc lessons.
Not only are DMs systematic in the way that they construct their preferences, but the
construction has a certain structure to it. The goal-relative explanation suggests that the
construction of preference depends upon both features of the context as well as the back-
ground attitudes of the DM. Background attitudes are context-insensitive cognitive and
conative attitudes. Naturally, we do have some background attitudes. In the cases above,
the DMs valued both attributes and viewed one attribute as more prominent. However,
these attitudes were insuXcient to determine the DM’s preferences in the decision prob-
lem. For this reason, these background attitudes do not issue straightforwardly in a set
of deliberative judgments. On the task-goal hypothesis, the goal of the choice scenario in
addition to these background attitudes are needed to determine the DM’s preferences.
The way background attitudes and a deliberative context interact in the determination
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of our deliberative judgments is analogous to the interaction that occurs between semantic
content and a conversational context in the determination of the content of an assertion.
What is asserted when I state that “John is here” depends upon the meaning of ‘here’ in
conjunction with features of the context of utterance, such as the speaker’s location. So
both semantic content and the conversational context is needed to determine assertoric
content. In just the same way, a subject’s deliberative judgments are determined by her
background attitudes in conjunction with features of the deliberative context.
3 The Local Constructive Bayesian
We can incorporate the constructive approach to decision making to provide a more de-
tailed version of the Local Bayesian account.
Local Constructive Bayesian: For any decision problem, an agent is rational if and
only if the agent deliberates with respect to a rationally constructed set of stable
deliberative beliefs, desires, and preferences that are representable by a unique prob-
ability, utility, and expected utility function.
Adopting the constructive approach adds an additional constraint to the local account by
requiring that both the decision model and the beliefs, desires, and preferences in that
model be constructed in a rational way. In order to Vll in the constructive account, we
must specify how the DM might justify the construction of stable beliefs, desires, and
preferences. Remember that we can move back and forth from talk of suXciently detailed
models and stable deliberative judgments since the construction of a suXciently detailed
model and stable attitudes go hand in hand. A model is suXciently detailed if and only
if the set of coherent deliberative judgments in that model are stable across reVnements.
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So to explore and Vll in the local constructive interpretation of Bayesian decision theory, I
will present a more detailed account that speciVes how the decision maker can construct a
suXciently detailed decision model along with a set of stable deliberative judgments.
3.1 Goals and Values
To provide an account of how the DM might select a set of relevant consequences and
construct her desires over them, I will take inspiration from the task-goal hypothesis and
consider the role that goals play in deliberation. On the task-goal construction of prefer-
ence, the task involved in the decision problem played an important role in determining
the comparative value of the relevant attributes. And though task-goals do not seem like
they can justify the DM’s assessment of consequences, ordinary goals play a justiVcatory
role that parallels the descriptive role of task-goals.
First, consider the ubiquitous role that goals play in decision making. When trying
to decide between taking the subway or a taxi during rush hour traXc, I may deliberate
on the assumption that I want to make it to a meeting on time. On a trip to the casino,
a gambler may decide that she is going to win at least three hundred dollars or go home
empty-handed. In each case, by adopting a goal for one’s decision problem, one identiVes
a clear standard for evaluating the outcomes of one’s choices. The outcome of taking the
subway or train will be evaluated relative to how well it achieves the goal of making it on
time to the meeting. Similarly, the outcomes of the gambler’s strategies will be evaluated
relative to whether she wins at least 300 dollars. So goals are relevant in our normative
theory because they specify a standard for evaluating the consequences of our choices. In
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order to identify the normative role of goals, we should then focus on the features of goals
that allow them to play this deliberative role. And in the process, build an account of how
goals can be used to identify the set of relevant consequences and to ensure that one’s
desires in a decision problem are stable.15
In order for a goal to specify a standard of evaluation, one must identify what is in-
volved in the satisfaction of that goal. For example, the goal of arriving on time for a meet-
ing is a goal that one satisVes if and only if one arrives on time. Moreover, no extra details
about the consequences of one’s actions matter relative to this particular goal. It doesn’t
matter whether one is sweaty or loses a shoe in the process. If the goal is merely to make
it on time, there is only one way to satisfy that goal. To put it another way, relative to this
goal, there is only one potential property that is relevant for assessing the consequences of
the DM’s actions, the property of being on time. Of course, our goals and what it means to
satisfy the goal can be more Vne-grained. Having the goal of running a marathon quickly
means there are better or worse ways of accomplishing this goal, which means that the
DM must be concerned with a more Vne-grained set of properties that could describe the
consequences of her actions. In this case, the DM must consider some Vne-grained set of
mutually exclusive and exhaustive properties that describe how quickly she ran the race.
And the relevant consequences are those states of aUairs that can be described by any one
of these properties. So when we adopt a goal, we must articulate what it means to satisfy
15Goals play a multi-faceted role in deliberation. See (Carlson et al. 2007) for more detailed discussion.
(Krantz and Kunreuther 2007) also oUers a non-Bayesian decision-theoretic framework that appeals to the
role goals play in decision making.
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that goal. In articulating what it means to satisfy that goal, we identify a set of relevant
properties. And the set of relevant consequences are any of those consequences that can
be picked out by one of the relevant properties.
Goals also determine which of the relevant consequences ought to be better or worse.
Relative to the goal of running the marathon quickly, the faster time ought to be better.
Goals play this role in part because they demarcate a set of relevant values.16 Values should
be understood as desires for properties and can thereby be represented by ceteris paribus
preferences. These are preferences over states of aUairs or consequences rather than acts
and these preferences express the relative desirability of consequences.17 In the simplest
cases, there is only one relevant property. The value for being punctual to a meeting is
represented by a ceteris paribus preference for states of aUairs that instantiate the prop-
erty of being on time before over states of aUairs that don’t instantiate this property. And
the ceteris paribus clause means that this is a preference I have only if every other detail
about these two states of aUairs is identical. While these simple values oUer a very coarse-
grained evaluation of possible states of aUairs, our values can provide very Vne-grained
assessments as well. Relative to the value of running a marathon quickly, my value isn’t
simply for the property of my run being a certain time. Rather, my values specify the de-
sirability of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive properties that specify how quickly
the race is run. My value for running quickly can thereby be represented by a set of ceteris
16The proposed view of goals, sub-goals, and properties (attributes) is strongly inWuenced by the discussion
in chapter 2 of (RaiUa and Keeney 1976).
17In the Savage-style framework, we can talk about preferences for consequences by appealing to constant
acts. For discussion of desires as values for properties, see (Pettit 2002).
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paribus preferences over the states of aUairs described by this set of properties. Moreover,
values provide a complete ranking over the relevant states of aUairs. My value for running
the marathon quickly entail that for any two states of aUairs that describe how fast I run, I
have a ceteris paribus preference for the state of aUairs where I run faster.
Multiple values may be associated with a goal. I may have the goal of implement-
ing the best city-wide health initiative. In articulating what this means, I may take the
best initiative as that which best improves the city’s health, is the most cost eUective and
politically viable. As a result, the properties that describe a city’s health as well as the
cost-eUectiveness and political viability of the potential initiatives are relevant. Associated
with this goal would then be the value for the city’s health, cost eUectiveness, and political
viability.
When more than one value is relevant, these values alone do not determine the relative
desirability of all the relevant consequences. For example, the value for wealth and leisure
are not enough to determine whether I should prefer a state aUairs where I am wealthy
but lack leisure to another state of aUairs where I enjoy leisure but lack wealth. Since
these values only provide ceteris paribus preferences and the two states of aUairs are not
equal with respect to all the relevant features, these values leave us with an indeterminate
preference. In decision making contexts, what allows us to assess the trade-oUs that we are
willing to make between values (i.e. the relative importance of each value) is the goal we
have in mind. For goals can be used to determine a preference when the relevant values
conWict. For instance, I may set as my goal to have my weekends free to spend with family
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and friends and so long as this is satisVed, I will do whatever I must to build as much
wealth as possible. Given this goal, I would prefer a state where I have less wealth but
have my weekends free over one where I possess greater wealth but spend my weekends
working. Of course, I may also specify another goal that takes the same values as relevant,
yet articulates diUerent trade-oUs. For instance, I may have the goal of creating as much
wealth as possible so long as I am able to enjoy at least one meal a week with my friends
and family. Again, the same values are in play, but with respect to this goal, I will weigh the
value for wealth much more heavily. Therefore, goals determine a set of relevant values,
but a set of values do not entail a goal.
The goal-relative construction of deliberative desires can be captured by the following
diagram (Figure 2.1):
Figure 2.1: Construction of Deliberative Desires
Values are fairly stable features of a subject’s conative state. Most of us generally value
wealth, leisure, and health. And we possess these values regardless of the situation that we
are in. Given their stability, it is plausible to view values as an important part of a DM’s
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background attitudes. However, as we’ve seen, there is an indirect relationship between a
DM’s values and her deliberative desires. In any given decision problem, not every value
may be relevant. There may be instances where the DM ignores the eUect of her choices
on her wealth and other instances where that value is of primary importance. So goals are
context-sensitive judgments that interact with our values in two ways to produce deliber-
ative desires in a deliberative context. First, goals identify the values that count as relevant
for a decision problem. This selection of relevant values is suXcient to determine the set
of relevant consequences. Next, goals determine the relative importance of these values.
The ranking of values is suXcient to determine the set of deliberative desires because they
determine preferences over the consequences when the relevant values conWict.
To illustrate, consider a case in which I plan to run a marathon. As I think about my
situation, I realize that I have not suXciently trained and am slightly worried about my
physical health. I decide to adopt the following goal. I will do everything in my power to
Vnish so long as I do not endure any lasting damage to my body. This goal may then be
used to demarcate the set of relevant consequences and construct one’s desires over them
(Figure 2.2).
From all the values that I possess, my goal identiVes two relevant values. The value
for success and for health. And in this particular case, let’s suppose that I consider a fairly
coarse-grained set of properties. Given my value for success, I consider two properties,
Vnishing the marathon or not Vnishing. Given my values for health, I consider the prop-
erties of being completely healthy, experiencing temporary pain, and having permanent
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Figure 2.2: Constructing Deliberative Desires Example
physical damage. Given these two sets of properties, there are six possible consequences
that I have to consider. And relative to the value for success and health, I judge that a is
best, e is second worst and f is worst. Though I know that the remaining consequence
lie somewhere in between a and e, these values cannot determine the relative desirability
of these consequences. After all, do I prefer Vnishing and receving permanent physical
damage or not Vnishing in good health? My adopted goal speciVes the relative importance
of these values and can thereby be used to make more Vne-grained evaluations. The value
for success is more important than health so long as I don’t received permanent damage.
Therefore, we rank b, c, and then d in a descending order of desirability (Figure 2.2).
To conclude our discussion of the goal-relative construction of desires, we can note that
goals ensure the stability of deliberative desires. In our discussion of comprehensive de-
cision making, we discovered two general sources of instability: the salience of additional
values and changes in the trade-oUs between values. Goals guard against both sources
of instability and we can construct goal-based desires over these consequences without a
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consideration for any other possible consequences. Goal-relative desires are stable desires.
3.2 Information and Evidence
In order to construct a suXciently detailed decision model, we must not only demarcate
a set of relevant consequences and construct stable desires over those consequences, we
must also demarcate a set of relevant states and construct stable beliefs over those states.
So let’s take the two parts of the construction of belief in turn. First, we must consider why
and how a DM might restrict the set of states that she considers to be relevant. Next, we
must discuss how she might construct stable beliefs over the relevant set of states. So our
aim is to show how a DM can construct stable probabilities over the relevant states.
What justiVes the practice of restricting the set of states that the DM considers? One
reason comes from the general principle that what matters in deliberation depends upon
what deliberation is for. As we noted in the previous section, the consequences that count
as relevant are directly determined by the values that count as relevant for one’s delibera-
tion. And the values that count as relevant are in turn determined by the goal of delibera-
tion, where the goal is what deliberation is for.
This general principle also extends to the states that matter for deliberation. If what
matters must depend upon what deliberation is for, then the set of relevant states must also
be determined by the goal of deliberation. Since goals allow us to consider a limited set of
consequences, goals can also be used to limit the set of states that a DM should consider.
First, some states will matter because their actualization will aUect whether one or another
of the relevant consequences occur. Suppose I am trying to get home in the fastest possible
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way. When deciding between two routes A and B, I may recognize that if there is traXc
on the freeway, route A will take an exceptionally long time. Since I care about duration
of the trip, I should consider the possibility of traXc. So the Vrst general rule is that the
DM must consider all the states that she thinks will aUect whether one or another of the
relevant consequences occurs. Call these consequence-determining states.
In a given deliberative context, states s and ¬s are consequence-determining
if and only if there is some available act A and relevant consequences c and c′
(where c 6= c′) for which performing A in s results in c and performing A in s′
results in c′.
A second set of states matters since their actualization is relevant for assessing the like-
lihood of the consequence-determining states. Suppose I Vnd traXc very likely if there is
a sporting event in the city. Since I judge that the possibility of a sporting event is relevant
for assessing the likelihood of a consequence-determining uncertainty, I should consider
this possibility as well. Call these evidentially-relevant states. And in a given deliberative
context, a state s is evidentially-relevant if and only if the DM consideration of s would
aUect the construction of her probabilities for any for any consequence-determining state
s′.
So by following our general principle about what matters for deliberation, we con-
clude that two types of states are all that matter. And though it is clear that not all states
count as consequence-determining, it’s not obvious that there is any way to limit the set
of evidentially-relevant states. So we need some reason to think that the DM has good
reason to restrict the set of relevant states. Here we can appeal to a second type of reason
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why the DM might restrict which states she counts as relevant. These reasons arise from a
consideration of what we are able to take into account when constructing our deliberative
beliefs.
To illustrate, let’s begin by making a technical distinction between information and
evidence. Let information refer to the general information provided by the subject’s back-
ground cognitive state. And let evidence refer to the information that is deemed relevant
to a particular deliberation. As a result, evidence is the information that is relevant for
constructing the beliefs that are to be used in deliberation. By looking to particular cases,
we will see that DMs can be reasonable in ignoring actual or potential information because
she does not know how to account for the information.18
To provide such a case in which the DMmay be justiVed in ignoring actual information,
consider a variant of Freund’s puzzle.19 From a deck with four cards, the ace and deuce of
spades and the ace and deuce of hearts, two cards are dealt to John. So there are 6 possible
hands (Table 2.2).
18My discussion here is tangential to discussions of the principle of total evidence. The principle of total
evidence states that the demand to believe h to the degree that one’s evidence conVrms h only make sense if
one considers the totality of one’s evidence. The total evidence available to a person is “the total knowledge of
the results of his observations.” p.138-139, (Carnap 1947) My point here is consistent with this demand. There
is an intuitive distinction between the information we receive from observations and evidence. Information
counts as evidence only when we know the results (i.e. what we learn) of our observations. It is for this
reason that arguments for the principle of total evidence like those found in (Good 1967) are irrelevant.
These arguments assume that we know the prior conditional probabilities so they assume that we know
what we would learn if we are given some information. In addition, Carnap notes that “an additional item
of evidence i may be omitted only if it can be shown that this omission does not change the value of c, in
other words, that c(h, e and i) = c(h, e).” p.139, (Carnap 1947) On the account I propose, our probabilities will
be constructed such that this condition is met. What counts as evidence will be all the information that is
relevant for determining one’s degree of belief in a particular deliberative context.
19(Freund 1965). The particular example comes from (Shafer 1986b)
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A♥, A♠ A♥, 2♥ A♥, 2♠
A♠, 2♠ A♠, 2♥ 2♥, 2♠
Table 2.2: Simple Algebra of Possibilities
Assuming the cards were dealt at random, you assign an equal probability to each state.
So there is a 1/6 chance that John has both aces. Now suppose John reveals that he has
an ace. Bayesian reasoning demands that once you take this information as evidence, you
should update your probabilities by conditionalizing on this event. To conditionalize on
event e, you update the posterior probability that p to equal the prior conditional probabil-
ity of p given e. Since the probability that he has two aces given he has at least one ace is
1/5, you update your probability to 1/5.
Subsequently, John reveals that he has the ace of hearts. Should the information pro-
vided by this assertion be taken as evidence? And if it is taken as evidence, how should you
update your probabilities to account for this information? Using the set of states provided
above, when John asserts that he has the ace of hearts, the only event in the algebra that
corresponds with the information provided is the event represented by the union of states
in the top row. Since the probability that John has both aces given that he has an ace of
hearts is 1/3, then you should update the probability to 1/3.
Though this update seems intuitive, it’s not obvious that we are left with the correct
probabilities. While you know that John has the ace of hearts, is it now more likely that
he has both aces? The ambiguity arises because it’s not clear what you learn from his
assertion. If you learn that John has the ace of hearts rather than not having the ace of
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hearts, then it is certainly more likely that he has both aces. However, if you simply learn
that the ace John has already revealed to you is a heart, then it’s not clear that you learn
anything that makes it more likely that he has both aces. Given our purpose of assessing
the likelihood that John has both aces, you do not learn anything more about his hand, just
some irrelevant detail about the card he has already revealed to you. To help clarify this
ambiguity, let’s enrich the space of possibilities by considering the possibility that John





Table 2.3: Enriched Algebra of Possibilities
Let’s assume that John never lies and if he has a choice of what to say, he randomly
decides which card to reveal. This allows us to assign some probabilities to these states.
For example, we know that there is a 0% chance that John asserts he has an ace of hearts
given two deuces in his hand. However, despite our assumptions, we cannot determine
probabilities for every event in the algebra. For example, what is p(SA♥)? Determining
this probability requires determining p(SA♥|A♥, A♠) and p(SA♥|A♥, 2H), etc. since
p(SA♥) = p(SA♥|A♥, A♠)p(A♥, A♠) +p(SA♥|A♥, 2♥)p(A♥, 2♥)
+p(SA♥|A♥, 2♠)p(A♥, 2♠) +p(SA♥|A♠, 2♥)p(A♥, 2♠)
+p(SA♥|A♠, 2♠)p(A♠, 2♠) +p(SA♥|2♥, 2♠)p(2♥, 2♠)
This in turn depends upon the question John is answering with his assertion.
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If his assertion answered the question of whether he has an Ace of Hearts or not, then
so long as John has an Ace of Hearts, he doesn’t have a choice and must assert that he has
an Ace of Hearts when he has one. On this assumption, we can calculate the following
posterior probability.
p(SA♥) = 1 ∗ 15 + 1 ∗
1
5
+ 1 ∗ 1
5
+ 0 ∗ 1
5
+ 0 ∗ 1
5
∗ 0 ∗ 0 = 3
5
p(A♥, A♠|SA♥) = 13
However, if John just volunteered that information, then the chance John utters that
he has an Ace of Hearts is 50% when he has the Ace of Hearts and some other card. For
he is in eUect answering the question, “What’s one of the cards that you have in your
hand?” If John responds that he has an ace of hearts with this question, all this is relevant
to determining the likelihood of his having both aces is that one of his cards is an ace, not
that one of his cards is an ace of hearts. So we would calculate the posterior probability






















+ 0 ∗ 0 = 5
10
p(A♥, A♠|SA♥) = 15
Of course, we can account for both types of queries by considering a more Vne-grained
set of states. This Vne-grained set of states would diUerentiate answers to the Vrst question
from answers to the second question. So, there is always some algebra that is Vne-grained
enough to capture the information a DM receives and how she receives it. Though in the
case above, it’s not even clear which question John is answering.
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There are two reasons why the DM may choose to restrict the set of possibilities (the
potential information) that count as relevant (potential evidence). The Vrst reason is fa-
miliar to our general discussion. For the ought implies can maxim will be violated if we
demand that the DM envisage all possible information and all possible queries she can en-
counter as she sorts out her beliefs. The second reason is that once additional possibilities
are considered, we may have diXculties constructing our beliefs (probabilities). For exam-
ple, if we abandon the assumption that John always tells you the truth, what probability
will you assign to the veracity of his assertions?
This leads us to our next question about the construction of deliberative beliefs. How
do we construct our probabilities? More speciVcally, how can a DM construct a set of
stable probabilities. To provide an account, I will appeal to a view, taken from (Shafer and
Tversky 1985), of how we should and often do construct our probabilities. They write,
The weighing of evidence may be viewed as a mental experiment in which the
human mind is used to assess probability much as a pan balance is used to
measure weight. As in the measurement of physical quantities, the design of
the experiment aUects the quality of the result.20
They go on to describe a variety of mental experiments that we can use in order to
weigh evidence and assign probabilities. Consider a very simple example. As I am sitting
at the park, I see John walking and wonder, what is the probability that he will step onto
the road with his right foot rather than his left? To answer this, I ask myself, what would
cause John to perform one or the other action? I imagine that the only relevant cause
20p. 300, (Shafer and Tversky 1985)
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is a reason or desire to do so. Considering my evidence, I conclude that I know nothing
about him that would suggest that he desires to use one foot or the other. Thus, using
my evidence to develop a simple causal model that would predict his behavior, I judge
that John’s use of his right or left foot is produced at random and assign both events a .5
probability.
There are a variety of mental experiments that one could use and as Shafer and Tversky
point out, the appropriateness of an experiment depends upon the case and evidence at
hand. Nevertheless, they share some general and intuitive features. First, since probability
judgments weigh evidence, they must be supported by evidence. Next, one’s evidence
should be used to Vt the case at hand to some canonical example involving probabilities.
When we want to assign quantitatively unique probabilities, the frequency, propensity, and
betting interpretations of probability supply some canonical examples.21 The frequency
interpretation proposes that we “compare our evidence to the scale of chances by asking
how often, in situations like the one at hand, the truth would turn out in various ways.”
The propensity interpretation proposes that we interpret “the evidence in terms of a causal
model and then [ask] about the model’s propensity to produce various results.” The betting
interpretation proposes that we “[assess] our willingness to bet in light of the evidence.”22
In the card example, we made an assumption similar to the one made in the walking
example. For we assumed that John never lied and when he had a choice, he would select
21Other types of canonical examples are possible. For example, cases where there are unique a priori
probabilities based upon strong symmetry judgments may provide another type of canonical example.
22(Shafer and Tversky 1985), p.316
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at random what card to reveal. So in both cases, we developed a simple causal model
that would predict his behavior. By making these assumptions and specifying the question
being asked, the chance that John makes one assertion or another is known and probability
judgments can be made. In the case where John arbitrarily oUers information about his
hand, we may suppose that his assertions are chosen at random and we can then view
John’s assertions as if they were the result of a coin toss. However, one could always
question whether these assumptions are suitable and question whether the evidence is
being scaled to the right canonical example.
Call the assumptions that allow us to Vt our evidence to a scale of canonical examples,
evidential assumptions. Evidential assumptions play a role that is analogous to the goals
we adopt for deliberation. They Vrst help us to restrict the set of relevant states. In the
case above, we adopted the assumption that the information provided by John was gener-
ated by random chance. If such assertions were made at random, then no additional states
can aUect the likelihood of these assertions. Next, evidential assumptions help us to as-
sign probabilities. By using the analogy of a fair coin, we were able to specify a uniform
probability distribution over the possible assertions. By constructing beliefs on the basis
of these assumptions, we circumvent the main source of instability of belief. For we have
constructed our probabilities over a space of limited possibilities in such a way that we
simply assumed that there are no unaccounted for correlations.
I haven’t said very much about the speciVc nature of evidential assumptions because
the question of how to construct probabilities is obviously a very diXcult one. Though
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I have no general account to oUer, it may help to consider the special case in which we
assign probabilities to the outcomes of a coin Wip. Here, our probabilities are typically
constructed on the basis of symmetry judgments. This oUers an example of an evidential
assumption since we can show why symmetry-based probabilities are stable across reVne-
ments.23 Coins typically exhibit various rotational symmetries. Moreover, the faces of
coins are similar and their weight is evenly distributed. Even if there are some diUerences
and imperfections, we assume that these details are irrelevant because of the way we use
these coins in games of chance. If a coin is Wipped so that it rotates a suXcient number of
times, we imagine that the imperfections will have no eUect on the likelihood of HEADS or
TAILS. So based upon our evidence, there seems to be a symmetry regarding the outcomes
of coin tosses. More speciVcally, we judge that answering the question of how likely it
is that the Wipped coin lands heads is in all relevant respects the same as answering the
question of how likely it is that the Wipped coin lands tails. So no matter how Vne-grained
a set of possibilities we consider, we judge that p(HEADS) = p(TAILS). This judgment of
symmetry means that that every piece of information can be disregarded in assessing the
probability of either HEADS or TAILS except for the fact that HEADS and TAILS are pos-
sible outcomes of a coin Wip. In the case where HEADS and TAILS are considered the only
possible outcomes, p(HEADS) = p(TAILS) = 0.5. Thus, symmetry-based probabilities are
stable across reVnements.
The main point of this discussion is to show that DMs often have very good reason
23I am indebted to Anubav Vasudevan’s work on symmetry and probability.
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to restrict the set of states that they consider. Moreover, there are assumptions they make
which justify these restrictions as well as justify their construction of probabilities. Though
I’ve oUered one example of how this could be done, our evidential assumptions may come
from a variety of sources. They may arise from symmetry judgments. They may arise from
assumptions about underlying stochastic processes. Whatever the case, a DM can justify
the selection of her decision model and construct her stable deliberative beliefs on the basis
of some type of evidential assumption.24
3.3 Constructing SuXciently Detailed Models
When introducing goals and evidential assumptions, I oUered reasons to think that the
beliefs and desires that are constructed on the basis of these judgments are stable. To
support this claim, I will show how a DM can use her goals and evidential assumptions to
construct a suXciently detailed model. To illustrate, let’s return to Carl’s choice between
investing his inheritance and taking a trip to the Maldives.
Let Carl have the goal of experiencing real adventure as he decides between his choice
of investing the cash in hopes of climbing Everest and taking a trip to the Maldives. In
specifying his goal, Carl must articulate what it means to him to have an adventure. After
some soul-searching, Carl decides that adventure requires exotic locales and dangerous ac-
tivities. So Carl identiVes two values, the value for states of aUairs in which he is in a exotic
locale and the value for states of aUairs where he engages in dangerous activities. Given
24As with the adoption of a goal, our evidential assumptions can be the object of a choice problem, but
when we are deliberating on the basis of them, they are not choices.
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this goal, snorkeling in the Maldives and climbing Everest are both desirable. However,
Carl has a stronger desire to climb Everest because while both trips provide equally desir-
able exotic locales, Everest ranks higher with respect to the value for dangerous activities.
Now, Carl’s goal can be used to Vx the set of relevant consequences and ensure the
stability of desires. Only the value for exotic locales and dangerous activities is relevant
for Carl’s decision. For simplicity, let’s assume that these values are simple and that for
each value, there is simply one relevant property, being in an exotic locale and engaging
in a dangerous activity. This means that for the purpose of evaluating the consequences
of Carl’s actions, Carl describes the consequences using these two properties. There are
four possible consequences corresponding to the possible ways the properties are or are
not instantiated. No Vner description of the consequences matters so the set of relevant
consequences is Vxed.
Next, we noted that DMsmust identify all the consequence-determining and evidentially-
relevant states. Considering the choice of investing the money, the uncertainty of the in-
vestment is relevant. If the investment is a success, Carl will be able to go to Everest where
he will be in an exotic local and engage in a dangerous activity, but if the investment is a
failure, he will be stuck at home where he experiences neither. For simplicity, let’s suppose
that the failure and success of the investment are the only states that are relevant for the
occurrence of the consequences.
Next, Carl must determine what information he counts as relevant in the construction
of his beliefs. These are the evidentially-relevant states. That is, he must identify which
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possibilities are relevant for constructing his beliefs about the success or failure of the
investment opportunity. Suppose Carl knows that the investment opportunity depends on
the change in crude oil prices. If crude oil prices double, his investment is certain to work
out. Otherwise, his investment is certain not to be successful. While Carl is quite certain
that the price of oil will rise, he is not positive that they will double. Now, we can imagine
that Carl assumes that doubling of oil prices is as likely as the Wip of a coin. Given these



































Table 2.4: Carl’s SuXciently Detailed Decision Model
This model is suXciently detailed because no Vner description of the states and conse-
quences is relevant. We’ve described the consequences in a way that everything relevant
to the goal has been described. So no additional description of the consequences can aUect
the way that the consequences are evaluated. Next, no additional possibilities matter be-
cause we’ve identiVed all the states that matter for whether one or another consequence
occurs and we’ve identiVed all the information that is relevant to the assignment of prob-
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abilities. For instance, the price of natural gas has no eUect on Carl’s beliefs. For Carl
simply assumed that the likelihood of oil prices doubling was analogous to the Wip of a fair
coin. Given this assumption, nothing else matters. Just as no additional detail will aUect
how likely it is that a fair coin lands heads or tails, no other detail will aUect how likely it
is that oil prices change. Therefore, all the relevant possibilities have been accounted for
in the assignment of Carl’s beliefs so no unaccounted for possibilities could destabilize his
beliefs.
4 The Normative SigniVcance of Bayesian Decision Theory
In order to understand the normative signiVcance of Bayesian decision theory, we began
by considering what the theory had to say about rational belief, desire, and preference. The
Practical Bayesian oUered the weakest interpretation on which BDT presents an account
of rationality within a Vxed decision model. Unfortunately, since the choice of a decision
model is normatively relevant, the Practical Bayesian oUers an incomplete account.
In order to seek a more substantial interpretation of BDT, I considered the strongest
view, that of the Comprehensive Bayesian. The Comprehensive Bayesian saw the theory
as oUering an all-things-considered view of rationality where the totality of a DM’s be-
liefs, desires, and preferences are governed by Bayesian coherence constraints. For the
comprehensive interpretation to be viable, DMs needed to deliberate with respect to com-
prehensive decision models, which captured everything that was relevant. Unfortunately,
we saw that the comprehensive account was untenable because rational deliberation must
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also proceed with respect to intelligible and suXciently detailed models and comprehen-
sive decision models could not be both intelligible and suXciently detailed.
Having rejected the comprehensive account, the local interpretation was presented as
an alternative. The Local Bayesian grounded her interpretation on the assumption that
intelligible and suXciently detailed models are those for which the DM has restricted what
counts as relevant. She does so by setting parameters for her decision problem. The adop-
tion of goals and evidential assumptions speciVed one way the DM may set these parame-
ters. For on their basis, I showed how the DM could construct intelligible and suXciently
detailed models along with a set of stable deliberative beliefs, desires, and preferences.
This view of decision making coincides nicely with the general constructive view of
deliberation so let us call the type of theory that arises from the local constructive inter-
pretation of BDT, a Constructive Decision Theory. In addition, call whatever inputs
are needed to construct appropriate decision models and deliberative judgments, construc-
tive parameters.25 So what is the normative signiVcance of adopting the constructive view
of decision theory?
First oU, constructive decision theory remains Bayesian in spirit. Deliberative beliefs,
desires, and preferences should still be probabilities, utilities, and probability weighted
utilities. The only change is that we incorporate how a DM demarcates what counts as
relevant for her decision problem and how she constructs deliberative beliefs, desires, and
preferences. We do so by accounting for how the DM sets the constructive parameters
25Another constructive parameter is the identiVcation of available acts or choices. I haven’t explicitly
discussed this since this parameter has always been seen as a constructive aspect of every decision theory.
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within our theory. This modiVcation changes the scope of the theory in two ways. First,
it expands the scope of the types of attitudes, assumptions, and judgments that are within
the purview of BDT. Second, it narrows the scope of its coherence constraints. Let me
explain.
On the comprehensive interpretation of BDT, the entirety of one’s beliefs, desires,
and preferences ought to be representable by a single probability, utility, and probabil-
ity weighted utility function. So long as there is no change in what the DM believes or
desires, these probabilities and utilities should then be used for every decision problem.
The constructive account proposes that probability and utility judgments are based upon
locally deVned constructive parameters which may vary from one deliberative context to
the next. If our constructive parameters are deliberation-speciVc and deliberative judg-
ments are constructed on their basis, the beliefs and desires that count as rational for one
deliberation are not necessarily what counts as rational for another. Since the Bayesian
principles of rationality explicate what it is for these deliberative judgments to be coher-
ent, they must only apply within a particular deliberative context. So the demand that
deliberative beliefs, desires, and preferences be representable by a unique probability, util-
ity, and probability weighted utility is restricted to the decision problem for which these
judgments are constructed.
Despite the change to the scope of the theory, the local constructive account of ra-
tional deliberation is still only concerned with coherence. For I have not imposed any
substantive constraints (i.e. non-coherence constraints) that govern the way we Vx the
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constructive parameters for a decision problem.26 I have simply shown that the DM must
Vx these parameters in certain ways that justify her in taking the constructed model as
suXciently detail and the constructed beliefs, desires, and preferences as stable. So one’s
deliberative beliefs, desires, and preferences ought to be coherent with the way one Vxes
the constructive parameters and vice versa.
Before I conclude my discussion of the local constructive account, I want to consider
one important and seemingly unintuitive consequence of the view. On the account oUered,
a DM can be justiVed in viewing her decision problem in a very restricted way even when
it would be of almost no additional cost to deliberate in a more comprehensive way. For
example, suppose that John is asked to evaluate two bets. The expected monetary gain is
identical for both bets, but for one of the bets, he is guaranteed to be Wogged. It seems
obvious that John should prefer the bet for which he will not be Wogged. However, on
my account, John could be perfectly coherent to be indiUerent to both bets. For we can
imagine two diUerent goals that John might adopt. He may adopt the goal of making the
most money possible or the goal of making the most money possible while minimizing
physical pain. And if John adopts the narrow goal of making the most money possible, he
is rational to be indiUerent between the two bets.
Myopic DMs like John exhibit some type of irrationality, but at Vrst glance it may
seem that the Local Bayesian fails to account for this. As it turns out, the situation is
26Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is nothing to say about how we justify setting these parame-
ters. We could go to a higher order. Deciding what goal to adopt can be seen as a decision problem. However,
in the case, we have made the choice of a goal the object of a choice problem. Therefore, the goal no longer
plays the deliberative role of a constructive parameter.
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more complicated so let’s carefully consider how the Local Bayesian evaluates extremely
myopic DMs like John. To do so, we must Vrst make a distinction between Vrst-order
rationality and second-order rationality. And the Local Bayesian proposes that John is
Vrst-order rational just in case he has a coherent, appropriately constructed set of deliber-
ative judgments about a decision problem. And part of what it means for his judgments
to be coherently constructed is for them to be coherent with the adopted goal and eviden-
tial assumptions. Though he exhibits a Vrst-order coherence, John can easily step back
from his initial deliberation about the two bets and consider the adoption of a goal as a
decision problem in and of itself. Or he can also consider the adoption of evidential as-
sumptions as a decision problem. In either case, he is taking a second-order approach to
his decision problem. And John is second-order rational just in case he has a coherent,
appropriately constructed set of deliberative judgments with respect to this second-order
decision problem, which is a decision problem about how to Vx the parameters of another
decision problem.
On the local constructive account, though John exhibits Vrst-order rationality, he is
clearly second-order irrational. For if John were to deliberate about which goal to adopt,
he should clearly choose to deliberate for the sake of the broader more inclusive goal. For
we know that given the options that he has available, there is no way the world could
turn out in which he would do worse by his own lights if he adopted the broader goal.
Deliberating with respect to the broader goal dominates the alternative. Of course, if the
choices were diUerent, the broader goal may not be better. What if one bet oUered the
4. The Normative SigniVcance of Bayesian Decision Theory 80
opportunity for untold wealth while the other bet oUered the opportunity for a sustained
state of euphoria. Would be it better to aim for riches, physical bliss, or both?
So in cases of myopia, the irrationality arises because we imagine a higher-order deci-
sion problem for which the DM has not made the best choice. Nevertheless, the DM is not
irrational with respect to her attitudes or choice in the original decision problem. The Lo-
cal Bayesian diUerentiates two types of rationality and by doing so, seems to oUer the right
explanation of these cases. For it would seem strange to think that myopic DMs are irra-
tional in just the same way as DMs with incoherent preferences. For a particular decision
problem, if I prefer oranges to apples and apples to pears, but also prefer pears to oranges,
I exhibit a Vrst-order irrationality. This means that my evaluative standard does not oUer
a coherent way of evaluating a set of choices. One symptom of this is that one cannot
make sense of my standard. In contrast, the evaluative standard of myopic DMs make
some sense. We can certainly imagine an evaluative standard that ignores the possibility
of physical pain. And though such a standard is comprehensible, we Vnd it problematic
because we can’t see any reason why someone would ignore such a possibility if by doing
so one would always do something worse by one’s own lights. Nevertheless, this type of
irrationality seems to be of a diUerent type than Vrst-order irrationality.
So what’s important is not that the Local Bayesian thinks that extremely myopic DMs
are rational. Rather, what’s important is that we properly identify the sense in which they
are irrational. And the Local Bayesian seems to have the right account. Myopic agents are
those who lack a certain reWectiveness about their lives. It’s not that they exhibit a failure
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to exercise their capacity for means-end rationality in the appropriate way. Rather, they
either lack the capacity to question their ends or fail to exercise this capacity appropriately.
The Local Bayesian proposes that we diUerentiate these two rational failures and associate
them with two diUerent types of criticisms.
The reader may still be worried that the local constructive account allows myopic DMs
to be rational in some sense. From this point of view, the criticism is that myopic DMs
should not exhibit any type of rationality. For whatever it is worth, I am not bothered by
this conclusion. For I do not share the intuition that myopia is irrational full stop. Decision
theory has traditionally adopted the Humean approach to rationality and there have al-
ways been some odd consequences of this approach. As Hume noted, it is not irrational to
prefer the destruction of the world to the prick of one’s Vnger. For that preference by itself
cannot be irrational. This claim is just like the claim that myopic decision making is not
Vrst-order irrational. When we consider a single preference, very weak rational constraints
apply. Similarly, from a certain narrow point of view of one type of decision problem, very
weak rational constraints apply. Nevertheless, the Local Bayesian does not have to resort
to intuition mongering. For even if the reader shares the intuition that myopia is irrational
in every sense, there are very good reasons to give this intuition up. For the consequences
of addressing this criticism and holding onto this intuition are much worse than the con-
sequences of allowing myopic DMs to exhibit a narrow type of rationality.
On the local constructive account, the DM cannot be irrational or rational indepen-
dently of a particular framing of a decision problem – a particular way of setting the pa-
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rameters for a decision problem. The Local Bayesian rejects context-independent notions
of rationality. So if we want to prevent myopic DMs from exhibiting even a Vrst-order
rationality, then there must be some additional demands on Vrst-order rationality. In par-
ticular, there must be demands on how the DM sets the parameters to a decision problem.
We can consider the two possibilities.
First, there may be an additional demand that the DM ought to engage in the higher-
order deliberation. So the DM must deliberate about which goals and evidential assump-
tions to adopt. However, what would justify this rational demand? And more importantly,
wouldn’t this demand start an inVnite regress of demands? Being rational in a second-
order deliberation would require deliberating with respect to a third-order deliberation and
so on ad inVnitum. At what point does the regress stop? Adding this additional demand
would be similar to demanding an all-things-considered rationality. So the Local Bayesian
is better oU sticking to the narrowly deVned context-sensitive notion of rationality.
The second possibility is to make substantive demands about the goals that we ought
to adopt. So in his Vrst-order deliberation, John ought to deliberate with respect to the
broader goal. And if this is a substantive demand, then it cannot arise from what he would
choose in a higher-order deliberation. Rather, this demand must arise from some gen-
eral obligation about the goals he ought to have. Given the Humean tradition in which
they work, decision theorists would be extremely hesitant to think that there are any such
obligations. What would justify them and where would they come from? For even if we
abandoned the Humean point of view, we are still constrained by the ought implies can
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maxim. And an obligation to consider all of one’s goals (and thereby all of one’s values)
would again lead us to a demand for comprehensive decision making. So if there are sub-
stantive demands, what are they? Perhaps the DM should take into account as many values
or goals as she can given the time and resources available. But why is that an appropriate
demand? And would this demand require one to deliberate about how many values and
goals to adopt? If it does, then another regress looms. More importantly, in what sense
would the DM do better by being more comprehensive? The only justiVcation that makes
sense is that by being more comprehensive, we come closer to being all-things-considered
rational. However, we have rejected the notion of all-things-considered rationality as a
viable notion of rationality.
The main lesson from our discussion concerns the dialectic between the three interpre-
tations. The main criticism of the local constructive account is that it is too local. So what
is ultimately motivating my defense is that there is no stable middle ground between the
comprehensive and local accounts. Since the comprehensive account is untenable and the
practical account is incomplete, the local account is the only viable alternative. And there
is no way to supplement the account without resorting back to the comprehensive view or





The Bayesian account discussed in the last two chapters exempliVes the Decision-
Theoretic Approach to understanding rationality. The central focus of the decision-
theoretic inquiry is on rational choice and the aim of decision theory is to articulate what
it means to have a coherent standard of evaluation for assessing one’s choices. Thus, the
decision-theoretic principles of rationality impose constraints on one’s beliefs, desires, and
preferences in virtue of the role that these attitudes play in evaluating one’s choices in
a decision problem. The Bayesian view proposes that a coherent standard of evaluation
ought to have all the formal features of an expected utility function. And on the particular
local, constructive interpretation of the theory, a DM’s standard of evaluation ought to
be representable by the unique expected utility function that arises from the goals and
evidential assumptions that set the parameters of her decision problem.
In contrast, many philosophers have adopted a very diUerent methodology for theo-
rizing about the normative principles of rationality. Rather than focus on deliberation,
this alternative methodology focuses on language and language use. This latter approach
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begins by considering our intuitions about the truth and falsity of sentences containing
those ordinary language concepts that are deemed important for our understanding of ra-
tionality – concepts such as “belief”, “desire”, “knowledge”, and “rational”. In addition to
intuitions about the truth and falsity of sentences, this approach also considers our intu-
itions governing the appropriateness and inappropriateness of asserting these sentences in
ordinary conversation. By appealing to the intuitions of competent speakers who possess
these concepts, one may oUer an analysis of these concepts by articulating their semantics
and explaining their use. For example, by articulating the truth-conditions of knowledge
ascribing and denying sentences, one can shed light on the standards that must be met
in order to know. And by explaining our attributions and denials of knowledge, we may
gain insight into the value and role that the concept of knowledge plays. Because this
approach is based upon language and its ordinary use, I will call it the Folk-Linguistic
Approach.
Though the decision-theoretic and folk-linguistic approaches are not inherently at odds
with one another, important diUerences have arisen between the two methodologies. The
main point of contention is the fact that the view of rational belief and desire presented
through a folk-linguistic approach appears to be quite diUerent than the view of rational
belief and desire presented through a decision-theoretic approach. The folk-linguistic ap-
proach tends to talk about all-or-nothing beliefs and desires while the decision-theoretic
approach tends to talk about graded beliefs or desires. I will also call these all-or-nothing
attitudes, binary attitudes since they are attitudes that one either does or does not have.
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One reason for this diUerence is that our attributions of belief and desire in ordinary dis-
course tend to ascribe all-or-nothing attitudes while evaluative standards that compare
choices tend to require graded notions. The folk-linguistic approach combines easily with
our traditional epistemological inquiries into rational or justiVed belief. For these inquiries
have primarily been concerned to understand how our beliefs can provide good or justi-
Ved representations the world. Since good representation is closely related to truth, these
inquiries have tended to focus on binary beliefs since only binary beliefs can be true or
false.1
Though it would be desirable to have a single comprehensive normative theory of ra-
tionality, the diUerences between these approaches and inquiries make it diXcult to see
how the concerns and insights of one inquiry relate to the other. In order to open lines
of communication, we must engage in the task of connecting the graded notions of deci-
sion theory to the binary notions of traditional epistemology. As it stands, there is little
agreement on how to accomplish this task and the diXculty in doing so has moved some
philosophers to question the importance of all-or-nothing attitudes for a theory of ratio-
nality. Patrick Maher has argued that binary beliefs play no role for rational action and
Richard JeUrey has gone even further in stating that the concept of binary belief is vague
and outdated, replaced by the clearer and theoretically more valuable notion of degrees of
belief.2 Richard Foley, who presents himself as defending the role of binary beliefs, sug-
1Though binary beliefs can only be true or false, proposals such as the one oUered in (Joyce 1998) attempt
to provide measures of the truthfulness or epistemic accuracy of partial beliefs.
2(Maher 1993), (Swain 1970)
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gests that the concept only oUers a rough and eXcient way of classifying a set of one’s
graded beliefs as being above a (somewhat arbitrary) threshold.3
In this chapter, I will defend the general claim that all-or-nothing attitudes have a role
to play in a decision-theoretic account of rational deliberation. Moreover, I will argue
that some of these binary attitudes are indispensable for articulating the nature of rational
deliberation and thereby indispensable for oUering an account of rational belief, desire,
preference, and choice. To do so, I will supply a catalog of various all-or-nothing decision-
theoretic attitudes. To characterize these attitudes, I adopt a pragmatic approach whereby
I individuate these attitudes in terms of the role that they play in a normative theory of
rational deliberation. So each attitude will be deVned in virtue of their deliberative role
and the norms that govern their adoption.
Though I will use these binary decision-theoretic attitudes to provide an account of
the folk-linguistic concept of knowledge in chapter 4, the main intent in this chapter is
stipulative and the primary task will be to deVne a set of theoretical concepts that refer to
all-or-nothing attitudes that a DM can have.
1 Constructive Parameters
I proposed that two pre-theoretic constraints govern a rational standard of evaluation.
First, I argued that evaluative standards can only be identiVable with respect to choices
described by intelligible decision models. Second, I argued that evaluative standards ought
to exhibit stability across more or less Vne-grained descriptions of one’s choices. And
3See Chapter 4 of (Foley 1993).
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we found that a stable standard arises from judgments that are constructed in suXciently
detailed models. Requiring DMs to deliberate with respect to intelligible and suXciently
detailed decision models requires DMs to determine what is and is not relevant to their
decision problems. This means that judgments of relevance are necessary for rational de-
liberation and since judging that some state or consequence is or is not relevant counts
as an all-or-nothing judgment, the decision-theoretic account of rational deliberation must
appeal to at least one type of binary judgment.4 Furthermore, the need for judgments of
relevance suggested a constructive approach to rational deliberation and it became neces-
sary to explain where these judgments of relevance came from.
In order to answer this question, I noted that DMs set parameters to their decision
problems. I called these constructive parameters because of their two deliberative roles.
First, they demarcate an intelligible decision model. Second, these judgments are used to
construct a set of stable deliberative judgments in the intelligible decision model, ensuring
that the selected decision model is a suXciently detailed one.
We discussed two ways of setting the constructive parameters. First, the DM adopts a
goal for her deliberation. Apart from the obvious role of identifying what one is deliber-
ating for, this goal is also used to demarcate a set of relevant states and consequences. In
4Some discussion is required to determine whether or not judgments of relevance are independent of
graded ones. When I explicated the notion of relevance, I did it in terms of preferences across reVnements
of a decision model. I stated that the smallest intelligible, stable model speciVes what counts as relevant
and stability was explicated in terms of coherent preferences. So it might be thought that preferences are
reducible to graded beliefs and desires. I admit that there is a dependence between ‘graded’ preferences and
judgments of relevance since stable preferences entail judgments of relevance. Despite this connection, I’ve
argued that we should adopt a constructive approach to preferences and from this constructive point of view,
preference are constructed on the basis of judgments of relevance. For this reason, I think that judgments of
relevance are indispensable binary judgments.
1. Constructive Parameters 89
addition, goals serve as a basis for constructing a set of stable deliberative desires over the
set of relevant consequences. I previously presented the adoption of a goal as one way the
DM could set the constructive parameters and argued that once the DM adopted a goal, she
can construct a set of stable desires for that decision problem. And if we assume that goals
specify real-valued trade-oUs between the various values, there is a unique goal-relative
utility function that can represents her deliberative desires for that decision problem.5
The constructive parameters are also used to demarcate a set of relevant states and to
serve as a basis for constructing a stable set of deliberative beliefs. Evidential assumptions
were used to set this parameter and symmetry judgments oUered one particular example.
I argued that once the DM has made suitable evidential assumptions about her decision
problem, she can construct a probability function that is stable and represents her deliber-
ative beliefs for that decision problem.
So a DM’s coherent standard of evaluation in an intelligible decision model is truly
rational only if this standard coheres with or is based upon the constructive parameters,
which are set by the adopted goals and evidential assumptions. Since the DM must set
these parameters in order to determine what counts as a rational state of mind and we
set these parameters with all-or-nothing attitudes, judgments, or assumptions, there are
an important set of binary attitudes, judgments, or assumptions that are necessary for
rational deliberation. For example, goals are necessary for rational deliberation and a goal
5Since each value is represented by a set of ceteris paribus preferences, I am making the assumption
that these preferences can be represented by a unique utility function. The real-valued tradeoUs specify the
weight we place on the diUerent values, so the resulting utility function is just a weighted average of the
utility functions that represent each value.
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is something one does or does not have. As I am using the term, it only makes sense to
talk about the degree to which one has satisVed a goal, not the degree to which one has a
goal.6
To conclude, we must articulate the norms that govern how we set the constructive
parameters for a decision problem. Since the only constraints operative in Bayesian de-
cision theory are coherence constraints, the DM rationally sets these parameters just in
case they cohere with the rest of her deliberative judgments. In turn, the parameter setting
judgments or assumptions are coherent with a set of deliberative beliefs and desires just in
case the latter are coherent (i.e. properly constructed) with the former. For example, goals
constrain our desires so that a single unique utility is permitted. So a DM’s goal is coherent
with her deliberative desires if and only if her desires are representable by the appropriate
goal-relative utility. If this condition is not met, then either one’s desires or goals must be
revised. Since coherence is all that matters neither one’s goals nor deliberative desires are
more privileged.
6Of course, it makes sense to say that one really wants to achieve some particular goal as opposed to
another goal. However, this sense of goal is not operative for our purposes. For we are simply seeing goals as
judgments about a particular decision problem. Of course, on the colloquial use of ‘goal’, we can compare the
goals that we may potentially work towards. This type of comparison is relevant when we decide whether
we should pursue one goal or another. The decision-theoretic framework I have advocated can account for
this colloquial usage. For this means that the selection of a goal has become the object of a choice problem
and of course it makes sense to prefer selecting one goal much more than another. Choosing one goal will
simply have a greater expected utility than choosing another goal.
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2 Deliberation and Choice
The next set of all-or-nothing attitudes comes from a reWection on decision theory’s object
of study. For the concern is to understand rational deliberation and when we deliberate,
we assume that there is something that is to be done and that there is something that
can be done. The Vrst assumption highlights the fact that the purpose of deliberation is
to do something. The second assumption highlights the fact that when deliberating we
assume that the things to do are under our control. Therefore, it is in the very idea of
rational deliberation that it concludes with the adoption of a voluntary attitude. Whether
we choose to do something or not is obviously an all-or-nothing matter and so choosing
to X is a binary attitude that is central to decision theory.
While discussions of rational choice are primarily focused on practical deliberation
and choice, many writers have shown that the decision-theoretic framework can be ap-
plied to explicate theoretical rationality and choice as well.7 By viewing decision theory
as a framework that applies to both practical and theoretical rationality, decision theory
commits itself to seeing theoretical or epistemic rationality as a type of instrumental ra-
tionality.8 From the decision-theoretic point of view, the instrumental structure of rational
deliberation provides some unity to theoretical and practical reason.9
7(Levi 1983), (Maher 1993)
8See (Kelly 2003) for criticism’s of this view.
9Isaac Levi has called the shared instrumental structure of practical and theoretical reason, the unity of
reason. “The] diUerence between theoretical inquiry and practical deliberation is a diUerence in goals and
not a diUerence in the criteria for rational choice that regulate eUorts to realize these goals.” p.72, (Levi 1984)
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While practical and theoretical deliberation are structurally similar, there are some
clear diUerences between the two. For one, they are concerned with distinct ends. Theo-
retical deliberation is solely concerned with theoretical or epistemic goals while practical
deliberation is concerned with practical goals.10 Because of their distinct goals, theoretical
and practical deliberation are also concerned with diUerent types of choices. This means
that the conclusions of practical and theoretical deliberation are distinct. Practical delib-
eration concludes with the adoption of some pro-attitude or conative attitude. After all,
since practical deliberations pursue practical goals that move us to change the world in a
way that satisVes them, we must conclude our practical deliberations by adopting some
voluntary conative attitude. Theoretical deliberations pursue theoretic or epistemic goals
that move us to change how we think about the world. Therefore, theoretical deliberation
must conclude with the adoption of some voluntary cognitive attitude. I will not rehash
the arguments for this claim since I am in broad agreement with the thorough discussion
and arguments found in (Kaplan 1981), (Maher 1993), and (Harsanyi 1983). Each argue that
voluntary cognitive attitudes are needed in a theory of rationality.
2.1 Intending
Call the conative attitude we adopt at the conclusion of practical deliberation, intending.
When trying to choose between a trip to the beach or the mountains, we might conclude
our deliberation by intending to go to the beach. The intention to A is a practical attitude
10I take it that there are no constraints on what count as practical goals though there may be strong
constraints on what counts as an epistemic goal.
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that commits one to acting in a way that makes the world such that A is true.
The decision-theoretic concept of intention is similar to Michael Bratman’s view of
intentions. Bratman sees intentions as “conduct-controlling pro-attitudes, one which we
are disposed to retain without reconsideration, and which play a signiVcant role as inputs
to [means-ends] reasoning.”11 So an intention is a commitment to a plan of action and
similarly, the decision-theoretic concept of intention is a type of practical commitment
to acting in a particular way for the sake of a goal. Since normative decision theory is
traditionally understood as explicating the norms of practical decision making, there is
very little we need to say about the norms governing intendings. They are simply the
standard norms of rational choice.
2.2 Accepting
Theoretical deliberation concludes not by intending to do something, but by accepting a
proposition. Accepting is also a type of commitment, but rather than a commitment to
a plan of action, acceptance is a commitment to the truth of a proposition. To accept
that P is to commit to the truth of P as the conclusion of one’s deliberation. Theoretical
deliberation must conclude with the adoption of a cognitive attitude because it is only
through the adoption of a cognitive attitude that one’s theoretical goals can be satisVed. It
is only natural to see a theoretical deliberation as a type of inquiry and the goal of inquiry
11p.20, (Bratman 1987) Like Bratman, I’m happy to acknowledge that intentions as the outputs of practical
deliberation can also act as inputs to future deliberation. For instance, if I conclude one practical deliberation
with the intention to build a house, I may then use this intention as the goal of another deliberation on the
basis of which I consider a variety of plans to execute my intention or in this context, to satisfy my goal.
Since intentions often function as goals, they do indeed play a role as inputs to future decision making.
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is to make up one’s mind by committing to an answer. C.S. Peirce famously noted that “the
sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion.”12 Accepting P is what happens when
one commits to the truth of some proposition as the answer to a question.
The decision-theoretic concept of acceptance is closely related to L.J. Cohen’s notion of
acceptance.13 Cohen deVnes acceptance as an active and voluntary context-sensitive atti-
tude that one takes toward a proposition. For Cohen, acceptance is similar to the speech-act
of assent, the only diUerence is that acceptance is a mental act. Like intending, accepting
is an attitude that one has control over. On Cohen’s view, acceptance plays an additional
deliberative role. If one accepts that P, then one may take P as true in further deliberation.14
However, it is important to note that our decision-theoretic notion of acceptance does not
necessarily play this role. For the moment, one should simply see the decision-theoretic
notion of acceptance as referring to the cognitive attitude that is adopted as the conclusion
of theoretical deliberation. Of course, it may turn out that rational acceptance is suXcient
or necessary for the rational adoption of other attitudes, but that is something that must
be shown.
What are the norms governing acceptance? Choosing what to accept can be viewed
like any other choice problem. One may choose to accept P so long as one’s choice maxi-
mizes expected utility. The only caveat is that we diUerentiated theoretical from practical
12p.115, (Peirce, Houser, and Kloesel 1992)
13(Cohen 1992)
14Similarly, on Levi’s view, when one concludes that P as the result of one’s theoretical deliberation, one
updates one’s state of full beliefs (knowledge) such that P is true. This state of full belief is then used as a
standard of serious possibility for future deliberation.
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deliberation in terms of their respective goals. By adopting the local goal-relative account
of rational deliberation, we can accommodate this distinctive feature of theoretical delib-
eration. Theoretical deliberations are for the sake of theoretical goals. Therefore, one
rationally accepts P if and only if accepting P maximizes the agent’s expected goal-relative
utility, where the goal is a theoretical goal.
Deciding what to accept is a type of decision problem that Vts squarely within the
goal-relative account of rational choice. Acceptings are mental actions that are required
for satisfying our theoretical goals and the norms governing acceptance are simply the
norms governing any other type of choice. What one accepts ought to maximize the ex-
pected goal-relative utility. To Vll in the account, we just need to clarify what we mean by
theoretical goals.
On most every decision-theoretic account of acceptance, our theoretical goals have two
features. We want to have informative, cognitively rich beliefs about the world, but we also
want to ensure that these beliefs are likely to be true. William James famously captured
this two-fold demand with the motto, “Believe truth! Shun error!”15 We can see these
two demands as particular examples of the general two-fold nature of theoretical goals.
For every decision-theoretic account of theoretical deliberation sees the DM as balancing
risk of error with cognitive gain. Most accounts recognize that the risk of error is simply
some function of the probability that a proposition is false.16 So, if we can specify what we
15p.18, (James 1956)
16For example, risk of error could just be viewed as the inverse of the probability that it is true.
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mean by a cognitive gain, we will thereby be able to specify what goal-relative utility is for
theoretical rationality.
To illustrate, consider a few examples. Mark Kaplan has proposed that we desire to
accept a comprehensive view of the world.17 If the goal is having a comprehensive view
of the world, then cognitive utility is a measure of comprehensiveness. The expectation
that we achieve some level of comprehensiveness is then weighed relative to the likeli-
hood that such a comprehensive account is true. Thus, the expected utility of accepting
some hypothesis is determined by how comprehensive the hypothesis is relative to how
risky it is. Isaac Levi explicates the notion of cognitive gain by introducing the notion of
informational value. Informational value is a measure that has the same formal proper-
ties as a probability function. In the special case, it assigns equal value to each element
in the partition of potential answers.18 Patrick Maher separates one’s degrees of beliefs
from cognitive utility by adopting a subjective view of cognitive utility. He argues that we
can aggregate a plurality of scientiVc/epistemic values and represent them with a cognitive
utility function.19
For our purposes, we will not consider the variety of proposals about cognitive gain
and loss. I see no reason to think that there is a single theoretical goal and the various
proposals explicating the notion of cognitive utility may simply correspond to the various
17(Kaplan 1981)
18(Levi 2004)
19(Maher 1993) presents a representation theorem proving the existence of a cognitive utility function
when one’s preferences between theories obeys certain rational constraints.
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theoretical goals that we may have. The general claim is that one accepts a proposition as
the conclusion of theoretical deliberation and the general principle that a choice is rational
if and only if it maximizes expected utility applies equally when the choice concerns what
to accept.
3 Premising
The Vnal binary attitude I want to discuss is the attitude of taking a proposition for
granted.20 In both theoretical and practical deliberation, we often take certain proposi-
tions for granted. The deliberative role of this attitude is fairly clear. When one takes P
for granted, one is willing to use P as a premise in one’s reasoning within that deliberative
context.21 So, if one may take P for granted, then one is permitted to use P as a premise.
Premising is in direct contrast to the adoption of a voluntary attitude that concludes our
deliberations. And we have identiVed two diUerent types of conclusions. One concludes a
theoretical deliberation – deliberations with respect to theoretical goals – by accepting P.
And one concludes a practical deliberation – deliberations with respect to practical goals –
by intending P. So premising is an input to deliberation while accepting and intending are
outputs. I will also use taking for granted and premising to be synonymous.
Premising should also be diUerentiated from attitudes like supposing, hypothesizing, or
assuming since each of these attitudes implies a temporary act of imagination. When one
takes P for granted, one genuinely commits to the truth of P for the relevant deliberative
20There may be other binary attitudes, such as the binary attitude of desire that I will not consider.
21(Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), (Harman and Sherman 2004)
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context. In addition, premising is distinct from judgments of relevance. If one is choosing a
movie to watch and considers the duration of the movie as relevant, this does not mean that
she may take for granted that the movie is of a certain length. Nevertheless, judgments
of relevance do matter when we articulate the norms governing premising for we may
rationally take P for granted only if P is relevant for our decision making. After all, one’s
deliberative beliefs are only deVned over the space of relevant possibilities.
Since the fundamental concern of rational choice is to specify what it is to have a co-
herent evaluative standard, then the norms that govern premising should be faithful to this
concern. Now suppose that a DM has identiVed a stable set of deliberative judgments to be
used in the evaluation of her choices. This means that the DM has a coherent set of pref-
erences and a set of coherent preferences is enough to entail that one’s beliefs, desires, and
preferences are probabilities, utilities, and probability weighted utilities. These judgments
then specify the rational standard for that decision problem. So if the DM were to take P
for granted, then this judgment is rational only if her posterior evaluations are identical
to her prior evaluations. By positing this constraint, we are in eUect demanding stability
across coarsenings rather than reVnements of one’s decision problems. And this demand
ensures that the DM remains coherent in the way she evaluates her decision problem. So
as a Vrst pass we can propose that rational premising is stable premising, where stability
demands that one’s posterior preferences are identical to one’s prior preferences.
To illustrate this idea, consider the following four decision problems described in (Ta-
bles 3.1-3.4). Let H denote that the coin landed heads and ¬H that it lands tails. Assuming
3. Premising 99
that the agent’s utility is linear with the dollar prize, the expected utility of each bet is
given below as well as the expected utility when H is taken for granted.
H [.9] ¬H [.1]
A $10 $10
B $0 $200
Table 3.1: Case 1
EU(A)=10 EU(B)=20
EU(A|H)=10 EU(B|H)=0
H [.9] ¬H [.1]
A $10 $10
B $0 $10
Table 3.2: Case 2
EU(A)=10 EU(B)= 1
EU(A|H)= 10 EU(B|H)=0
H [.75] ¬H [.25]
A $10 $10
B $8 $20
Table 3.3: Case 3
EU(A)=10 EU(B)=11
EU(A|H)=10 EU(B|H)=8
H [.9] ¬H [.1]
A $10 $10
B $8 $20
Table 3.4: Case 4
EU(A)=10 EU(B)=9.2
EU(A|H)=10 EU(B|H)=8
In 1 and 3, we should not take H for granted since both H and ¬H are relevant to the
decision problem and if we took H for granted then our evaluation of the choices would
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alter. However, in 2 and 4, we can take H for granted because our resulting preferences
would remain stable. The only diUerence between 1 and 2 are the dollar amounts and the
only diUerence between 3 and 4 are the agent’s degrees of belief. So both one’s beliefs
and desires as well as one’s goal and evidential judgments on which they are based aUect
whether or not one may take a proposition for granted.
Unfortunately, this principle is too weak. Consider a situation in which the conse-
quences of one’s choice are always more desirable than the consequences of another. No
matter what the DM takes for granted, her preferences will be unaUected since one choice
is always preferred. The DM may thereby take any proposition for granted. However,
it is unintuitive to think there are situations in which one may arbitrarily believe either
P or ¬P and be rational in doing so. When premising that P, one is committing to its
truth so there should be some epistemic reason for this commitment. To ensure that what
a DM premises is not epistemically arbitrary, we can add in the weak condition that the
DM must judge that P is more likely than ¬P , meaning that p(P ) > .5. So our ratiVed
principle would read as follows:
Rational Premising: In a deliberative context where S has rationally constructed a
coherent set of deliberative judgments, S may rationally premise that P if and only
if p(P ) > p(¬P ) and S’s preferences remain stable.22
22(Fantl and McGrath 2002) present a similar proposal. However, they appeal to a notion of all-thing-
considered rationality that is in stark contrast to the deliberation-speciVc rationality proposed by construc-
tive decision theory. Moreover, since they are working within a context-independent notion of rationality,
they demand that one’s preference should remain stable in every decision problem. However, this would
amount to a type of skepticism since we can always Vnd some decision problem for which one’s preferences
would be destabilized by premising that P.
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4 Premising and Accepting
Premising and accepting are two diUerent types of context-sensitive commitments to the
truth of a proposition. What exactly is the relationship between them? Given the norms
that govern premising and accepting, we can show that the standards that govern accep-
tance are independent from the standards that govern premising. First, consider a choice
problem where A dominates B (Table 3.5).
H [.51] ¬H [.49]
A $10 $10
B $1 $2
Table 3.5: A Dominated Choice
Clearly we can take H for granted since premising H does not aUect one’s preferences
and H is more likely than ¬H. However, unless H were an extremely informative proposi-
tion, one would gain very little by accepting H, but incur a fairly large risk of error. Since
the norms of premising allow the DM to premise that H no matter how informative H is,
rationally premising that P does not entail that one may rationally accept that P. To be
clear, we are glossing over some details when we say this. When we say that premising
does not necessarily entail accepting, we mean to say that even if one may premise P in
deliberative context C, this does not entail that for every deliberative context C’ in which
P is one of the potential answers of a theoretical inquiry, one may accept P. It is of central
importance that the norms governing premising and accepting are relative to a deliberative
context.
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Now consider another case in which one is almost certain that H (e.g. The sun will rise
tomorrow). It seems natural to think that in many theoretical decision making contexts,
we would be rational to accept this proposition. After all, by accepting H we incur very
little risk of error. However, consider the following bet on the proposition H (Table 3.6).
H [.99] ¬H [.01]
A $1000 -$n
B $100 $1
Table 3.6: High Probability
Assuming utility is linear with dollar amount, then so long as n>$89099, then we can-
not take H for granted since taking H for granted would aUect our preferences. More
generally, for any H, no matter how comprehensive, informative, or likely, so long as one
oUers a horrible enough consequence, there will be a decision context where one may not
rationally take H for granted. So, rational acceptance does not necessarily entail rational
premising. As before, this claim means that just because there is some deliberative con-
text in which one may accept that P, this does not mean that for every other deliberative
context, one may premise that P.
5 Premising, Degrees of Belief, and Certainty
It is worth taking a moment to comment on the relationship between premising, accepting,
and partial believing. It is often thought that if one has the all-or-nothing belief that P, then
one must be certain that P. One reason for this is that degrees of belief are often thought
to be derived from what is taken for granted or believed in the all-or-nothing sense. On
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some accounts, like Isaac Levi’s, binary beliefs supply a standard of serious possibility
and rational degrees of belief ought to be derived from binary beliefs along with a set
of conVrmational commitments - commitments regarding how likely some proposition is
given one’s beliefs or evidence.
The account of premising and accepting that I have just laid out suggests a diUerent re-
lationship between binary beliefs and partial beliefs. My decision-theoretic account inverts
the standard account of the relationship between what one takes for granted in inquiry and
one’s degrees of belief. First, evidential assumptions rather than binary beliefs are the ra-
tional basis of one’s degrees of belief. These assumptions Vx the space over which one’s
degrees of beliefs are deVned and place constraints on what counts as a rational degree
of belief.23 Next, I have proposed that the norms that govern rational premising depend
in part on one’s degrees of beliefs. In a reversal of the standard normative relationship,
degrees of belief now serve as part of the rational basis for one’s binary beliefs.
Of course, within a particular deliberative context, if one takes P for granted, one is
thereby certain that P. However, the standard problems arising from the certainty of one’s
binary beliefs do not arise on this account. For on my view, one may only take P for granted
and thereby be certain that P only in cases where for all intents and purposes, it makes no
diUerence whether one maintains one’s degree of belief that P or is certain that P. Typically,
what is problematic about the idea that belief entails certainty is that such a view entails
some ridiculous consequences like being willing to bet one’s life on the truth of P for a
23The space of relevant possibilities also depends upon one’s goal judgments.
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very small gain. However, if belief and thereby certainty is only allowed in cases where it
wouldn’t matter whether one becomes certain or simply maintains one’s degrees of belief,
then certainty is only allowed in cases where there are no problematic consequences. And
there are very few propositions that one may rationally take for granted when one’s life is
at stake.
My account also abandons the orthodox view of the connection between what accepts
as the output of inquiry and one’s degrees of belief. Like premising, accepting is a context-
sensitive attitude and what one accepts in part depends upon one’s degrees of belief rather
than the other way around. After all, one may accept that P if and only if accepting P max-
imizes the expected goal-relative utility, where the goal is a theoretical goal. By accepting
P as the conclusion of an inquiry, one comes to the Vrm opinion that P is the answer to
a question. Because the attitudes adopted at the conclusion of theoretical deliberation are
binary cognitive attitudes, it does not make sense to ask whether the attitude of acceptance
entails certainty in one’s acceptance. However, even if we imagine that accepting P in a
deliberative context means that one is certain that P for that deliberative context, none of
the problematic consequences arise. For as we noted, accepting does not entail premising
and vice versa. So even if accepting P entails certainty, it is not a certainty that one may
base one’s future choices upon.
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6 The Ordinary Concept of Belief
In the proposed account, premising and accepting are context-sensitive attitudes whose
adoption is under our control. Moreover, each attitude has a distinct deliberative role and
the norms governing them are such that rational premising does not necessarily entail
rational accepting and vice versa. These decision-theoretic concepts seem to be diUerent
from the folk-linguistic concept of belief. First, it is often not under our control what we
do or do not believe. Next, we typically do not diUerentiate those beliefs that function as
the conclusions of inquiry from those that function as the premises for inquiry. Believing
that P seems to entail that we both accept that P and take P for granted.
Though the concepts that I have described here do not capture these features of the
ordinary notions of belief, this does not mean that they fail to account for our use of
the folk-linguistic concept of ‘belief’. I happily reject our folk psychological theories about
belief. And I think that the features of belief that I have just described are simply features of
a folk theory and they are not features that come from a careful study of our linguistic use.
And it may be the case that our use of ‘belief’ is better captured by the distinct concepts of
premising and accepting rather than the folk-theoretic concept. To illustrate, ascriptions of
belief are better explained by premising and accepting since they tend to be deeply context-
sensitive. When faced with dire consequences, we may be hesitant to say of a subject that
they believe even though it is a belief that we had previously ascribed. Moreover, we often
do ascribe belief in way that implies that this attitude is under a person’s control. After
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presenting a friend with reasons why I was late, I may state, “You can choose whether or
not to believe me.”
Having said that, it is not obvious that there is a single concept of belief that is associ-
ated with the English word ‘belief.’ Our folk-linguistic understanding of belief seems to be
a mongrel concept and for the purposes of developing a theory of rationality, I propose to
explicate – in the Carnapian sense – the ordinary concept of belief. Carnap’s explication
of the concept of probability oUers a paradigmatic example of this type of analysis.24 He
proposed that there are two distinct concepts of probability and diUerentiated their two
meanings and uses. And when the term ‘probability’ is used in a particular context, there
will be certain contextual features that determine whether ‘probability’ refers to one type
of probability or the other. Similarly, I think that there are two distinct concepts of be-
liefs and the decision-theoretic concepts of premising and accepting are meant to oUer an
explication of the ordinary concept.
7 Learning and Dynamic Rationality
To conclude our discussion of premising and accepting, I would like to address a concern
that arises from diUerentiating two notions of belief. In essence, it will be a version of the
worry, addressed at the end of the last chapter, that the local account of decision theory is
too localized.
The problem arises once we recognize that accepting and premising are attitudes that
24(Carnap 1945)
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one has only in the context of a particular decision problem. If these attitudes are context-
sensitive, then it’s unclear how our beliefs in one context ought to relate to our beliefs
in another context. Suppose we inquire into whether New York City is a larger city than
Seattle and accept that New York is larger. Subsequently, we are asked to choose between
two bets. Both bets depend upon the very same proposition, that NYC is larger than Seattle.
For one bet, we win a large monetary prize if this proposition is true and for the other we
win a large monetary prize if the proposition is false. Since we just accepted that New York
is larger than Seattle, it would appear rational to choose the former bet. Unfortunately, the
account of accepting and premising oUered here makes no such prescriptions since we
have no account of how the conclusions of our theoretical deliberations aUect what we
may take for granted in other deliberations. Nevertheless, shouldn’t the conclusions of our
theoretical inquiries matter to our future deliberations? When we deliberate and inquire
about the world, we learn something that we hope will provide us with information that
helps us to go about our lives.
The general worry is that the decision-theoretic account on oUer seems to have diX-
culties understanding how it is that we learn in a rational way. The strongest criticism is
that the local account prohibits rational learning. The weakest worry is that the account
provided is incomplete since it is silent on the rational connections between our cognitive
and conative attitudes across deliberative contexts. I’d like to address both worries. First,
I will directly address the strong concern about the prohibition of learning. The proUered
account does allow for rational learning though the Bayesian principles of dynamic ratio-
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nality have a limited role to play. I will oUer some reasons to adopt a restricted view of
these principles. Second, I defend the limited scope of the decision-theoretic project by
rehearsing some traditional distinctions between diUerent types of belief change. Bayesian
accounts of rationality have always ignored some changes of beliefs as outside the purview
of their theory and I discuss the reasons for this. Finally, I discuss one way in which the
theory is incomplete and propose how this gap might be Vlled in.
My decision-theoretic account takes the standard Bayesian framework for granted and
thereby inherits the principles of dynamic rationality that come with the framework. So
when the DM takes P for granted in a deliberative context, her probabilities must be up-
dated in accordance with Bayesian conditionalization. Nevertheless, the demands of con-
ditionalization are restricted to a particular framing of a decision problem. This means that
the Bayesian principles of dynamic rationality only tell us how we ought to learn in the
the context of a particular deliberation.
It seems appropriate to restrict the principles of dynamic rationality to a particular
deliberative context. First, when one moves from one deliberative context to another, one
changes the framing of the decision problem. In doing so, one may change the space of
possibilities relevant to the decision problem so one may adopt a diUerent set of evidential
assumptions. Conditionalization says nothing about how to change one’s probabilities
given a change in the space of possibilities or a change in the constructive parameters.
Bayesian conditionalization only applies relative to a Vxed space of possibilities and a Vxed
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assignment of prior probabilities.25
In addition, updating by conditionalization is a rational constraint that ensures that
one’s beliefs don’t change more than they ought to. This fundamental intuition of dynamic
rationality is often called the principle of minimal mutilation or change.26 The underlying
intuition is that if one does not have reasons to change one’s beliefs, then one ought not
to change one’s beliefs. Once a probability measure is deVned over the space of relevant
possibilities, conditionalization is only concerned to ensure that certain features of our
probabilities do not change more than they ought to.
Finally, it is important to note that traditionally not all changes of belief are meant to
be captured by the dynamic features of Bayesian rationality. For instance, suppose one
perceives that P. How to update one’s belief state when one accepts that P is governed by
Bayesian conditionalization, but the Bayesian account oUers no constraints or prescrip-
tions governing the direct change of belief resulting from experience. Such changes have
often been viewed as outside the purview of Bayesian rationality. So there is a standard
distinction made between those beliefs that are directly changed by virtue of experience
and those beliefs that are changed in virtue of other changes of belief. It is only the latter
type of change that is covered by the Bayesian principles of dynamic rationality.27
By articulating the nature and scope of our dynamic principles, it becomes clear how
25Patrick Suppes has been particularly vocal about the restricted signiVcance of Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion. C.f. (Suppes 1966), (Suppes 1977)
26The discussion in the last section of (Quine 1951) is often referenced as the source of this principle.
27See an argument for in (JeUrey 1983) and against in Levi’s contribution in (Swain 1970).
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limited they are. For the initial changes of belief are those that really do aUect the infor-
mation that one has about the world and it’s exactly these changes that are not covered.
Instead, these principles of rationality only demand that when one’s beliefs change, we
ought to conserve as much of our previous belief state as possible.
Traditionally, the decision-theoretic account of rationality has always ignored certain
types of belief change. While it may desirable to have these changes within the scope of
a theory of rationality, there are some methodological reasons to ignore them. Decision-
theoretic principles of rationality are the principles that govern rational deliberation. As a
result, these principles are identiVed in virtue of reWections on what it means to deliberate
well. So if there are changes of belief that are neither the direct or indirect result of delib-
eration, then it’s not clear that the decision-theoretic approach has anything to say about
the reasonableness of such changes. This is not to say that these changes are outside the
realm of rationality.28 They are just outside of the scope of a decision-theoretic inquiry
into the nature of rationality.
I hope that this short discussion about the nature of Bayesian rationality has eased
some of the worries the reader might have had about the role that learning has in the local
account. Nevertheless, I admit that the theory is incomplete for it fails to oUer a place and
explanation of the intuition that I Vrst mentioned. When we answer a question, we learn
something and what we learn aUects our future deliberations. My account has oUered no
place and explanation for this phenomenon. So let me make a very brief remark about this.
28(Burge 2003) provides a well-known account of how one’s perceptual belief can be justiVed in virtue of
experience.
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The process of learning seems to be much more subtle and complicated than most
accounts have suggested. On some views, when we rationally accept that P, we thereby
believe (and perhaps are justiVed in believing) that P in every subsequent deliberation. So
the belief that P is now in the set of one’s background cognitive attitudes. The problem
with this very simple view is that it fails to consider the deliberative context in which one
accepted that P and it fails to consider the nature of background attitudes. For when a DM
accepts that P, she is answering a question and has a particular goal in mind. Moreover,
her inquiry must demarcate certain possibilities as relevant or irrelevant. Because a DM’s
inquiries are more or less narrowly deVned, it’s not obvious that she should learn that
P is true when she accepts that P. Why should the sustained take away of a narrowly
demarcated inquiry be the very coarse-grained information that P is true? Why shouldn’t
the real take away be that P is the answer to a particular question framed in a particular
way? It is not an easy task to articulate how our background attitudes are or ought to be
aUected by one’s inquiries about the world. To solve this problem, we would need a better
picture of what our background cognitive attitudes look like and then we would need some
account of what it is that we may rationally learn when we answer a question. Taking on
this question would take us far astray so I will set this question aside.
8 Conclusion
We have amassed an inventory of binary attitudes, judgments, and assumptions that play
an important role in Bayesian decision theory. There are the constructive parameters that
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are essential to framing a decision problem and constructing our deliberative attitudes.
There are accepting’s and intending’s, which are the types of choices one makes as the
conclusion of one’s deliberations. Finally, there are premising’s which identify the propo-
sitions that one takes for granted in deliberation.
On the basis of these decision-theoretic binary attitudes, I hope to provide an analy-
sis of the folk-linguistic concept of knowledge. In chapter 4, I will present an account of
knowledge that I think does a good job of addressing the intuitions we have in the Gettier
cases. And in Chapters 5 and 6, I will take on the task of explaining our linguistic intu-






1 The Semantic and Pragmatic Inquiries
Many contemporary discussions about knowledge have been focused on two interrelated
inquiries. The pragmatic inquiry identiVes the role that knowledge plays which in turn
can be used to specify the value that knowledge has. Articulating the pragmatic or func-
tional role of knowledge is crucial to a satisfactory account because we want an account of
why and how knowledge is important.1 The semantic inquiry focuses on analyzing the
meaning of the ordinary concept of ‘knows’ by identifying the truth-conditions governing
knowledge ascribing and denying sentences. Since we want our analysis of knowledge to
be connected to the concept that we refer to in actual conversation, our analysis should
illuminate the semantics of ‘knows’. One may retort that a philosophical analysis need not
1The question of why knowledge is valuable is the fundamental value question, but we may also ask more
focused and detailed questions about the value of knowledge. (Pritchard 2007b) poses a set of secondary value
problemswhich ask why knowledge is more valuable than any proper subset of its parts. For example, we can
ask why knowledge is more valuable than true belief, justiVed belief, or even justiVed true belief. Finally, the
tertiary value problem concerns why we demarcate knowledge as a special property of one’s epistemic state
and not another similar, but less demanding or more demanding property. For my purposes, I will primarily
be focused on the simple question of why knowledge is valuable since these more speciVc questions often
presuppose certain ideas about what knowledge is.
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stick so closely to the ordinary folk concept.2 Perhaps, one’s account of knowledge should
only preserve some basic intuitions about ‘knows’. However, this would undermine some
of the interest we have in knowledge. Edward Craig notes,
There seems to be no known language in which sentences using ‘know’ do not
Vnd a comfortable and colloquial equivalent. The implication is that it answers
to some very general needs of human life and thought, and it would surely be
interesting to know which and how.3
Part of what makes knowledge philosophically interesting is that the concept ‘knows’ and
its cognates are commonplace and ubiquitous. Our everyday conversations involve as-
criptions, withholdings, and denials of knowledge and a satisfying philosophical account
of knowledge should be able to account for this usage. As Craig’s quote suggests, the
pragmatic and semantic inquiries of knowledge are intertwined. We are interested in the
epistemological concept of knowledge because we take it to be useful and important.
2 The Standard Variability of Knowledge
The standard variability of knowledge is one of its most important and elusive features. An
adequate account of knowledge must identify what factors are relevant for determining the
standards that a true belief must meet to count as knowledge. By focusing on this feature of
knowledge, I hope to develop an account of knowledge that addresses both the pragmatic
and semantic concerns.
2One may interpret Descartes as engaged in this type of constructive aUair by identifying knowledge as
that class of beliefs that are infallible and incorrigible on which one can base the sciences and metaphysics.
3p.2, (Craig 1999)
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Two types of cases have become central in highlighting the standard variability of
knowledge: Gettier cases and contextualist cases. The 1999 remake of the The Thomas
Crown AUair presents a nice found example of a Gettier case. In the movie, the protagonist
secretly steals Monet’s San Giorgio Maggiore at Dusk from the Metropolitan Museum of
Art. Then, in a seemingly magnanimous gesture, he oUers to replace the stolen painting
with one by another French Impressionist, Camille Pissaro. At the climax of the movie, the
police try to foil Thomas Crown’s plan to return the stolen painting, but he accomplishes
the task by simply pulling the Vre alarm at the museum. As the sprinklers activate, the
surface of the donated painting dissolves, revealing it to be a forgery, meticulously water
painted over the previously stolen Monet.
Thomas’ elaborate ruse places Catherine Banning, the insurance agent sent to help
the police investigation, in a Gettier situation. As she looks at the donated painting, she
believes that she is standing in front of a painting by a French Impressionist, her belief
is true, and she is in a very strong epistemic state with respect to this proposition. After
all, her perceptual faculties are working properly, she is very familiar with Pissaro and his
paintings, and she has no reason to think that Thomas Crown would present the museum
with a forgery. Nevertheless, Catherine does not know that she is in front of a painting
by a French Impressionist. Her justiVcation comes from her relation to the painted surface
rather than the genuine Monet lying underneath. Since the latter makes her belief true,
her justiVcation is not appropriately connected with the relevant facts and is insuXcient
to turn her true belief into knowledge. In Gettier situations such as these, the subject is
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lucky to have a true belief and luck is antithetical to knowledge.
On the standard story, Gettier Cases undermine the justiVed true belief analysis of
knowledge by showing that one can always concoct situations where a fallibly justiVed
belief, no matter how strong one’s justiVcation, is nevertheless true by luck. However, by
showing that there is no Vxed standard that a subject’s epistemic state can meet that always
turns her true belief into knowledge, these cases also show that so long as knowledge is
possible, the standards for knowledge must vary from case to case. So Gettier cases oUer
one important class of examples of the standard variability of knowledge.
Contextualist cases feature a very diUerent way in which the standards governing
knowledge vary. These cases come in pairs where the standards required for knowledge
are fairly low in one case and very high in another. For example, if I make myself sand-
wiches with cursory knowledge of the ingredients, it may seem true to say that I know
the sandwich contains no peanuts. But if I serve sandwiches to a friend who has a serious
allergy to peanuts, the same assertion may no longer seem true and I should go and double
check. Given the precarious situation my friend is in – he might die if he eats any peanuts
– the standards for knowledge are very high and I fail to meet them. In both cases, I am
in the same epistemic state with respect to the target proposition. So the strength of my
epistemic state remains Vxed and the only thing that diUerentiates the two cases are the
practical consequences of being wrong. In general, contextualist cases are constructed to
show that the epistemic standards required for knowledge depend upon practical factors –
which are subjective or objective factors that are unrelated to the likelihood that the target
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proposition is true.
In contrast, Gettier cases deal with objective truth-relevant factors – which are objective
factors of the subject’s situation that are related to the likelihood that the target proposi-
tion is true.4 The objective fact that the Pissaro is a fake and that a genuine Monet lies
underneath prevents Catherine from knowing. Since both Gettier and contextualist cases
oUer distinct examples of the standard variability of knowledge, it would be desirable to
have a general account that explains how these standards are determined in every context.
It is important to note that this feature of knowledge comes from our intuitions about the
truth and falsity of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences. So the need to account for
the standard variability of knowledge arises directly from our semantic concerns
2.1 Two Accounts of Standard Variability: Contextualism and SSI
In response to the contextualist cases, two views have received the most attention, Con-
textualism and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI). Both views oUer very dif-
ferent explanations of the standard variability of knowledge. For the contextualist, the
variability of standards stems from the fact that the meaning of ‘knows’ is sensitive to
features of the attributor’s conversational context, denoting diUerent relations that are each
associated with distinct epistemic standards. In contrast, the subject-sensitive invariantist
countenances a single knowledge relation and proposes that the standards of knowledge
vary because knowledge is individuated by its deliberative role. So the standards for knowl-
edge depend upon features of the subject’s deliberative context and in diUerent deliberative
4(DeRose 2009) discusses the diUerences between these cases.
2. The Standard Variability of Knowledge 118
contexts, diUerent epistemic standards must be met in order to know.
By showing that the standards of knowledge depend upon objective truth-relevant fac-
tors, Gettier cases oUer additional data that can be used to compare the relative merits
of contextualism and SSI. The Vrst goal of this chapter is to show that the contextualist
account runs into insurmountable diXculties dealing with the Gettier cases. Next, I will
show that there is a version of SSI that can adequately explain our Gettier intuitions, oUer-
ing a reason to favor SSI’s account of the standard variability of knowledge. In chapter 6, I
will complete the discussion of the standard variability of knowledge by showing how SSI
can explain our intuitions in the contextualist cases.
2.2 Two Anti-Luck Epistemologies
Just as Gettier cases can be used to compare contextualism and SSI, these cases can also
be used to diUerentiate two Anti-Luck Epistemologies. For it is generally acknowledged
that to address Gettier cases, one must explain why knowledge precludes epistemic luck.
And by considering their details, contextualism and SSI are naturally associated with two
diUerent types of anti-luck epistemologies. My discussion of contextualism will highlight
its connection with Modal Epistemologies, which deal with the counterfactual sen-
sitivities of a subject’s belief and have often been motivated by discussions of epistemic
luck. In contrast, SSI is naturally articulated as a Decision-Theoretic Epistemology.
A decision-theoretic epistemology appeals to decision theory to articulate what it is for a
decision maker to be in a rational state of mind with respect to a decision problem and
then explicates knowledge as a feature of this rational state of mind. My discussion of SSI
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will highlight this connection and I will present a novel decision-theoretic version of SSI
by appealing to the Constructive Decision Theory developed in the previous chapters.
I will conclude my discussion of Gettier cases by describing the anti-luck epistemology
that arises from the decision-theoretic account of knowledge. What emerges is a view
that sees luck as intrinsically connected to the outcomes of actions and I use this proposal
to bring together discussions of the standard variability of knowledge and epistemic luck.
Gettier and contextualist cases show that the standards for knowledge are sensitive to both
practical factors and truth-relevant objective factors. This dual sensitivity is necessary if
knowledge is to preclude epistemic luck. In each situation, the context-sensitive standard
variability of knowledge determines a standard such that if it were met, the outcomes of
the actions one would perform if deliberating on the basis of what one knows would not
be lucky.
My hope is that the decision-theoretic version of SSI will help to answer the pragmatic
and semantic questions about knowledge. By developing a decision-theoretic account of
knowledge, we directly address the pragmatic questions by articulating the deliberative
role of knowledge. And if the proposed account can explain the standard variability of
knowledge exhibited in both Gettier and contextualist cases, we will have gone a long way
to providing an adequate semantic account of ‘knows’.
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3 Contextualism
Contextualism is primarily a semantic theory about ‘knows’. Contextualists argue that
just as ‘I’ and ‘here’ respectively denote diUerent speakers and places, ‘knows’ may denote
diUerent relations between subjects and propositions in diUerent contexts of utterance.
Call the set of denoted relations knowledge-relations. Contextualism is epistemologically
signiVcant because it rejects the orthodoxy in countenancing not just one but a family of
knowledge-relations. The commitment to a context-sensitive semantics of ‘knows’ and a
plurality of knowledge-relations constitutes the core of a contextualist epistemology. To
evaluate the contextualist’s account of the Gettier cases, we must be able to assess the truth
of particular knowledge attributions and denials. This requires bare bones contextualism
to be Vlled in by answering two questions:
1. What are knowledge-relations?
2. How do we determine which knowledge-relation is picked out by an attribution or
denial of knowledge?
3.1 Contextualism + Modal Epistemology
To answer the Vrst question, contextualists typically appeal to a modal epistemology.5
Modal epistemologies, such as the sensitivity, safety, and relevant alternatives theory, view
knowledge as a kind of necessity. On each view, a subject knows that P if and only if P
is true and the subject is in the appropriate relation to P in the set of relevant possible
5(Heller 1999) discusses this connection.
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worlds. Though the following discussion applies to most versions of contextualism, to be
more concrete, I will consider a contextualized version of the safety theory in more detail.6
Safety theorists introduce the following notion:7
Safe Belief: S’s belief that P is safe if and only if in nearly all (if not all) near-by possible
worlds where S believes that P , P is true.
As reliable indicators that the believed proposition is true, safe beliefs oUer one explication
of non-lucky beliefs and can be used to oUer an account of knowledge, thereby specifying
what knowledge-relations are: S knows that P if and only if P is true and S has a safe
belief that P .
Any modal epistemology should explain why every possible world is not relevant for
knowing. For the safety account, if too many possible worlds are considered to be suX-
ciently close, no belief would be safe and the safety requirement would amount to skep-
ticism. If brain-in-a-vat worlds are relevant, most of our perceptual beliefs would fail to
be safe since such beliefs would persist in these worlds but be false. Like all modal epis-
temologies, the safety theory faces the diXcult task of providing a principled account of
how to demarcate the set of relevant possible worlds.
By going contextualist and answering the second question, an account can be provided.
Contextualists propose that each knowledge-relation is individuated by the set of possible
6(Cohen 1998) and (Brogaard 2004) respectively criticize the way contextualized relevant alternatives
and sensitivity accounts resolve the Gettier problem. Though many safety theorists, like Ernest Sosa and
Duncan Pritchard, present their views as competitors of contextualism, one might adopt a contextualized
safety theory to address some criticisms of the safety account.
7(Pritchard 2007a) oUers a lengthy discussion of how to articulate safety.
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worlds that count as relevant in a conversational context. Features of the speaker’s context
are then used to determine which possible worlds count as relevant. These speaker-sensitive
factors are either objective features of the speaker’s situation or subjective features, which
are those that the speaker is aware of. Speaker-sensitive factors are appealed to because
such factors typically determine what is expressed by a context-sensitive expression. For
example, the meaning of ‘here’ depends upon the speaker’s location, ‘tall’ on the compari-
son class that is salient to the speaker.
For the contextualist, the set of relevant possible worlds is determined by those pos-
sibilities that are conversationally salient to the speaker. If I bring up the possibility that
your car might have been stolen, this possibility becomes conversationally salient so stolen
car worlds are now relevant for the knowledge attributions that we make in our conver-
sation.8 In addition, any world that is just as close as these stolen car worlds also count
as relevant. Similarity determines which worlds are close to one another. World w is just
as close as world w’ if and only if w is similar to w’. In order to Vx the relevant notion of
similarity, the contextualist makes a second appeal to conversational salience, only what is
saliently similar counts as relevant. Since stolen car possibilities typically bring to salience
the general possibility of neighborhood crime, worlds where similar crimes have occurred
will be saliently similar. Thus, if stolen car worlds are relevant then so might worlds where
your car has been vandalized.
8This is a bit of simplication. In chapter 4 of (DeRose 2009) discusses a variety of views about how
standards may be raised or lowered. I present my own view in Chapter 6 that is in rough agreement with the
view DeRose proposes.
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The contextualist’s appeal to conversational salience oUers a way for the modal epis-
temologist to avoid skepticism. After all, in some contexts, only a small set of possible
worlds is salient and this means that a fairly low epistemic standard is all that is required
to stand in the attributed knowledge-relation. So contextualism and modal epistemologies
Vt together nicely. A modal epistemology speciVes the family of knowledge-relations that
‘knows’ refers to and contextualism speciVes which one of these relations is picked out by
‘knows’ in a given conversational context.
3.2 The Contextualist’s Account of Gettier Cases
The contextualist approaches the Gettier problem from the point of view of the attributor
of knowledge. As attributors who know the plot of the movie, our awareness that the
painted surface is a forgery and that a genuine Monet lies underneath brings to salience a
number of possibilities. First, the actual world must obviously be counted as being nearby.
Next, the actual world brings to light the general possibility that the perceived painting
could be a forgery. As a result, any non-actual worlds where the perceived painting is a
forgery are saliently similar so they also count as nearby. A particularly salient set of non-
actual forgery worlds are ones where the forgery is painted over a blank canvas rather
than a genuine Monet. Given the perceptual basis for Catherine’s belief, in these worlds,
she would have formed the same belief that she was standing in front of a painting by a
French Impressionist. Since her belief would be false and these worlds are relevant, her
belief fails to be safe. So safety contextualism accurately predicts that Catherine fails to
know.
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Unfortunately, if these non-actual forgery worlds are not salient, they are not relevant
and we get the wrong results. The audience is surprised to learn at the end of the movie
that the donated Pissaro is a fake. Since they are previously unaware of this fact, non-actual
forgery possibilities are not relevant for attributions of knowledge made by the audience
earlier in the movie. The safety contextualist is committed to the claim that in this situation
the knowledge-relation ascribed between Catherine and the target proposition is one that
she stands in even if her belief fails to be true in many non-actual forgery worlds. Since
her belief would be true in ordinarily salient worlds, like ones where she is looking at
genuine paintings by other French Impressionists, contrary to our intuitions, attributions
of knowledge made earlier in the movie would be true.
Stewart Cohen has argued that the contextualist’s resolution fails in virtue of its appeal
to speaker-sensitive factors to determine which knowledge-relation is denoted by a knowl-
edge attribution or denial.9 Call skeptical and Gettier possibilities those possible worlds that
are respectively made salient by skeptical hypotheses and Gettier cases. For the contextu-
alist, both skeptical and Gettier possibilities are not always salient to the speaker so they
are not always relevant. In contrast, our intuitions tell us that Gettierized subjects fail
to know regardless of the context in which the knowledge attribution is made so Gettier
possibilities should always be relevant.
Cohen diagnoses this failure as a misunderstanding of when to apply the contextual-
ist’s strategy. The appeal to speaker-sensitive factors work best for pairs of cases where
9(Cohen 1998)
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our intuitions about the truth of certain sentences lack stability. The meaning of ‘tall’
is context-sensitive because in one context, the sentence “Catherine is tall” seems to be
true and in another context, the same sentence seems to be false. In contrast, our intu-
itions about the truth of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences in Gettier cases do
not exhibit much instability. Therefore, they do not lend themselves to a contextualist
explanation.
In response to these diXculties, the contextualist could turn to a mixed strategy, ap-
pealing to speaker-sensitive features to explain why skeptical possibilities may sometimes
be ignored and then to another set of factors to explain why Gettier possibilities can never
be ignored. And in Gettier cases, it seems clear that the standards depend upon subject-
sensitive factors. Subject-sensitive factors are either objective factors of the subject’s actual
situation or subjective factors, which are those that the subject takes into account. In
Catherine’s case, the objective fact that she perceives a fake Pissaro that is painted over
a genuine Monet prevents her from knowing regardless of whether she or the attributor
of knowledge takes this possibility into account. And we must diUerentiate the objective
factors of the subject – features of the world the subject is in – from the objective factors
of the speaker – features of the world the speaker is in – because as speakers we can at-
tribute knowledge to subjects in non-actual worlds. In Gettier cases, our attributions of
knowledge depend upon the world the subject is in and not the world that the speaker is
in.
Unfortunately, if we appeal to subject-sensitive factors, we run into a serious diXculty.
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For the account is constrained on one end by the need to avoid skepticism and on the other
end by the need to ensure that Gettier possibilities are always relevant and Gettierized
subjects always fail to know. So we need some subject-sensitive rule that includes Gettier
possibilities and excludes skeptical possibilities as relevant. What subject-sensitive dis-
tinction will do? From the subject’s point of view, skeptical and Gettier possibilities seem
to be both objectively and subjectively similar. Skeptical possibilities where Catherine is
a brain-in-a-vat and Gettier possibilities where the forged Pissaro has no genuine Monet
underneath are both non-actual so they seem similar from the objective point of view. In
addition, both possibilities are perfectly compatible with Catherine’s evidence so they ap-
pear subjectively similar as well. So if Gettier possibilities are always relevant, its hard to
see why skeptical possibilities are not. David Lewis, acknowledging this diXculty in his
own account, wrote that it would be better to Vnd a way to reformulate the rule that deter-
mines what is relevant “so as to get the needed exception without ad hocery. I do not know
how to do this.”10 So the contextualist appears to have two equally undesirable options. If
the standards for knowledge only vary with speaker-sensitive factors, Gettier possibilities
are sometimes deemed irrelevant so Gettierized subjects sometimes count as knowing. If
subject-sensitive factors are then included as varying the standards for knowledge, both
Gettier and skeptical possibilities always appear to be relevant. It’s not clear how one can
salvage the contextualist’s explanation of the Gettier cases.
10(Lewis 1996), p.556-557
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4 Subject-Sensitive Invariantism
In opposition to contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism views the meaning of ‘knows’
as being invariant across diUerent contexts of use. Thus, knowledge ascribing sentences
always ascribe the same relation between the subject and a proposition. SSI proposes to
individuate this relation in virtue of the role that knowledge plays in underwriting what
we taken for granted in deliberation. This intuition is motivated by everyday examples. It
is natural to state that you should wear a seat belt because you don’t know that you will
not get in an accident. Since you don’t know, you shouldn’t take this fact for granted and
if you don’t take this fact for granted, you should wear a seatbelt. This suggests that one
should take P for granted only if one knows that P . Moreover, if you did know, you may
assume that you will not get in an accident and would be justiVed in not wearing a seat
belt. So if you know that P , then you may take P for granted. These types of examples
support the core SSI thesis:11
Knowledge-Deliberation Thesis (KDT): In a given deliberative context, S knows
that P if and only if P is true and in that deliberative context, S believes that P and
is rational to take P for granted.
KDT suggests that the standards required for knowledge depend upon practical features
of the subject’s deliberative context. After all, the standards required to rationally take P
for granted depend upon the subject’s practical factors. For an ordinary lunch, my regular
11Subject-sensitive invariantists disagree about how to articulate the role of knowledge in deliberation (c.f.
(Fantl and McGrath 2002) and (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008)). I will simply take KDT for granted, hoping
that we can evaluate KDT by its fruits. Furthermore, for ease of explanation, ‘believing’ will be taken to be
synonymous with ‘taking for granted’.
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patronage puts me in a strong enough epistemic state for me to take it for granted that the
food will not make me sick. When I go to the same local diner as the King’s royal taster,
a higher standard must be met to take the same proposition for granted because there is
more at stake.
4.1 A Decision-Theoretic Epistemology: SSI + Constructive Decision Theory
The commitment to an invariantist semantics of ‘knows’ and a thesis like KDT connecting
knowledge and deliberation constitutes a generic SSI. As with a generic contextualism,
to assess SSI’s explanation of Gettier cases, this bare bones account must be Vlled in to be
able to assess the truth or falsity of particular knowledge attributions. SSI is naturally Vlled
in by appealing to a decision-theoretic account of rationality that answers the following
question: when may a subject take a proposition for granted in deliberation? The answer
can then be plugged back into KDT to supply a detailed account of knowledge. In the
previous chapter, I oUered such an account:
Rational Premising: In a deliberative context where S has rationally constructed a
coherent set of deliberative judgments, S may rationally premise that P if and only
if p(P ) > p(¬P ) and S’s preferences remain stable.12
Before we can use the concept of rational premising to develop an account of knowl-
edge, we need to add one additional detail which will allow us to diUerentiate two types of
12One way in which this proposal and the account of knowledge on which it is based diUers from the ones
oUered by (Weatherson 2005), (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008), and (Fantl and McGrath 2009) is the simple
reason that it does not reduce full belief to a certain type of partial belief. Rational Premising articulates the
conditions under which one may rationally premise that P. They are not the conditions under which a partial
belief counts as a full belief. For this reason, I believe that my account can deal with many of the powerful
objections raised against reductive accounts in (Ross and Schroeder 2012).
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rational premising. In our discussion of the Gettier cases, we noted that the justiVcation
needed for knowledge must account for or be sensitive to objective factors of the subject’s
situation. It is this type of sensitivity that is needed to eliminate epistemic luck. Thus,
most epistemologists believe that the justiVcation required for knowledge must account
for external, objective factors. It might be thought that decision theory articulates a purely
subjective notion of rationality and is thereby unsuitable for explicating the externalist
type of justiVcation needed for knowledge. Nevertheless, not all decision theories work
with purely subjective notions.13 By appealing to the idea that decision problems aren’t
given to us and that what counts as relevant must be demarcated, we will see that con-
structive decision theory can be used to develop an externalist account of rational belief.
By providing an externalist interpretation of rational premising, we will be able to provide
an account of knowledge that addresses these cases.
In constructive decision theory, a deliberative belief is rational within a particular de-
liberative context and in previous discussions, I’ve only articulated how this context is
deVned by the DM’s subjective judgments, particularly her goals. What counts as relevant
is captured by a decision model which determines the set of relevant states and conse-
quences. And we noted that ultimately what matters or is relevant in deliberation must
depend upon what deliberation is for. So when it comes to demarcating the set of relevant
consequences, it is natural to be solely focused on the DM’s goals. So the relevant con-
13The use of objective probabilities in (Neumann and Morgenstern 1953) oUers one such example, but
the view presented here is closest to (Pratt, RaiUa, and Schlaifer 1964) in which one appeals to thought-
experiments to assign probabilities.
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sequences will always be determined by the DM’s subjective judgments. However, when
it comes to demarcating the relevant states, both subjective and objective considerations
may come into play.
By distinguishing two ways in which the set of relevant states are determined, con-
structive decision theory can be used to articulate a purely subjective, internalist account
of rational belief or an objective, externalist account of rational belief. If the set of relevant
states is determined solely by the DM’s subjective judgments, then the resulting account
of rational belief will be a purely subjective one. Call S’s belief subjectively stable if and
only if S’s belief is stable in a deliberative context deVned only by the subjectively relevant
states and consequences. Accounting for objective factors results in an externalist account
of rational belief. Call S’s belief subjectively and objectively stable if and only if S’s
belief is stable in a deliberative context deVned by the subjectively and objectively relevant
states and consequences.
What does it mean for a state to be subjectively or objectively relevant? In our frame-
work, only consequence-determining and evidentially-relevant states count as relevant.
So any explanation of what counts as relevant must appeal to the fact that a state is
consequence-determining or evidentially relevant. Moreover, only the DM herself has
authority over which states count as consequence-determining or evidentially-relevant so
every explanation of why a state is relevant must appeal to the DM’s subjective judgments.
And I proposed that these judgments are context-sensitive judgments or assumptions that
specify the constructive parameters for a decision problem. So far, constructive decision
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theory oUers no place for objective facts in the demarcation of the set of relevant states
and consequences. However, I believe we can identify one and only place at which such
facts may enter in. Let’s turn to an example to illustrate.
Suppose Catherine is trying to decide whether to take a cab or the train back home
from the museum. And the only pair of states that she has judged to be consequence-
determining are the ones in which there is or is not traXc on the road. Now, there are
two ways in which states may be relevant for assessing the probability of consequence-
determining states. First, consider the case in which Catherine thinks it is likely that the
President is visiting the city and judges that this possibility is relevant for assessing the
likelihood of traXc. Such a possibility is evidentially-relevant and since the explanation of
its relevance only appeals to the DM’s own judgments about what counts as relevant, it is
merely subjectively relevant.
In contrast, consider a diUerent case in which there has been an accident on the streets.
Catherine is unaware of this fact and has not considered this possibility. Thus, Catherine
has not judged the possibility of an accident as being relevant for her deliberation. How-
ever, let’s suppose that Catherine recognizes that car accidents result in traXc. Since there
has in fact been an accident, then from the point of view of the objective observer, Cather-
ine ought to consider this possibility. Moreover, the explanation of its relevance appeals to
both an objective fact and the DM’s own judgments. First, there has been a car accident.
Second, from the point of view of the omniscient observer, given the information Cather-
ine has, if Catherine had taken it for granted that there had been a car accident, she would
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have come to a very diUerent assessment of the likelihood of traXc. The intuitive notion
of objective relevance comes from the observation that true but unconsidered propositions
relevant for assessing the likelihood of consequence-determine states ought to taken to be
account.
To oUer a more detailed deVnition of objective relevance, let me introduce a distinction
and some terminology. From the constructive point of view, there is a diUerence between
bringing a possibility to mind and considering that possibility in one’s deliberation. I can
bring to mind the possibility that I am a brain-in-a-vat, but this does not mean that I have
thereby taken this possibility into account when I deliberate. In order to take this skeptical
possibility into account, I must reconstruct my beliefs over all the relevant states in a such
a way that accounts for this possibility. Just thinking about a possibility does not mean
that one has accounted for it.
The notion of objective relevance is meant to capture the idea that there are some
actualized states whose consideration would aUect our constructed probability judgments.
To capture the idea that probabilities are constructed relative to a space of relevant states,
let pX(s) be the probability of s where s ∈ X and X is the set of relevant states. Next, we
must capture what it would be for the DM to take a previously unconsidered state z (i.e.
z /∈ X) into account. We can capture this in the following way. If Z is the reVnement of
X that takes state z into account, then pZ(s) is the newly constructed probability that has
considered z. Now we can oUer the following deVnition.
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Objective Relevance: A state y is objectively relevant if and only if y is actual, y /∈ X ,
and for some s ∈ X where X is the set of relevant states and Y is the reVnement of
X that takes y into consideration, pY (s|y) 6= pX(s).
Objectively relevant states are actual states of the world whose consideration as being
true would aUect the probability judgments one constructs over the set of relevant states.
For Catherine’s decision problem, the state of the world in which there is an accident is
objectively relevant because there has been an accident and if Catherine considered this
possibility and took it for granted that y obtained, the resulting probabilities would be
aUected. It is important to note that just because pY (s|y) 6= pX(s), this does not entail that
pY (s|¬y) 6= pX(s).14 If it did, then every state would count as objectively relevant leaving
us with an unrealistic account of knowledge. A simple example will explain why. Let y be
the state in which Magneto, the villain of X-Men fame, has held up traXc all over the city.
Just because one considers this possibility and takes it for granted that it does not obtain
does not mean that one will become more or less conVdent that there is or is not traXc
on the freeway. When it comes to outlandish possibilities, it does not matter whether one
ignores them or takes it for granted that they do not obtain. One’s beliefs remain the same
either way.15
14This means that the types of conditional probabilities that I am considering are diUerent from standard
conditional probabilities. After all, typically p(x|y) 6= p(x) if and only if p(x|¬y) 6= p(x). The reason
the two types of conditional probabilities diverge is simple. Conditional probabilities assume that probabil-
ities are deVned over what one is conditionalizing upon. However, in the cases I am considering, we are
conditionalizing on a state that has not yet been considered so no probabilities have been deVned.
15There is a simple argument why the shift from ignoring whether or not P to premising that ¬P should
not always aUect one’s beliefs. There are an uncountable number of outlandish skeptical possibilities. And
if we raised our probabilities for every skeptical possibility that was assumed not to hold, this would give us
an artiVcial and unreasonable way for us to become extremely conVdent in contingent propositions.
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Two additional objections present themselves. First, many objective facts are mislead-
ing and in accounting for them, we would have an inaccurate assessment of the DM’s
epistemic state. For example, if Catherine is unaware that the President is in town, that
possibility is nevertheless objectively relevant for Catherine’s assessment of the likelihood
of traXc. However, it may also turn out that the President’s staU has decided not to travel
through the city in a motorcade, choosing instead to travel by helicopter. In this situation,
the initial fact about the President whereabouts are misleading. And were Catherine to
account for only this possibility, her belief that there is no traXc may be weakened enough
to undermine her claim to knowledge. In response, it is important to note that such facts
are misleading only when considered on their own. And if all the objectively relevant facts
are considered, we have an objectively accurate assessment of the DM’s epistemic state.
Next, it may be objected that there are too many objectively relevant facts, resulting
in a psychologically unrealistic account of knowledge. This objection does have some in-
tuitive pull. In fact, for subjects who possess very strong epistemic states with respect to
propositions about traXc, a very large number of states may be objectively relevant. After
all, well-positioned subjects should be able to identify evidential connections that others
would not be able to recognize. For example, such subjects may possess statistical infor-
mation about the relationship between weather and traXc making facts about the weather
relevant. Though I acknowledge the worry, I am not sure how problematic it is and can
only oUer a tentative reply. It should be admitted that in most situations, there are a great
deal of objectively relevant states. However, why should we think that there are an unman-
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ageable number of them. Since we are cognitively limited subjects, our epistemic states are
limited as well and this places an upperbound on the number of evidential connections
that we can recognize. And that bound oUers one way to restrict the number of states
that count as objectively relevant. This may be an overly optimistic view, but I think the
burden is on the opponent to show that this is indeed a serious problem. It is for the same
reason that I embraced the burden of showing that the comprehensive account of rational
deliberation is an unrealistic view of rationality.
Using the notion of a subjectively and objectively stable belief to characterize the ex-
ternalist account of rational belief needed for knowledge, we can appeal to KDT to propose
a decision-theoretic account of knowledge:
Stability Account of Knowledge: In a given deliberative context, S knows that P
if and only if P is true and in that deliberative context, S premises that P and her
premising that P is subjectively and objectively stable.16
The stability account addresses the two problems that faced a contextualized modal episte-
mology. Because of its appeal to speaker-sensitive factors, the contextualist was committed
to the claim that Gettier possibilities were deemed irrelevant when they were not conver-
sationally salient. This lead to the unintuitive claim that Gettierized subjects sometimes
counted as knowing. On the stability account, the only factors that aUect the epistemic
standards required to know are factors of the subject’s deliberative context and are thereby
subject-sensitive factors. It should also be noted that this brand of SSI countenances more
deliberative factors than are typically considered. SSI typically proposes to expand the fac-
16For the remainder of the chapter, I will use ‘premising’ as being synonymous with ‘believing’.
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tors that determine the standards for knowledge to include the subject’s practical stakes.
The stability account proposes that the standards for knowledge depend even more broadly
on all the subjective and objective factors that set the parameters for the subject’s delib-
eration. For example, knowing will depend upon the values that count as relevant in the
subject’s deliberative context. Another important feature of this account is that it inverts
the relationship between knowledge and the set of relevant states. On many views, what
one knows determines the set of relevant states and one’s probabilities are then deVned
over this space.17 In contrast, I take the set of relevant states to be determined by the way
we Vll in the constructive parameters to a decision problem and how we set these param-
eters also serve as the basis for our probabilities. What one knows is then determined by
the truth and stability of one’s preferences and full beliefs.
Next, modal epistemologies ran into diXculty because it was diXcult to imagine a
principled way to diUerentiate Gettier possibilities from skeptical possibilities that would
allow us to ignore skeptical hypotheses while ensuring that Gettier possibilities are always
deemed relevant. The appeal to similarity failed to diUerentiate the two because both types
of possibilities seemed to be similar from both the objective and subjective point of view.
The distinction between objectively and subjectively relevant states oUers a principled
way to diUerentiate Gettier possibilities from skeptical possibilities. Gettier possibilities
arise from the actual world while outlandish skeptical possibilities arise from hypothetical
hypotheses. This means that the former are objectively relevant and should always be
17(Levi 1983) and (Weatherson Forthcoming) oUer two very diUerent examples of this type of view.
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taken into account while the latter are only relevant when considered as such by the DM.
4.2 SSI’s Account of the Gettier Cases
At Vrst glance, it might seem that the deliberative concerns of the stability account are
orthogonal to the concerns of Gettier cases. After all, the deliberative situation of the
subject seems irrelevant for assessing whether or not a Gettierized subject knows. This
disconnect may explain why proponents of SSI do not typically address Gettier cases.18
However, there is a special set of cases in which we can truly make denials of knowledge
without having any information about the subject’s deliberative context. These are cases
where the subject would fail to know in every deliberative context she could possibly be
in. By using the stability account to show that the Gettier cases are such special cases, SSI
can be used to account for Gettier cases and epistemic luck.
Returning to Catherine’s Gettier case, we can consider every possible deliberative con-
text she could be in by placing no restrictions on her potential goals and the set of relevant
consequences. Nevertheless, there are some states that we must assume are relevant. First,
since we are asking whether or not Catherine knows that [P ] she is standing in front of a
painting by a French Impressionist, we should assume that P and ¬P are relevant. Next,
there are at least two objectively relevant states that Catherine must consider. The paint-
ing that Catherine is looking at is actually a fake [F ] and if she considered this possibility
and took it for granted, she would Vnd it extremely unlikely that she was standing in front
18(Douven 2005) is an exception, but he suggests that Gettier cases are under-described. I Vnd this ap-
proach unmotivated since our Gettier intuitions are unaUected by however we elaborate the subject’s delib-
erative context.
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of a French Impressionist’s painting. So the truth or falsity of F is relevant for assessing
the likelihood of P . In addition, there is a genuine Monet underneath the fake [M] which
just entails that P soM is objectively relevant as well. Since both possibilities are objec-
tively relevant, they must be taken into account. So the set of possible decision problems
Catherine could be in is restricted by the fact that she must consider the possible truth and
falsity of P , F , andM .19
Given the set of relevant states, how should Catherine construct her probabilities? In
chapter 2, I appealed to the picture of probability construction described in (Shafer and
Tversky 1985) where probabilities are the result of mental experiments that weigh evi-
dence. Shafer and Tversky describe a variety of mental experiments that we can use to
assign probabilities and these experiments shared two general and intuitive features. First,
since probability judgments weigh evidence, they must be supported by evidence. Next,
one’s evidence should be used to Vt the case at hand to some canonical example involv-
ing probabilities. And when we want to assign quantitatively unique probabilities, the
frequency, propensity, and betting interpretations of probability supply some canonical
examples.
Given this picture of the construction of probability, how should Catherine construct
her probabilities? In Gettier cases, we Vx what evidence the subject possesses so let us Vrst
19There may be a variety of subjectively relevant states, but whatever these are, it will not aUect my
analysis. In addition, there are additional objectively relevant possibilities such as the fact that she is in a
museum, that she is in the modern art wing, and that the placard says that the painting is by the French
Impressionist Camille Pissaro. For the moment, I will ignore them though I will return to them to address
some objections to account I oUer.
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Vx Catherine’s evidence to consist in the following:
1. Her extensive knowledge of museums and art, particularly her knowledge of the
French Impressionists.
2. Her perceptual evidence that the painting in front of her looks like one painted by
Pissaro.
In order to make the probability judgment p(P ), Catherine may then engage in the follow-
ing mental experiment in which she compares her case to a case with frequencies. For she
might consider a test, where she is placed in front of all the other paintings in the same
museum. She can then judge the percentage of cases in which she would judge correctly
that P . Based upon her evidence E, she would judge that she would be very reliable so
p(P ) would be very high.
According to the stability account, this experiment cannot be used to make probability
judgments in Catherine’s situation because she must also take into account the objectively
relevant states that the perceived painting is or is not a forgery. Moreover, it is a crucial
feature of Gettier cases that Catherine possess no evidence for or against F . Though one
might think that Catherine does have some evidence, this is just because the forgery possi-
bility has not been suXciently described. For even with Catherine’s extensive knowledge
of museums and art, her evidence says nothing about whether the painting is such a per-
fect forgery that museum experts would have no way of detecting it. Gettier possibilities
must always be described so that they are perfectly compatible with the evidence that the
subject is presumed to have. In this respect, Gettier possibilities are like radical skeptical
4. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism 140
hypotheses except that they are constructed relative to a Vxed set of evidence. Once a
skeptical hypothesis is taken seriously, it’s hard to imagine what evidence could rule it out.
Similarly, for whatever evidence a Gettierized subject is presumed to possess, once a Get-
tier possibility is deemed relevant, it’s hard to imagine what part of the subject’s evidence
could be presented in favor of its truth or falsity.
Given the relevance of the forgery possibility, Catherine must design a new experiment
to weigh her evidence. Since she has no evidence for or against the forgery possibility,
Catherine can imagine a diUerent test where it is randomly selected whether the painting
in front of her is a perfect forgery or real. p(P ) is then determined by the frequency with
which she would correctly judge that P . On the basis of her evidence, she imagines that
she would do no better than chance, so p(P ) = .5.20 This would entail that Catherine’s
belief that P is not stable so she fails to know. Moreover, because p(P ) = p(¬P ), she fails
to know that P in every deliberative context she could possibly be in.
To address some criticisms, a couple of points should be made. First, one might propose
a diUerent set of mental experiments by which Catherine would come to assign a probabil-
ity greater than .5 to P . After all, Catherine possesses additional information about master
forgers, the art world, and museums. Using the additional evidence, Catherine may be
justiVed in having a high degree of conVdence that P . While it is true that she has addi-
20In essence, we are imagining that Catherine assess the following: p(P |E) = p(P |E∧F )p(F )+p(P |E∧
¬F )p(¬F ). To assess p(F ), she must consider her evidence and since we stipulated that the subject has no
evidence that directly supports F or ¬F (i.e. p(F |E) = p(¬F |E)), Catherine should judge that p(F ) =
p(¬F ) = .5. Moreover, in Gettier cases, the conditional probabilities are fairly straightforward, p(P |E ∧
F ) ≈ 0 and p(P |E ∧ ¬F ) ≈ 1. Therefore, Catherine calculates that p(P |E) = .5 and thereby judges that
p(P ) = .5.
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tional evidence, it will not make a diUerence in this case. For the sake of simplicity, I had
described the case somewhat sparsely. But once we consider all the details, we will see
that none of Catherine’s evidence will matter. In the movie, Thomas Crown has taken all
the necessary steps to trick Catherine and the museum. For Catherine knows that there
is a single individual capable of making a suXciently good forgery, but since he is in jail
that possibility is ruled out. However, unbeknownst to Catherine, this master forger has a
daughter who is just as talented and being a friend of Thomas Crown’s, she has been com-
missioned to produce the forgery. With respect to each of these possibilities, Catherine’s
knowledge about museums and the art world provides neither evidence for nor against.
And since Catherine cannot be sure that she has been tricked in this way, she must judge
that p(P ) = .5 once these more detailed alternatives are considered.
The dialectic is simple. One may object to the assessment of Catherine’s epistemic state
by appealing to some evidence that Catherine possess to justify a higher than .5 degree of
belief that P . But if we have identiVed a real Gettier case, the world must be such that
certain facts defeat every piece of evidence that the subject can have for or against P . And
in the end, once all the facts are taken into account, the stability account proposes that the
subject has no reason to believe P rather than ¬P.
Next, it may be helpful to clarify the relationship between the two notions of rational
belief provided by the stability account and internalist and externalist notions of justiVca-
tion. When she does not consider the objectively relevant possibilities F and ¬F , Cather-
ine judges p(P ) to be very high and in most deliberative contexts, her full belief that P
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would be subjectively stable. We can interpret rationally constructed probabilities in sub-
jectively deVned deliberative contexts as internally justiVed degrees of belief and a subjec-
tively stable belief as an internally justiVed belief. In contrast, once Catherine considers the
objectively relevant possibilities, her evidence requires her to judge p(P ) = p(¬P ) = .5.
As a result, in every objectively deVned deliberative context, her belief is not stable. We
can interpret rationally constructed probabilities in objectively deVned deliberative con-
texts as externally rational degrees of belief. Objectively stable beliefs are then externally
justiVed beliefs.
Using this interpretation, we can oUer a more intuitive gloss on the stability account’s
explanation of our Gettier intuitions. The stability account asks us to consider the proba-
bilities Catherine is rational to have in objectively deVned deliberative contexts and pro-
poses that her externally justiVed degree of belief that P is .5. To put it more colloquially, if
Catherine accounts for everything of relevance from the objective point of view, she would
have no epistemic reason to believe that P rather than ¬P . Since her belief is epistemically
arbitrary, it exhibits the worst type of instability and she fails to know in every deliberative
context she could be in. It is this externally evaluated type of epistemic arbitrariness that
underwrites our Gettier intuitions and in the next section, I will show that this also helps
to explain our intuitions about knowledge and epistemic luck.
To conclude our discussion of Gettier Cases, we can use their common structure to
generalize the stability account’s explanation. First, there is the Target Proposition P that
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the subject fails to know and her belief is based upon her Evidence E.21 Next, the Gettier
PossibilityG is one that obtains, is evidentially relevant and is described in such a way that
the subject has no evidence for or against G (i.e. p(G|E) = p(¬G|E)). Though she bases
her belief that P on evidence that is unreliable in her actual situation, the Lucky Proposition
L ensures that her belief is true. The stability account’s resolution appeals to the fact that a
DM’s probability judgments must be constructed on the basis of the evidence we stipulate
her to have. Given the subject’s evidence and the relevance of the Gettier possibility, she
must judge that p(G) = p(¬G). And since G is always chosen so that p(P |G) ≈ 0 and
p(P |¬G) ≈ 1, we can calculate:
p(P ) = p(P |G)p(G) + p(P |¬G)p(¬G) ≈ .522
Since the Gettierized subject should judge that p(P ) = p(¬P ), her externally rational
belief that P fails to be stable in every deliberative context that she could possibly be in.
Thus, regardless of what deliberative context she is in, she does not know that P .
21(Shope 1983) focuses on the role that a false lemma Q plays in justifying the belief that P . This false
lemma can be given a place in the way I describe Gettier cases but we can also just talk of the evidence the
subject has without appeal to the false lemma that the evidence supports.
22Remember that p(G|E) = p(¬G|E) and p(P |E∧G) = p(P |¬E∧G) so p(E) does not matter for p(P ).
We also need to calculate p(L) though it’s not clear how this is to be done. Since p(P ) = .5 and p(G) = .5,






4p(L|¬P ∧¬G). Though it’s clear that p(L|P ∧G)
is close to 1 and p(L|¬P ∧G) is close to 0, what should the other conditional probabilities be? If we assign
them .5, then p(L) = p(¬L) = .5. Though this may seem a bit strange at Vrst, it nicely entails that there
is no deliberative context where the Gettierized subject may stably believe that L or ¬L. Thus, she neither
knows that L nor knows that ¬L.
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5 SSI’s Anti-Luck Epistemology
By linking Gettier cases with the debate between contextualism and SSI, there is a strong
case to be made in favor of SSI since it succeeds while contextualism fails to account for the
context-sensitivity that the standards for knowledge exhibit in Gettier cases. In addition,
our discussion of the Gettier cases linked contextualism with modal epistemologies and
SSI with decision-theoretic epistemologies. These connections will allow us to contrast
two types of anti-luck epistemologies. Modal epistemologies are concerned with counter-
factuals and on such accounts, a lucky belief is explicated in terms of the truth or falsity of
that belief in nearby possible worlds. A simple proposal is that a belief that P is non-lucky
if and only if in most (if not all) nearby possible worlds where the subject believes that P , P
is true.23 In contrast, decision-theoretic epistemologies are concerned with rational delib-
eration and action. Since any account of knowledge that explains the Gettier cases should
account for the underlying intuition that knowledge precludes epistemic luck, what does
the stability account say?
The answer comes by Vrst considering the diUerence between being lucky and non-
lucky, which is accounted for by the intuition that skill precludes luck. A skillful chef is
not lucky to produce a tasty meal. Skill is also connected with being unlucky. A poker
player who has played skillfully may still lose but the outcome is unlucky. We can capture
23(Pritchard 2007a) uses the modal view of luck to motivate the safety theory. His account of non-lucky
belief is more nuanced than the one I have presented here. Since my aim is to present my own view in broad
contrast with Pritchard’s, I will not consider the interesting details.
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this intuition with the following, where A is some action:
Skillful Action: If S skillfully A’s, then the favorable outcomes of A are deserved and
the unfavorable outcomes of A are unlucky.
An important caveat is that this only applies to the intentional outcomes of an action,
which depend upon what the action is or is for. As Donald Davidson noted, my Wipping
the light switch to illuminate the room may have the unintentional consequence of alert-
ing a burglar, but I did not perform the action of alerting the prowler. I only Wipped the
light switch and illuminated the room. Since I do not deserve credit for the unintentional
consequences of my actions, I do not deserve credit for alerting the prowler. The principle
of skillful action can be paired with the following:
Action-Luck Principle: If S does not skillfully A, then the favorable outcomes of A are
lucky.
There are two ways one may not skillfully A, by not A-ing or by A-ing in an unskilled
fashion. In the case where I do not intentionally alert the prowler, I would be lucky to do
so. And if I try to become rich by buying a lottery ticket, any outcome that increased my
wealth would be lucky since my action lacked the requisite skill.
The central feature of the action-luck principle is that luck is intrinsically connected to
actions (or lack there of) and their outcomes. This focus on action contrasts with views
like the one presented in (Pritchard 2007a) where luck can be attributed to any event that
is signiVcant to some individual. Though Pritchard’s account captures many features of
luck, it fails to capture the fact that all types of luck and not just epistemic luck have an
evaluative dimension that is non-epistemic. When I say that you are lucky to win the
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lottery, I imply that you did nothing to deserve it. By connecting luck with action, the
action-luck principle can captures the non-epistemic features of luck. Winning a lottery is
lucky because you bought a ticket that just so happened to be a winner so you did nothing
to deserve that outcome. It is lucky that no one was hurt by a landslide because no one
acted in a way to avoid the landslide. So no one deserves credit for that outcome.
To address epistemic luck, let’s consider an instance of these general principles:
Skilled Believing: If S skillfully believes that P , the relevant outcomes of believing that
P are non-lucky (deserved or unlucky).
Lucky Believing: If S does not skillfully believe that P , the favorable outcomes of be-
lieving that P are lucky.
It only makes sense to say that one believes skillfully if that belief is for the sake of some-
thing, if it achieves or does something. A baseball pitcher aims to play well by winning
the game. And a skilled pitcher is well equipped to achieve his or her aims. What does
an agent aim at when she forms a belief? A standard answer is that she aims at the truth
or getting things right. So a skillful believer is one that is well equipped to achieve the
aim of believing the truth. Apart from these metaphors, we can further describe the aim
or purpose of belief by describing the role that belief plays in our lives. And in chapter 3,
we say that beliefs play two distinct deliberative roles and the aims and therefore the rele-
vant outcomes of believing may depend upon the deliberative context in which the belief
is formed.
First, beliefs may function as outputs or conclusions of theoretical deliberations. In
these special cases, the relevant action is believing an answer to a question and the in-
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tended aim is coming to a true (and perhaps informative) conclusion or belief. Second,
beliefs function as inputs or premises when they are used in the process of deliberating.
When deliberating about where to eat lunch, I may come to believe that the local diner is
open. And the content of my belief can then be used as a premise in my practical reason-
ing. And in this case, the relevant actions are eating lunch at one place or another, and
relevant outcomes are what happens to me as a result of my dining choice. Here, believing
is in the service of good decision making and my beliefs provide information by limiting
the possibilities that I seriously consider.
So beliefs aim at truth and play roles as inputs and outputs to the reasoning we engage
in when we deliberate. One important consequence of adopting the broader deliberative
view of belief is that we expand what counts as the relevant outcomes of believing. On
the modal account, whether a belief counts as lucky only depends upon the truth or falsity
of the belief in nearby possible worlds. These are the only relevant outcomes. But if we
are to account for every case of lucky belief, then we will also have to account for cases of
believing where the relevant outcomes are practical.
Suppose I believe without any good reason that if I remain where I stand, I will be
struck by a falling tree. Having moved away, a giant rock suddenly falls in the exact spot I
was previously standing. Surely, this is a case of lucky believing. However, what’s lucky is
not explained by the fact that the belief is true but by the fact that I had the belief. Lucky
Believing oUers the right account of this case. The outcome of acting on the basis of my
epistemically spurious belief was a favorable one. And since my belief lacked epistemic
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skill, the outcome was a lucky one. But in this case, the lucky outcome is not the truth of
my belief but the fact that I was not seriously injured. So if we are to explain every type
of lucky belief, an account of epistemic luck should consider any type of deliberation in
which one forms a belief. And in cases of practical decision making, skillfully believing
that P requires the agent to take into account the practical outcomes of believing.
By widening the discussion of epistemic luck and the relevant outcomes of believing,
contextualist cases may be brought into the fold. Suppose I eat regularly at the local diner
and when I go there, the workers are always dressed in white. Before I walk to the diner
one day, I come to believe that the workers will be dressed in white though I do not care
much whether or not that is true. In this case, I have very good evidence that the workers
will be dressed in white and not red and it would not be lucky if my belief turned out to
be true. Accordingly, it seems true to say that I know that the workers will be dressed in
white and not red.
Now suppose that I Vnd myself serving in the capacity as the King’s aide and one day
he declares that he wishes to eat at my local diner and tells me to make arrangement. Now,
I know that red is the family color of the King’s sworn enemy and he would be furious if
any of the diner worker’s were dressed in red. Though I am normally very careful about
such details when arranging the King’s activities, I have become quite lazy in this instance.
Not having ensured that everything is in order at the diner, I come to believe that the
workers will not be dressed in red. But given my precarious situation, I should not take
this proposition for granted without further inquiry and evidence. And since I should not
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take this proposition for granted, it would seem that I fail to know that the workers will
not be dressed in red. My lack of knowledge is conVrmed by a consideration of luck. The
King may be delighted with his dining experience and I may be rewarded rather than jailed
or put to death. But I am lucky to be rewarded because I acted upon beliefs that were not
skillfully formed so any favorable outcome is lucky. What makes my believing lack skill
is that I failed to take into account the practical features of my deliberative context. My
life was at stake and I should have accounted for that potential outcome when I came to
believe that the workers would not wear red.
If Skilled Believing and Lucky Believing are right, then a satisfactory account of
lucky and non-lucky beliefs requires an account of skillfull believing. And for one to skill-
fully believe that P, one must take into account all the relevant outcomes of forming that
belief. In situations where one’s beliefs are being used as premises in practical reasoning,
skillfully believing takes the practical consequence of one’s choices into account. It is this
idea that connects decision-theoretic epistemologies with epistemic luck. The decision-
theoretic epistemology articulated by the stability theory suggests that skilled beliefs oc-
cur within a deliberative context and a skillfully formed belief is one that is rational once
everything of subjective and objective relevance has been accounted for. What it means
to be rational is for one’s belief to be stable, having no ill-eUects on one’s rational state of
mind. The adoption of a stable belief is a belief formed in a skillful manner.
From this perspective, believing a true proposition in Gettier cases is just like buying
the winning ticket in a fair lottery. When one has no good reason to buy one ticket rather
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than another, possessing the winning ticket would be purely a matter of luck. Similarly,
once everything of objective relevance is accounted for, a Gettierized subject has no epis-
temic reason to believe that P rather than ¬P so any favorable outcome when deliberating
on the basis of that belief is purely a matter of luck. This deliberative view of epistemic
luck also accounts for the more narrow concern for the truth or falsity of belief. For when
we consider special cases of theoretical deliberation, one would clearly accept that P if de-
liberating on the basis of a belief that P . So if one skillfully believes that P in this context,
it could not be lucky that P is true since that is a favorable outcome.
Lastly, we can use this connection between skillful belief and epistemic luck to oUer an
explanation of the standard variability of knowledge. Practical factors, as in contextual-
ist cases, aUect the standards for knowledge because a skillfully formed belief should take
the relevant outcomes of believing into account and the outcomes that count as relevant
depend upon practical factors. Similarly, objective factors, as in Gettier cases, aUect the
standards for knowledge because a skillfully formed belief should take the outcomes of
believing into account and the outcomes depend upon the actual world. By focusing on
the role that knowledge plays in deliberation, it would appear that knowledge rules out
epistemic luck because its standards are sensitive to both practical and objective factors.
Therefore, if non-lucky beliefs are ones that must exhibit this dual sensitivity, a satisfac-
tory anti-luck epistemology is one that must be able to account for both the Gettier and
contextualist cases.
Now that we have seen that the stability account can account for our intuitions in the
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Gettier cases, we must now turn to the contextualist cases. In the remaining two chapters,
I will build a model for explaining assertions, which I will apply to explain and predict our
use of ‘knows’. In doing so, I will show that the decision-theoretic account of knowledge
can capture our intuitions in the contextualist cases and address some of the most diXcult
problems that face SSI.
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Chapter 5
TheMany Norms of Assertion
The norms governing action are many and varied. Moral, political, and instrumental
norms may all govern one’s actions. And since assertions are a type of action, they should
also be governed by a plurality of norms. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of writers
have proposed that assertions are governed by a single norm that is constitutive of the
type of action it is.1 Timothy Williamson writes that “the speech act [of assertion], like
a game and unlike the act of jumping, is constituted by rules.”2 On this simple view of
assertion, it is proposed that a single norm individuates assertion from other speech acts.
For example, guessing and asserting seem to be governed by diUerent norms and the hope
is that assertions are uniquely governed by a single norm. An action is governed by a norm
in the relevant sense just in case that norm supplies the regulative or guiding ideal for that
action. Various versions of the simple view have been proposed:
TRUTH: One must: Assert P only if P is true
KNOWLEDGE: One must: Assert P only if P is known
RATIONAL BELIEF: One must: Assert P only if P is rationally believed
1(Williamson 1996) and (DeRose 2002) are prominent supporters of this view. (Sosa 2009) and (Greenough
2011) oUer dissenting opinions.
2p.489, (Williamson 1996)
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The debate about these competing proposals has primarily focused on our intuitions
regarding the appropriateness and inappropriateness of particular assertions. In general,
it has been noted that a speaker ought to meet some epistemic standard in order to make
an assertion and the debate has focused on identifying cases that help us hone in on this
evidential norm. Unfortunately, the data pulls us in diUerent directions. The infelicity of
asserting that a ticket in a fair lottery has lost on purely probabilistic grounds has been
used to argue that the evidential norm governing assertion must be stronger than any-
thing derivable from TRUTH or RATIONAL BELIEF. In opposition, the appropriateness
of asserting predictions (e.g. It’s going to rain tonight) without knowledge has been used
to argue that the evidential norm must be weaker than KNOWLEDGE.3 And as the de-
bate continues, additional cases have been presented both in favor and against a host of
alternative proposals.4 In short, the data has failed to point overwhelming in favor of one
proposal.
In what follows, I develop an alternative approach to the debate. Rather than theorize
on the basis of cases, I will adopt a top-down approach by situating the inquiry within a
broader theoretical context. Since assertion is just a type of action, perhaps the guiding
constitutive norm of assertion can be derived from a general theory of rational action. To
accomplish this task, I develop a distinctive decision-theoretic framework to generalize
the Stalnakerian account of assertion. The resulting framework is then used to articulate
3(Weiner 2005)
4(Lackey 2007) presents some cases in support of the norm that one must: assert P only if one reasonably
believes that one knows that P.
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a schema governing the norms of assertion though which I discuss the norms governing
assertions of probability and preference. By adopting the top-down approach and consid-
ering types of assertions that have been largely ignored by the debate, I will argue against
simple views like TRUTH, RATIONAL BELIEF, and KNOWLEDGE. Moreover, I will show
that there is no single constitutive norm of assertion. Once we connect the norms of de-
cision theory to the norms of assertion, we will Vnd that distinct norms govern diUerent
types of assertions.
1 A Decision-Theoretic Account of Assertion
The key feature of the decision-theoretic approach is to explicate the norms governing an
attitude or action in virtue of its deliberative role. For example, degrees of belief play an
important role when choosing between risky bets. It is then argued that degrees of belief
ought to be probabilities since that is required if we are to evaluate bets in a coherent way.
So if the norms governing assertion are to be given a decision-theoretic analysis, we must
Vrst identify the deliberative role of assertion. And if we are to identify its deliberative
role, we must identify what assertion does; we must identify its consequences. To do so, I
turn to Stalnaker’s account of assertion.5
5Stalnaker also sees an account of assertion as Vtting within a general account of human action. He
writes, “speech [is] action to be explained, like any other kind of action, in terms of the beliefs and purpose
of the agent. . . To put language and speech in context, we need a general account of rational activity, and of
the cognitive and motivational states that explain it.” p.2, (Stalnaker 1999)
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1.1 The Stalnakerian Account of Assertion
The Stalnakerian account Vrst characterizes the features of the conversational context that
are relevant for understanding what assertion does. On Stalnaker’s view, what is relevant is
“the body of information that is presumed, at that point, to be common to the participants
in the discourse.”6 In addition, Stalnaker proposes to
represent the information that deVnes the context in which a speech act takes
place with a set of possible situations or possible worlds – the situations that
are compatible with the information. This set. . . will include all the situations
among which the speakers intend to distinguish with their speech acts.7
The shared presuppositions of the conversation are also called the common ground. The
second part of the Stalnakerian account articulates what assertion does by specifying how
assertion aUects the common ground.
An assertion can then be understood as a proposal to alter the context by
adding the information that is the content of the assertion to the body of in-
formation that deVnes the context, or equivalently, by eliminating from the
[common ground]. . . those possible worlds in which the proposition expressed
in the assertion is false.8
On this account, the contours of a conversation can be represented by changes to the
common ground.
Stalnaker’s account can be used to articulate the deliberative role of assertion. Conver-
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shared information, which is a type of coordination problem. One can imagine conversa-
tion as a special case where cooperation amongst speakers is assumed but it must still be
determined how best to cooperate.9 Assertions communicate information and when un-
challenged, the speaker can assume that this information is now shared amongst the con-
versational participants. Given the type of eUect assertions have on the common ground,
assertions are the fundamental way in which speakers coordinate to identify and update
the conversational presuppositions. In summary, the Stalnakerian account speciVes:
1. What assertion aUects: The common ground
2. The eUect assertion has: Updates the common ground
3. The deliberative role of assertion: Used for coordination by identifying and up-
dating the set of shared presuppositions
Methodologically, the Stalnakerian account makes our inquiry manageable by restrict-
ing the relevant consequences to those consequences that assertions have on the common
ground. This restriction does not commit us to denying the broader consequences of asser-
tion. Our assertions may hurt someone’s ears, make a friend feel comfortable, or reinforce
stereotypes. Such eUects however are not integral to the type of action assertion is. Assert-
ing is fundamentally an illocutionary versus perlocutionary speech act where one states
9We can abandon this assumption by assuming less than full cooperation between speakers. For example,
we might suppose that assertions do not change the common ground by default, but are proposals that must
explicitly be accepted by all of the conversational participants. In section 1.3.2, I appeal to belief revision to
account for the ways that assertion updates the common ground. In order to weaken the assumption of full
cooperation, we can use a non-prioritized version of belief revision (c.f. Hansson 1999) rather than the AGM
account. However, I will not consider this possibility because it will add complications while adding little
insight to the debate about the norms of assertion.
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that something is the case and the Stalnakerian account identiVes and abstracts away this
core feature of assertion.10 More importantly, by restricting the relevant consequences of
assertion, we have a way to focus our inquiry on the constitutive norms of assertion -
those norms that govern assertion qua assertion. The constitutive norms of assertions are
the norms that govern assertion when we only consider its constitutive eUect of altering
the common ground.
1.2 Limitations of the Stalnakerian Account
Unfortunately, the Stalnakerian account is limited in:
1. The types of presuppositions that speakers can share
2. The ways that assertions can alter the common ground
On the Stalnakerian account, the common ground only represents what is commonly taken
to be true. However, speakers may also express claims about the likelihood of an event.
They may express claims about how much evidential support one proposition provides for
another. Or they may express their preferences. And each of these assertions may corre-
spond to diUerent types of information, attitudes, and judgments that speakers can share.
For example, speakers may share judgments regarding the subjective likelihood of an event
or the relative preference amongst various states of aUairs. The shared presuppositions of
a conversational context are as rich and varied as the types of assertions that we can make.
And at Vrst glance, it seems unlikely that all of these shared attitudes and judgments can
10(Searle 1975)
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be captured by a set of possible worlds. I will not rehash the arguments for this claim since
I agree with discussion in (Yalcin 2011) and (Swanson 2011) that the content of expressions
of probability cannot be completely captured by some propositional content. And if these
arguments are correct, then the Stalnakerian account must be amended in order to account
for the way that expressions of probability alter the common ground.
The second limitation arises because Stalnaker is only concerned with assertions that
are consistent with the common ground. So the account is only meant to deal with asser-
tions that add information. John MacFarlane writes, “Stalnaker’s story oUers no obvious
way to think about retraction, and no clear explanation of why assertion should have a
correlative act of retraction.”11 The account only captures conversations in which speakers
share more and more information, but many conversations fail to have this feature. De-
bates about controversial topics often require a give and take between the participants and
the contours of these conversations cannot be captured by a mere accrual of information.
We must therefore capture the ways in which speakers both add and retract information
from the common ground.
1.3 Generalizing the Stalnakerian Account
Despite these limitations, we can preserve the spirit of Stalnaker’s account by retaining its
two core insights: that the common ground represents a coherent set of shared presuppo-
sitions and that assertions aim to alter these shared presuppositions. These insights tell
11p.90, (MacFarlane 2011) MacFarlane appears to suggest that retractions are a diUerent type of speech act
than assertions. However, it seems more appropriate to view assertions (e.g. “It might not rain.”) in some
contexts as retracting rather than adding information.
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us what assertion does and thereby articulates its deliberative role. We can address the
limitations of Stalnaker’s account by enriching its representation of the common ground
and broadening its view of how assertions alter the common ground. Though standard
decision-theoretic frameworks are unsuitable, I will develop a richer framework to repre-
sent the common ground. The AGM account of belief revision will then be used to provide
insight into how to represent the various ways in which assertions can change the common
ground.
1.4 The Insights of Decision Theory
Decision theory connects to assertion because of the simple fact that conversation, like any
other type of intentional behavior, is purposive. Grice noted that conversation or talking
is “a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior.”12 Of course, there is
no single purpose that conversation always has. The goals of communication are as varied
as our personal goals. Speakers may debate the answer to a question. They may exchange
information. They may engage in joint decision making. Given the multitude of goals, the
attitudes that can be shared in conversation should be as rich and varied as the attitudes
that are used to explain any type of goal-directed behavior. After all, the common ground
can be used as a basis for any type of deliberation. Therefore, in order to account for our
assertions and shared presuppositions, we need to be able to represent all the judgments
and attitudes that could be relevant for any type of deliberative activity
The appeal to decision theory is quite natural since the decision-theoretic representa-
12p.28, (Grice 1989)
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tion of a decision making agent(s) is speciVcally designed to account for all the judgments
and attitudes that are relevant for rational deliberation. And we can look to these models
to develop a suXciently rich representation of the common ground.
Bayesian decision theory oUers the best known decision-theoretic framework and the
Bayesian represents an agent’s beliefs, desires, and preferences with probabilities, utilities,
and expected utilities. Unfortunately, the orthodox Bayesian account is ill-equipped to
deal with the type of disagreement and conWict that frequently arises in conversation. If
speakers are discussing a ranking of the all-time greatest baseball players, there will be
serious disagreement and conWict in both beliefs and values. The speakers may disagree
about which qualities matter when assessing a baseball player. Should the beauty and
elegance with which one plays the game matter? Do the number of championships or
individual accomplishments matter more? There will also be disagreement about how
to assess players on the basis of a relevant property. Was Roberto Clemente or Jackie
Robinson a more aesthetically pleasing baseball player? More importantly, disagreements
cannot always be resolved. We will not always be able to articulate a standard of evaluation
in the debate that supplies a complete ranking of all the players.
The orthodox Bayesian framework fails to account for these conWicts because it makes
the assumption that when deliberating, an agent can always determine what she thinks
and feels and as a result, she can always resolve any conWict amongst her beliefs and val-
ues. When deciding whether Babe Ruth or Ted Williams was a better baseball player, the
orthodox Bayesian assumes that the agent always has some determinate opinion. This as-
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sumption is typically justiVed for pragmatic reasons. If the agent needs to make a decision
about what is best, she should just make some judgment when she is unsure. However,
since there are multiple agents involved in conversation, no single agent will have author-
ity over the matter. When there is disagreement, the conversational participants must be
judicious in adjudicating between the various opinions.
To account for such disagreement, we can turn to the generalized Bayesian framework
described in (Levi 1986). Since Levi’s decision theory is intended to capture unresolved
conWict amongst multiple agents, it is particularly well-suited for the task at hand.
To introduce the framework, consider the following unresolved conWict between the
beliefs of two agents. Bill and Ted are debating whether or not it will rain the next day.
Bill seems conVdent that it will rain, assigning a 75% probability. Ted is less conVdent,
assigning a 55% probability. One approach to this conWict is to take the average of the two
probabilities and let the mutually agreed upon probability be 65%. However, this approach
simply assumes that both speakers take the other’s beliefs to be just as valid as their own
and so it fails to take seriously the fact that Bill and Ted are in disagreement. Rather than
average their beliefs, we can represent their shared beliefs as the set of weighted averages
of the two probability assignments.13 The resulting indeterminacy in probability reWects
the fact that Bill and Ted have not resolved their diUerences of opinion. This indeterminacy
is analogous to the indeterminacy that results from suspending belief. If one has suspended
belief about P, there is an indeterminacy of belief since one neither believes P nor believes
13The resulting set will be a convex set of probability functions. I am not committed to this way of
capturing disagreement and unresolved conWict. I use it merely for convenience.
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¬P.
The same considerations apply to any unresolved conWict between Bill and Ted’s de-
sires. Assuming normalized utility functions, suppose Bill assigns a utility of .8 to watching
TV and a utility of .5 to going out to the park. Alternatively, Ted assigns a utility of .6 to
watching TV and .7 to going to the park. To represent this diUerence in opinion, we should
not average their utilities. Instead, we should represent their shared desires as being rep-
resented by the set of all weighted averages of their two utility functions. As in the case
of conWicted beliefs, the indeterminacy of utility reWects their disagreement on how to
evaluate the two states of aUairs.14
To complete our discussion of decision theory, we need to supplement Levi’s decision-
theoretic framework. For what we have so far is insuXcient to capture all the contours
of conversation. This Vnal amendment is not usually made by decision theorists but will
become crucial for articulating the norms of assertion. Decision theory articulates what it
means to have a coherent state of mind with respect to a particular decision problem. A
decision problem is then deVned by a set of relevant states and consequences over which
an agent’s probabilities and utilities are deVned. It is typically presupposed that the set of
relevant states and consequences, the decision space, is given. For this reason, the theory is
typically presented by considering well-deVned bets (e.g. bets on coin tosses or lotteries).
14Since we no longer have a unique probability and utility function, rational preferences can no longer be
determined by a single expected utility function. Instead, following (Levi 1986), we can adopt the Cross Prod-
uct Rule whereby the set of permissible expected utility functions is derived from every pair of permissible
probability and utility functions. According to this rule, A is strictly preferred to B if and only if for every
permissible expected utility, the expected utility of A is strictly greater than that of B.
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For such bets, the relevant states and consequences are Vxed so we know what the decision
space should be. However, this is rarely the case. When we decide whether or not to take
a sweater out for the day, our decision problem does not automatically present itself with
a speciVcation of which states and consequences count as relevant. For example, should
we consider the state where we Vnd ourselves in a very cold, air-conditioned room? The
decision maker must determine this for herself and decision theory says little about how
this is to be done. In addition, the standard Bayesian frameworks do not account for the
reasons we have for demarcating what counts as relevant and what counts as irrelevant.
Decision theory also says little about the reasons that underlie and justify our proba-
bilities, utilities, and preferences. After all, the Bayesian supposes that an agent is coherent
so long as any probability and utility represents her beliefs and desires. However, we typ-
ically have reasons for making these judgments. Ted may Vnd a day at the park more
enjoyable than watching TV because he wants to get some fresh air. Ted’s goal to get fresh
air underwrites his utility judgments but decision theory does not countenance the role
that such reasons play. The theory simply assumes that all of these reasons are captured
by a single utility function. Since reasons play an important normative and descriptive
role, it would be desirable to amend the decision-theoretic framework to account for them.
This is especially important if the framework is meant to capture conversation and other
types of rational activity where multiple agents are involved. After all, conversational par-
ticipants must be able to discuss the reasons for considering certain possibilities as relevant
just as they must discuss the reasons that justify their probabilities and utilities. Moreover,
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when engaging in these debates, speakers must be able to express and identify reasons qua
reasons. So reasons should be represented as such in the common ground.15
To account for the role that reasons play, we can expand the set of judgments and at-
titudes that are accounted for by the theory. And there are a variety of ways in which the
decision maker may justify her demarcation of a decision space along with her probability
and utility judgments. A detailed discussion would be beyond the scope of this paper and
for the sake of simplicity, I will group together the judgments and attitudes that function
as reasons and call them our constructive judgments. They are “constructive” because they
serve as the basis for constructing a decision space as well as one’s probabilities and utili-
ties. Constructive judgments are to be distinguished from our deliberative judgmentswhich
refer to the beliefs (probabilities), desires (utilities), and preferences (expected utilities) that
are deVned over the decision space. I will call the resulting account a Constructive De-
cision Theory.
To clarify the notion of a constructive judgment, consider the following examples. Sym-
metry judgments can be used to construct and justify our probability judgments. If one
thinks that two outcomes of an experiment, like a coin toss, are evidentially symmetrical,
they ought to be given the same probability assignment. Goal judgments can in turn be
used to justify our utility judgments. If we are picking a restaurant for dinner, we may
decide that the goal of our deliberation is to have a quick meal or a good conversation. In
each case, the goal of deliberation supplies the reasons for one’s utility judgments since
15To be more careful, these are what the conversational participants take to be reasons.
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the utility should measure how well an outcome satisVes the relevant goal. To state the
relationship more carefully, constructive judgments function as constraints on the set of
rationally permissible probabilities, utilities, and expected utilities for a decision problem.
Both symmetry and goal judgments respectively restrict which probabilities and utilities
are rationally permissible. For example, the goal of having a quick meal, the utility of a
twenty minute meal cannot be less than the utility of a thirty minute meal.
The constructive framework can also be used to solve a problem that arises for the ex-
panded view of the common ground. In general, we need a story about how to generate
the common ground. And the standard story identiVes “the common ground with common
belief about what is accepted.”16 Given the richer view of the common ground, we need
to provide a story about how to generate shared probabilities, utilities, and expected util-
ities. And it is not clear how we can do this from the probabilities, utilities, and expected
utilities of each speaker. By adopting the constructive point of view and incorporating
constructive judgments into the common ground, the standard story can be extended to
account for these additional shared judgments. First, there are a set of shared constructive
judgments that all the speakers accept for the purposes of the conversation. Second, the
speakers have a common belief about which constructive judgments have been accepted.
Therefore, since the set of rationally permissible probabilities, utilities, and expected util-
ities can be generated from these constructive judgments, the richer common ground can
16More carefully put, Stalnaker writes, “It is common ground that φ in a group if all members accept (for
the purpose of the conversation) that φ, and all believe that all accept that φ and all believe that all believe
that all accept that φ, etc.” p.716, (Stalnaker 2002)
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still be identiVed on the basis of what is commonly believed to be accepted.
1.5 The Insights of Belief Revision
The second limitation of the Stalnakerian account is that it fails to account for assertions
that retract information from the common ground. By appealing to the AGM account of
belief revision, we can amend the Stalnakerian account to incorporate retractions. The
AGM theory represents a belief state as a set of possible worlds and oUers an account of
how certain changes of belief ought to aUect one’s belief state.17 In the case where an
agent comes to believe a proposition that is consistent with what she already believes, the
belief state B is updated by taking an intersection of the possible worlds in the prior belief
state with the possible worlds in which P is true (Figure 5.1). In other words, all the ¬P
worlds are thrown out. This simple case of belief change is called an expansion since we




17The AGM theory was Vrst given in the language of sentences (Alchourrón, Gardenfors, and Makinson
1985) where a belief state is a deductively closed set of sentences. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between deductively closed sets of sentences and sets of possible worlds. A possible world is simply a maxi-
mally consistent set of sentences. Therefore, every deductively closed set of sentences S can be represented
by some set of possible worlds [S] where each world in that set contains all of the sentences in S. In addition,
(Grove 1988) shows that the AGM theory can be translated into the possible worlds language.
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The Stalnakerian and AGM accounts are structurally identical. The common ground
which represents the shared presuppositions and beliefs of the speakers is analogous to the
belief state of an epistemic agent. This should come as no surprise. After all, the common
ground represents those beliefs that are shared by the speakers for the purposes of the
conversation. So the AGM account should apply since the account is meant to apply to
the beliefs of any agent, whether they are a single agent’s beliefs or a set of shared beliefs
between multiple agents. Next, asserting is analogous to believing. Whether believing or
asserting P, the resulting belief state/common ground is the intersection of all the possible
worlds in the prior belief state/common ground with the set of possible worlds where P
is true. Believing P changes a belief state in the same way that asserting P changes the
common ground. So the eUect of asserting can be represented as an AGM-style expansion.
The added insights of the AGM account come once we consider changes of belief that
are not expansions. Sometimes we engage in a contraction of our beliefs by retracting
information while adding nothing new. By contracting, one is suspending belief about
propositions that were previously taken for granted.18 One of the main points of contention
in the theory of belief revision is the question of how we should represent contractions.
But my point is that whatever the right account of contraction is, such an account oUers
a natural way to extend the Stalnakerian account to accomodate retractions. And for the
sake of concreteness, I will use the idea of a partial meet contraction proposed by the AGM
18AGM also discusses revisions of a belief state, which are cases in which one comes to believe a proposition
that is inconsistent with one’s current belief state. In revisions, one must remove some previously held beliefs
in order to maintain consistency and accommodate new information.
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account.19 On this view, the belief state resulting from the contraction of proposition P
from the belief state B is a union of the set of possible worlds where B is true and a subset
of possible worlds where ¬P is true. Of course, we need to articulate which subset of ¬P
worlds to consider. AGM proposes that the selected subset of ¬P worlds is determined by
an ordering of the possible belief states (every possible set of possible worlds). And the
main AGM theorem states that our changes of belief meet a set of rationality postulates if
and only if there exists an ordering of every set of possible worlds. Intuitively, this ordering
represents how deeply entrenched one’s beliefs are - how unlikely it is that a belief will be
given up. This entrenchment ordering is the subjective version of David Lewis’ distance
measure over sets of possible worlds. And the AGM account states that when one contracts
P from the belief state B, one adds to the belief state the closest set of possible worlds in




One may object that a measure of entrenchment that supplies the relevant ordering on
sets of possible worlds is simply not available in conversational contexts. There are two
19See (Levi 2004) for criticisms and an alternative.
1. A Decision-Theoretic Account of Assertion 169
responses to make. The Stalnakerian framework already makes assumptions of rationality
by assuming that the common ground is consistent. The ordering of sets of possible worlds
in the AGM framework is simply a consequence of rational constraints on belief change.
Since it is purportedly a matter of rationality that retractions of information function like
AGM-style contractions, this assumption is on par with the assumption that the common
ground is coherent.20 This assumption can be further motivated by the fact that conversa-
tional participants need some guide for retracting information. If there are no guidelines
for retraction then how will speakers know what the resulting common ground will be?
Orderly retractions assume some measure of entrenchment as a guide.21
A second response to this objection comes from our conversational practices. When a
speaker intends to retract information from the common ground, some reason is given. A
skeptic’s assertion that you might not have hands is typically accompanied by a hypothe-
sis, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) hypothesis, in which you would not have any hands.
When asserting that one might not have hands because one could be a BIV, the skeptic is
indicating that we ought to put all worlds where you are BIV and lack hands back into the
common ground. When speakers retract information from the common ground, they usu-
ally supply reasons for their retractions. These reasons specify how the retraction should
be accommodated because they communicate which subset of ¬P worlds to include back
20Just as we generalized Bayesian decision theory to account for disagreements of belief and desire, we
can generalize AGM to account for disagreements about entrenchment.
21The use of the AGM framework also corresponds nicely with Kratzer’s semantics of modals (Kratzer
2008), which requires two contextually determined factors: a modal base and an ordering source. Kratzer’s
assumption of an ordering source is equivalent to the assumption that there exists a (partial) measure of
entrenchment.
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in.
While the appeal to AGM-style contractions helps to expand the Stalnakerian account,
the resulting account still lacks some generality. If speakers may share any of the decision-
theoretic judgments and attitudes discussed in the previous section, then we must provide
an account of how to rationally change each of these judgments and attitudes. In addition
to rational changes of full beliefs, we must also articulate how to rationally change our
probability judgments, utility judgments, and constructive judgments.
Suppose a conversation begins with a maximally indeterminate degree of belief in the
possibility of rain or no rain. When one successfully asserts that it will probably rain to-
morrow, the common ground should represent the fact that the speakers now share a more
determinate probability judgment. We can take this assertion as updating the common
ground so that every permissible probability judgment assigns a probability greater than
.5 to the possibility that it will rain tomorrow. However, assertions may also retract prob-
abilistic information. After checking the weather forecast online, Bill and Ted may share
the belief that there is a .75 chance of rain. However, after studying the weather maps,
Ted may assert, “It’s unlikely to rain. Just look at these images.” Ted’s assertion does not
straightforwardly retract the original probability judgment of .75 and replace it with one
that is less than .5. Rather, the assertion retracts the more determinate probability by mak-
ing a broader range of probability assignments permissible in the conversational context.
Just as the AGM account of belief revision shows us how to maintain consistency across
a variety of changes in belief, we need a more comprehensive theory of belief and desire
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revision that articulates how we ought to maintain coherence across the variety of changes
that can take place.
1.6 Summarizing the Decision-Theoretic Account of Assertion
We have expanded Stalnaker’s account in two ways. First, constructive decision theory
broadens the set of attitudes and judgments that can be shared amongst speakers. Second,
AGM-style contractions are used to account for assertions that retract information from the
common ground. The deliberative role of assertion can also be given a decision-theoretic
characterization. The common ground represents all the judgments and attitudes that are
required for multiple agents to engage in deliberation. We noted that assertion plays a
crucial coordinating role in identifying and updating what the conversational participants
commonly took to be true. Since the notion of a common ground has been expanded, the
deliberative role of assertion has also expanded. Assertions now play a broader role in
allowing speakers to coordinate by identifying and updating every shared judgment that
can be relevant for engaging in any type of cooperative goal-directed activity.
2 The Decision-Theoretic Norms of Assertion
We can now turn to use the norms of decision theory to articulate the norms of asser-
tion. To do so, we must Vrst connect the two sets of norms, which will require a bit of
terminology. A context change potential (CCP) was introduced by Irene Heim to talk about
the eUect that assertions have on the conversational context.22 CCPs represent how a par-
22(Heim 1983)
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ticular assertion changes the common ground and is a function from common grounds to
common grounds. These functions are meant to capture speaker meaning and not sentence
meaning. Heim originally saw all context change potentials as representing the ways that
assertions add information to the common ground. I will be using the term more generally
to account for any type of change to the common ground. So both expansions and con-
tractions of the common ground are meant to be captured by a CCP. In addition, changes
in shared probability, utility, and preference judgments will also be captured by a CCP.
The decision-theoretic corollary of a CCP will be called an agent change potential (ACP).
An ACP is a function from coherent states of mind with respect to a decision problem to
coherent states of mind. These states of mind represents all the judgments and attitudes
that could be needed for a particular deliberation. Since the decision-theoretic framework
that we described in the last section was used to represent the common ground, there
is a straightforward connection between a CCP and an ACP. The CCP picked out by an
assertion can be represented by some ACP. That is, changes in the common ground are
equivalent to changes in a decision maker’s state of mind. We arrive at this interpretation
by viewing the set of judgments and attitudes shared between the conversational partic-
ipants as the conversational state of mind. Thus, given the straightforward connection
between CCPs and ACPs, we have the link we need to connect the norms of assertion with
the norms of decision theory. The norms that govern assertions are just the norms that
govern changes from one coherent state of mind to another.
To discuss the relevant decision-theoretic norms, consider the following decision prob-
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lem where Bill is choosing between driving or Wying from New York to Washington DC
and let (Table 5.1) represent his current state of mind.











Table 5.1: Bill’s Decision Problem with his (Probabilities) and [Utilities]
Since the expected utility is 17/40 for driving and 1/2 for Wying, Bill should prefer Wying
over driving. Moreover, his deliberative beliefs, desires, and preferences form a coherent
state of mind since they are representable by a unique probability, utility, and expected
utility function. So under what circumstances would Bill change his mind? And more
importantly, what would justify such a change?
Bayesian decision theory only oUers principles that govern how Bill should change his
deliberative beliefs (i.e. probabilities or full beliefs). However, not all reasonable changes
of mind are changes of belief. Bill may also have good reasons to change his view of the
decision problem as well as his desires and preferences. He may learn that the airport
from which he is departing is unreliable during bad weather. This information would alter
Bill’s view of his decision problem since rain would aUect the consequences of traveling
by plane. Bill could also come across an unexpected monetary gift, thereby changing the
desirability of a cheap trip. Though these two examples are cases of change on the basis of
new information, not all cases are of this type. Suppose Bill remembers his plan to Vnish a
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novel and since he can’t read well on planes, he considers the option of taking the train. In
this case, Bill learns nothing new. Rather, certain values and goals become salient, oUering
Bill reasons to change the way he views his decision problem as well as his preferences.
These examples share a few features that govern all reasonable changes of mind about
a decision problem. First, there is some previously unconsidered reason that justiVes the
change. Additional information about the likelihood of rain delays provides Bill a previ-
ously unconsidered reason for changing the way he views his decision problem. Informa-
tion about his level of wealth also oUers a new reason for reassessing his desire for the
various outcomes. Of course, we cannot appeal to any reason. Bill would not justiVed in
changing his degree of belief in rain on the basis of realizing how much he wants a sand-
wich. So changes of mind should be grounded in a good reason. But what does it mean for
a change to be grounded in a good reason? Let me brieWy sketch what such an account
would look like within the constructive decision-theoretic framework that we are working
in.
The constructive framework has two features that help to explicate what it would be
for a change of mind to be grounded in a good and previously unconsidered reason. First,
the framework distinguishes constructive judgments from deliberative judgments and as-
sociates what a decision maker takes to be a reason with the constructive judgments she
makes about her decision problem. Since the framework will only capture what it means
for deliberative judgments to be grounded in a reason, my discussion of good reasons and
justiVed changes will be restricted to changes of deliberative judgments that are grounded
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in changes in reasons (constructive judgments). The second feature is that the framework
articulates what it means for one’s deliberative judgments to be coherent with or to stand
in a rational relation to one’s constructive judgments. Constructive judgments place con-
straints on the set of rationally permissible deliberative judgments. For example, on the
basis of Bill’s goal to have a short trip, the only desires that would be rationally permissi-
ble are those that rank short trips more desirable than long trips. So a set of deliberative
judgments is coherent with one’s constructive judgments just in case the decision maker’s
deliberative judgments are all and only those judgments that are deemed rationally per-
missible.
We can use this notion of coherence to articulate what it means for a change of mind to
be grounded in a good and previously unconsidered reason. Since constructive judgments
represent what a decision maker takes to be a reason, a change to the decision maker’s
deliberative beliefs, desires, or preferences must be grounded in a change in the set of
constructive judgments. Moreover, the resulting set of deliberative judgments must be
coherent with the posterior set of constructive judgments. Only then would the decision
maker have good reason for the change. Suppose Bill changes his mind by adopting a pref-
erence for driving over Wying. This change may be justiVed by the fact that Bill has come
to learn that he requires an expensive surgery for an old injury. As a result, he now values
thrift much more than he values expediency. A change in evidence along with a change in
the relative ranking of the two values are a change to his reasons (constructive judgments)
on the basis of which a diUerent set of desires now count as rationally permissible.
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So a decision maker seems rational in changing her state of mind only if she can ap-
peal to a good and previously unconsidered reason. And we can use this decision-theoretic
picture to develop a general schema for articulating the norms governing assertions that
change the common ground. Of course, since we restricted our discussion to changes in de-
liberative judgments, we must also restrict our discussion of assertions to those assertions
that change the set of shared deliberative judgments represented in common ground.23
So if the CCP of asserting P corresponds with the ACP of adopting a shared deliberative
judgment J in the common ground, the following schema holds:
Reasons Schema
One must: assert P only if one has a good and previously unconsidered reason
for the conversational participants to adopt J.
Though this is a somewhat vague principle, it can still be used to test various versions
of the simple view of assertion. For we can restate the proposed simple views as constraints
on the reasons schema. TRUTH, RATIONAL BELIEF, or KNOWLEDGE all propose that
assertions are governed by some evidential norm. And if one of these views is correct,
then it must be the case that the speaker has a good and previously unconsidered reason
for asserting P if and only if she satisVes the relevant evidential norm. For example, if
KNOWLEDGE is correct, then S has a good and previously unconsidered reason for assert-
ing that P just in case S knows that P. If TRUTH is correct, one has a good and previously
23In addition, there are some assertions that are not straightforward changes to the common ground. As
(Stalnaker 2002) points out, there are cases in which the conversational context becomes defective. Defective
contexts are ones in which the speakers’ presuppositions diverge from one another. And if a speaker recog-
nizes that such a problem has occurred, she may make assertions whose aim is to repair the common ground.
Since the common ground is defective, these assertions cannot be understood as straightforward expansions
or contractions of the common ground and diUerent norms may apply.
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unconsidered reason for asserting that P just in case P is true. In what follows, I will sim-
ply grant that some version of the simple view can account for assertions about matters of
fact. And I will focus my inquiry on the question of whether or not any of the proposed
norms also apply to assertions of subjective probability and preference. The literature has
largely ignored these assertions and I believe the best argument against the simple view
comes by considering a broad variety of assertions. I will argue that as we consider what it
means to have a good reason to make assertions of subjective probability and preference,
it will become clear that norms like TRUTH, RATIONAL BELIEF, and KNOWLEDGE do
not govern all assertions.
2.1 Assertions of Subjective Probability
Bill and Ted are discussing their plans for the following day. Bill asserts, “I will
probably be at the library tomorrow. I have a book due and I don’t want to pay
the Vne.”
In order to apply our schema, we must identify how Bill’s assertion changes the common
ground and associate that change with some shared judgment that is made amongst the
speakers. In this case, a plausible interpretation is that Bill’s assertion changes the set of
shared probability judgments. More speciVcally, his assertion updates the common ground
such that the only permissible probability judgments are those that assign a greater prob-
ability to P, that Bill will be the library the next day, than ¬P.
Bill’s assertion is intuitively justiVed. For Bill has a good and previously unconsidered
reason that justiVes his assertion, so he has a good reason that justiVes the change he
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proposes to the common ground. He has information that Ted does not have about his
beliefs along with his motivations for being at the library. And this additional information
provides good support for his claim. Since he does not want to pay the Vne and that
requires that he stop by the library, it is likely that he will be at the library. Given this new
information, the only permissible probability judgments assign a greater than .5 probability
to the possibility that Bill will be at the library. This case is a commonplace example in
which Bill possesses additional evidence that supports the probability claim. Additional
evidence oUers good reasons for changing the shared set of probability judgments.24
Our main concern is to assess what this ordinary case says about the norm governing
assertions of subjective probability. Typically, the proponents of the simple view identify a
norm that requires the asserted content to possess some epistemic property such as being
true, known by the speaker, or reasonably believed by the speaker. Since Bill possesses a
good and previously unconsidered reason for making his assertion, he is presumably free
from criticism. However, does this reveal anything about the epistemic property that the
content of his assertion must have? That is, in virtue of possessing a good reason, is the
asserted content true, known, or rationally believed?
Unfortunately, the truth and knowledge norms both fail to capture what it means for
Bill to possess a good reason for his assertion. Though I think that the rational belief
24The reader may have some additional commitments as to what counts as evidence. Such considerations
will not matter for our purposes and we can add any additional details about Bill’s epistemic state to ensure
that his reasons are good (i.e. the information he possesses counts as evidence). For example, we can suppose
that Bill’s beliefs about the library book’s due date and about his desires are true and that his true beliefs are
justiVed enough to count as knowledge.
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norm has similar troubles with assertions of subjective probability, my main criticism will
come from a consideration of assertions of preference. So I will set that norm aside for
the moment. The truth and knowledge norm are problematic because they require that
the asserted content be true. But what does it mean for claims of subjective probability
to be true?25 Are these claims about the external world, about the speaker’s cognitive
state, or an epistemic fact about how strongly a set of evidence supports a proposition?
None of these proposals will work for each fails to capture what is being expressed by
claims of subjective probability (i.e. how these assertions change the common ground).
The Vrst option fails to account for the fact that Bill is not making a claim about objective
probabilities, whether understood as frequencies or propensities. Rather, he is making a
claim about subjective (or epistemic) probability. The second option fails to account for
the fact that Bill is not just making a claim about his own degree of belief. Just as the
assertion that P is distinct from the assertion that one believes that P, it would be a mistake
to think that Bill’s assertion that probably P is an assertion that Bill has a certain degree of
belief that P. If understood this way, it would fail to account for the fact that Bill’s assertion
attempts to change the shared probability judgment. When one asserts that one believes
that P, one does not update the common ground so that P is true. Similarly, if one asserted
that one was conVdent that P, one would not update the degree of belief shared amongst
the conversational participants. The third option fails to account for the fact that such
expressions make no direct appeal to evidence. After all, Bill would have made the same
25I am using the term subjective probability to include the notion of epistemic probability. So nothing is
lost by viewing these as claims of epistemic probability.
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assertion even if he possessed a completely diUerent set of evidence.
More importantly, the knowledge and truth norm fail to capture what it means for Bill
to be justiVed in making the assertion. For whatever epistemic status Bill has with respect
to the reasons that justify his assertion that P, this does not confer upon Bill the same
epistemic status with respect to the asserted content P. For example, if I know that my
plane is leaving in 5 minutes, this may provide the justiVcation I have for my assertion
that I should run to catch the plane. However, just because I know my reasons does not
mean that I know what I assert - I know that I should run to catch the plane. After all,
the plane may crash. Just because a known or true reason justiVes an action, this does not
mean that the resulting permission or obligation is known or true.
The general lesson is that we must distinguish the subject’s epistemic state with re-
spect to the justifying reasons and the subject’s epistemic state with respect to the asserted
content. I believe this basic point has been obscured by the focus on assertions of mat-
ters of fact. By considering assertions of subjective probability, we Vnd that if evidential
norms govern these assertions, they do not pertain straightforwardly to the asserted con-
tent. Rather, the relevant evidential norms appear to apply to the reasons that justify the
assertions and the evidential relation between the justifying reasons and the asserted con-
tent.
It may be objected that having a good and previously unconsidered reason is not the
guiding ideal for assertions of subjective probability. Suppose Bill has forgotten about an
important all-day meeting. When informed about this, he may retract his assertion and say,
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“You’re right. I probably will not be at the library after all.” In order to account for these
cases, we may want to tweak our schema by placing additional constraints on the justifying
reasons. For example, perhaps one must have a conclusive reason in the Dretskean sense
where a reason R is conclusive just in case if not P, then R would not hold.26 So the
fact that Bill has a book due and doesn’t want to pay the Vne is not conclusive since both
claims could be true even though he probably will not be at the library. However, whatever
tweaks must be made, it does not aUect the argument. What is problematic about TRUTH
and KNOWLEDGE is that they impose an evidential ideal on the speaker’s relation to the
asserted content. But for assertions of subjective probability, that relation is not where the
evidential norms apply.
2.2 Assertions of Preference
Bill and Ted are deciding how to get to their meeting.
Bill: Taking a cab is better. It’s faster.
Ted: No, the train is better.
Bill: Why?
Ted: I’d rather not pay for a cab.
How do Bill and Ted’s assertions of preference change the common ground? One thought
is that Bill’s expression of preference Vrst updates the common ground so that there is a
shared preference for the cab and then Ted’s assertion does two things. It Vrst retracts
Bill’s original claim and then updates the common ground so that there is now a shared
preference for the train. However, this interpretation would capture the conWict between
26(Dretske 1971)
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their opinions and thereby fail to account for their disagreement.
It is much more plausible to see Ted’s assertion as achieving a weaker type of retrac-
tion. Initially, when Bill asserts that the cab is better, the common ground represents a
shared preference for the cab over the train. Moreover, Bill’s assertion seems justiVed be-
cause he has identiVed a relevant value that justiVes this preference. Bill wants to take
the fastest trip to the meeting and given their shared beliefs, the train is preferable. Since
the duration of travel is all that is relevant for the moment, Bill can reasonably state this
preference without any qualiVcation. When Ted asserts that the train is better, he retracts
the unqualiVed preference for the cab. His assertion achieves this not by replacing it with
a shared preference for the train but by changing the common ground so that there is both
a preference for the cab and for the train. The decision-theoretic framework can represent
this conWict by allowing for one permissible expected utility function relative to which the
cab is better and another permissible expected utility function relative to which the train
is better. Ted’s assertion results in an indeterminacy of preference because a broader set
of preferences are permissible relative to both values. Moreover, Ted does not seem sus-
ceptible to criticism since he has a good and previously unconsidered reason to make his
assertion. He has appealed to the unconsidered value of spending less money and with
respect to this value, the train may be preferred. So the appeal to unaccounted for values
provides a good reason for expanding the set of permissible preferences.
Assertions of preference are particularly interesting because they are cases of asser-
tions that are not solely governed by evidential norms. For changes in preferences may be
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justiVed on the basis of a change in utility and the change in utility may in turn be justiVed
on the basis of a change in values. So the reasons that justify assertions of preference arise
partly from non-evidential rather than evidential considerations. Ted’s assertion of prefer-
ence is based upon the value for thrift. It is not based upon his belief that he values thrift
nor is it based upon the purported fact that the cab is better. His assertion is based upon
the value itself. Moreover, his values do not provide evidence for the asserted preference.
After all, these values are not in a truth-relevant relation to the preference. They do not
make the preference more or less likely to be true.
So assertions of preference show that the proposed simple views have failed to take into
account the relationship between having good reasons for an assertion and the speaker’s
relation to the asserted content. These examples also oUer an additional lesson by showing
us something about the types of reasons that can justify our assertions. Since our reasons
are often non-evidential, it would be strange to only impose evidential constraints on what
counts as a good reason. Thus, assertions of preference do not seem to be solely governed
by an evidential norm as every version of the simple view suggests.
Again, it could be objected that Ted’s reasons are not good enough since he may retract
his assertion when Bill oUers to pay for the cab. We can reply to this objection in the same
way as we did before by adding stronger constraints on the reasons that ideally justify
Ted’s assertion. But these worries do not aUect the criticism that evidential norms are not
the only type of norm that govern assertions of preference.
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3 The Many Norms of Assertion
By connecting decision theory with assertion, we are presented with the view that asser-
tions are speech acts that aim to change the conversational state of mind. It is important
to note that this type of change – changes to a coherent state of mind with respect to a de-
cision problem – is not something that is unique to interpersonal communication. When
an individual deliberates, she reWects on her decision problem, considers her beliefs and
desires, and attempts to come to a rational equilibrium with which she is content. Dur-
ing this process, she may engage in intrapersonal communication by “speaking” to herself.
When we speak to ourselves, we try to coordinate our information, attitudes, and judg-
ments in order to engage in reasoned deliberation. For example, suppose Jill is trying to
decide where to go for an afternoon and comes to a coherent state of mind according to
which a long drive down to the shore is best. She may then realize that she needs to attend
her brother’s birthday dinner and should not drive very far. By remembering this, she may
reassess her choices and come to a diUerent coherent state of mind since previously uncon-
sidered information and values have become relevant to her deliberation. Remembering is
a way of making assertions to one’s self and may cause changes to one’s coherent state of
mind with respect to a decision problem.27 The decision-theoretic account sees assertion as
analogous to this type of intrapersonal communication. Asserting that one doesn’t want to
27Some Bayesians would object since they think that rationality requires a coherent set of beliefs and
desires over every possible state of the world and consequence. Since bounded human agents cannot satisfy
this demand, such an all-things-considered interpretation of Bayesian decision theory would fail to satisfy
the maxim that ought implies can. On my view, Bayesian decision theory only imposes coherence constraints
within the set of possibilities that have been deemed relevant for a given decision problem.
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travel far in a conversation has essentially the same eUect as remembering that one doesn’t
want to travel far in one’s own deliberation.
By using constructive decision theory, we can begin to articulate the conditions un-
der which an agent is justiVed in changing from one coherent state of mind to another.
And given the decision-theoretic view of assertion, the same theory can be used to artic-
ulate when an assertion is justiVed. By considering some particular cases, we found that
a plurality of norms govern these changes. For assertions about matters of fact, a single
norm articulating how strong one’s epistemic state has to be in relation to the asserted
content may suXce. However, as we broaden the types of assertions we consider and
thereby broaden the ways that assertions change the common ground, it seems unlikely
that a single evidential norm will do. The norms that govern assertions of subjective prob-
ability appear to govern the evidential relationship between the reasons and the asserted
content as well as the subject’s relation to the reasons. Furthermore, the norms that gov-
ern assertions of preference are not solely evidential norms. For evaluative concerns may
justify preferences and the rational relationship between these evaluative concerns and
preferences are non-evidential.28
So it seems that no simple account will do. By situating assertion within a decision-
28It might be objected that utterances of subjective probability and preference are not assertions. How-
ever, it is diXcult to see how else to classify these utterances. The only plausible alternative is that they
are expressives, which (Searle 1975) identiVes as speech acts that express the speaker’s attitudes towards
a proposition. However, the assertions of probability and preference that I have considered do not simply
express the speaker’s attitudes toward a proposition. Since these expressions attempt to change the common
ground by updating the shared attitudes toward a proposition, they cannot only express information about
the speaker’s attitudes.
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theoretic framework, we Vnd that the constitutive norms of assertion can be derived from
the general norms governing rational deliberation. And by doing so, we have found that
contrary to the simple view, the norms of assertion are not one, but many.
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Chapter 6
The Use of ‘Knows’
To complete our discussion of the stability account, we must now address the standard
variability of knowledge as it is exhibited in the contextualist cases. These cases are also
important because they have been used to present some important objections against SSI.
As Keith DeRose summarizes the situation, SSI’s two greatest problems are its “inability to
properly handle certain third-person attributions of knowledge” along with “its denial of
intellectualism and its related suceptibility to what we can call ‘now you know it, now you
you don’t’ objections.”1 By appealing to the decision-theoretic account of assertion and
knowledge to develop a model that explains and predicts our linguistic use, I will show
that SSI can account for our use and respond to these two objections.
1 The Linguistic Data
Two features of our ordinary use have dominated the debate between contextualism and
SSI. The Vrst set of data purports to show that the standards governing knowledge attribu-
tions and denials depend upon practical features. The second set of data concerns how we
1p.185, (DeRose 2009)
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retract previous knowledge attributions when the conversational standards are raised.
Before I describe the data, I want to make a note about the way that I will describe
our linguistic intuitions. It is sometimes assumed that our intuitions concern the truth and
falsity of our knowledge ascribing and denying sentences.2 However, in order to remain
neutral between pragmatic and semantic explanations of our intuitions, I will characterize
our intuitions as concerning the appropriateness or inappropriateness of utterances.3
1.1 Practical Variability of Standards
Contextualist cases come in pairs where the subject’s epistemic state remains Vxed but the
standards required for the subject’s true belief to count as knowledge vary. As a result, the
examples are meant to show that the use of ‘knows’ depends upon non-epistemic features.
DeRose’s bank cases oUer paradigmatic examples.
(Bank Case A) My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We
plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as
we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they
often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our
paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that
they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and
deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, ‘Maybe the bank
won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.’ I reply, ‘No, I
know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until
noon.’
2DeRose is particularly clear that the intuitions which support contextualism concern the truth and falsity
of certain knowledge ascribing and denying sentences.
3Here I am following Chomsky (via Allen Hazlett), when he writes, “we cannot in general know, prethe-
oretically, whether [some] deviance is a matter of syntax, semantics, pragmatics, belief, memory limitation,
style, etc.” p.4, (Chomsky 1977)
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(Bank Case D) My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as
in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our pay-
checks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday
morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But
in this case, we have just written a very large and important check. If our pay-
checks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning,
the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation.
And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these
facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will
be open tomorrow?” Remaining as conVdent as I was before that the bank will
be open then, still I reply, “Well, no. I’d better go in and make sure.”4
In the low practical stakes case A, it seems appropriate for the attributor, DeRose, to
say of himself that he knows. In the high practical stakes case D, it seems inappropriate
for DeRose to say of himself that he knows. Since DeRose’s epistemic state in A is the
same as in D, the only diUerence between the two cases are the practical stakes of being
wrong. So these two cases are meant to show that the standards governing the appropri-
ateness of knowledge attributions depend upon practical features that may vary from one
conversational context to another.
As we’ve already discussed, contextualism and SSI diUer in their explanation of the
variability of standards governing the use of ‘knows’. The contextualist proposes that the
truth conditions of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences varies from one context of
use to the next. This means that ‘knows’ is a context-sensitive term, referring to diUer-
ent relations in diUerent contexts of use. And what distinguishes these relations are the
epistemic standards that the subject must meet in order to count as knowing. Since the
4p.913,(DeRose 1992)
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referent of ‘knows’ depends upon the context of use, the contextualist naturally identiVes
the standards picked out by the attributor’s context as those that determine whether or not
a knowledge attribution is true and appropriate. In Bank Case A and D, diUerent standards
govern the attributor’s context and as a result, the same knowledge-ascribing sentence, “I
know that the bank will be open”, is true when uttered by DeRose in A, but false when
uttered in D.
Subject-sensitive invariantists retain the classical view that ‘knows’ refers to a unique
knowledge-relation. But they deviate from the classical view by proposing that non-
epistemic features of the subject, such as the subject’s practical stakes, are relevant for
determining the standards that are needed for the subject’s true belief to count as knowl-
edge. Since Bank Case A and D are situations in which DeRose’s practical stakes diUer,
DeRose counts as knowing in the low stakes case A, but not in the high stakes case D.
So the contextualist thinks that the standards governing the use of ‘knows’ is deter-
mined by the attributor while the sensitive invariantist thinks that the standards are de-
termined by the subject. Despite their diUerences, Bank Cases A and D cannot be used to
diUerentiate the two views. Since the attributor and subject are identical in these situa-
tions, we cannot tell which context the use of ‘knows’ is being sensitive to. So we must
look to third person cases of knowledge attributions and denials where the subject and
attributor are not identical. The Vrst type of third person case is one where the subject is
in a low standards context, but the attributor is in a high standards context.
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(Bank Case B) Bonnie and Clyde are driving to the bank on a Friday after-
noon. Clyde is on the phone with his friend Al when they arrive at the bank.
Seeing the line come out the door, Clyde informs Al of their situation. Al
replies that he was at the bank two weeks earlier on a Saturday at it was open
until noon. Turning to Bonnie, Clyde states, “Al knows that the bank will be
open tomorrow. He was at the bank two week ago on a Saturday and it was
open until noon. Let’s come back tomorrow.” Bonnie then reminds Clyde of
their situation. They have just written a very large and important check. If
their paychecks are not deposited into their checking account before Monday
morning, the important check will bounce, leaving them in a very bad situa-
tion. Bonnie asks Clyde, “Banks do change their hours. Does Al really know
the bank will be open tomorrow?” Clyde describes their predicament and re-
lays the question to Al who tells Clyde that he is not sure. Clyde turns to
Bonnie and says, “I guess Al doesn’t know. I’d better go in and make sure.”
It seems appropriate for Clyde to say of Al that he does not know. Contextualists
account for this intuition by claiming that since the standards of knowledge attributions
are sensitive to the attributor’s high standards and the subject’s epistemic state does not
meet those standards, it cannot be said of the subject that he knows. In contrast, SSI
predicts that knowledge attributions will be sensitive to the subject’s standards. Since Al’s
standards are low, SSI appears to wrongly predict that Al knows. DeRose concludes that
“these third-person cases provide a powerful objection – to my thinking, a killer objection
– to SSI.”5
The second type of case is one where the subject is in a high standards context, but the
attributor is in a low standards context.
5p. 65, (DeRose 2009)
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(Bank Case C) Suppose Bonnie and Clyde are in the situation described in
Bank Case B. In another part of town, John is thinking about going to the
bank. Having seen Clyde two weeks prior, he wonders whether he will be
there. It doesn’t really matter to John whether the bank is open or whether
Clyde will be at the bank. Discussing this with a friend, he says, “Clyde was
at the bank two Saturdays ago. He knows that the bank will be open on this
Saturday.”6
Some sensitive invariantists claim that there is an intuition that John’s utterance is
false. And since the attributor’s standards are low, SSI accurately predicts that knowl-
edge attributions are sensitive to the subject’s standards. In contrast, contextualism would
wrongly predict that John’s assertion is true. Jason Stanley has appealed to these intuitions
to argue in favor of SSI.7 As I noted, I will resist appealing to intuitions about the truth and
falsity of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences and focus on our intuitions of appro-
priateness and inappropriateness. And regardless of whether the sentence is true or false,
John’s seems to be warranted in making the assertion, which both SSI and contextualism
can account for. For sensitive invariantists, John’s attribution is warranted given the lim-
ited information he possesses, but it is false. For the contextualist, John’s attribution is true
and warranted.
These four cases can be used to provide a taxonomy of the relevant cases (Table 6.1).
6This case is a version of the one presented in (Stanley 2005).
7(Stanley 2005)
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Table 6.1: Taxonomy of Cases
1.2 Retracting Knowledge Attributions
The second set of data concerns our retractions of knowledge attributions. And Bank Case
B oUers an example of a retraction. In this case, Clyde initially attributes knowledge of
the bank’s hours to Al. But once he is informed of the stakes of the situation, Clyde’s
standards are raised and he retracts his claim. Some have proposed to interpret these
retractions as informing us about the truth and falsity of our knowledge attributions. For
example, (MacFarlane 2006) proposes that these retractions tells us that after the standards
are raised, Clyde earlier knowledge attribution is treated as false. And if that is the case,
then the retraction data would provide a powerful argument against SSI. For the sensitive
invariantist thinks that Al knows before Bonnie’s standards are salient if and only if Al
knows after Bonnie’s standards are salient.
Again, I will limit myself to the intuition that the retraction is appropriate. But even
if we restrict ourselves to intuitions about appropriateness, the retraction data does speak
against SSI. For contextualists have argued that the retraction data cannot be accounted
for by SSI. In particular, it has been thought that the sensitive invariantist cannot oUer
a plausible pragmatic explanation of our intuitions. The general pragmatic strategy is to
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explain the appropriateness or inappropriateness of our utterances in terms warranted and
unwarranted assertibility and rather than truth and falsity.
There are two types of cases that are best explained by this strategy. The Vrst type of
case concerns literally false utterances that are nevertheless appropriate. Here, the speaker
is typically ignorant of some facts, but has enough evidence to warrant her assertion. For
example, I may have overwhelming evidence that Bob committed the crime and say so. If
it turns out that Bob has a twin who committed the crime, my utterance though false is
clearly justiVed. In cases of incomplete information, we can use the notion of warranted
assertibility to explain why speakers may appropriately utter a false sentence.
The second type of case concerns literally true utterances that are nevertheless inap-
propriate. Suppose I utter that Bob is somewhat tall. While this utterance may be literally
true, it also implicates the fact that Bob is not very tall. If what is implicated is false, then
it would be inappropriate to assert the sentence. It is in these types of cases where prag-
matics can be used to explain away intuitions of inappropriateness despite the fact that the
sentence is true.8
Unfortunately, Clyde’s retraction falls into neither categories. First, we can Vll in the
case so that Clyde is fully aware of Al’s practical situation. And even if Clyde knew all the
relevant facts, it would still be reasonable of him to make his retraction. Next, since SSI
assesses the utterance as false, the appeal to pragmatics seems strange. For we would need
to account for the appropriateness of a literally false assertion rather than the inappropri-
8This is a short summary of the argument found in (DeRose 2002).
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ateness of a literally true assertion. Therefore, the retraction data as it has been presented
oUers good evidence against SSI. I believe the correct response is to question the retraction
data, a task that I will turn to below.
2 A Model of our Use of ‘Knows’
In what follows, I will develop a model of our use of ‘knows’ that appeals to the decision-
theoretic account of assertion and knowledge. By using this model to account for the
practical variability of standards and retraction data, I will respond to the contextualist’s
criticisms. The model answers the following questions:
1. Who and what determines the standards of a conversation?
2. What is the semantics of ‘knows’?
3. What are the relevant pragmatic features of ‘knows’?
4. How should we retract knowledge attributions?
2.1 Who and What Determines Conversational Standards
DiUerent conversations have diUerent standards. Since a skeptic is unwilling to accept
many claims without extremely strong evidence, the standards in a conversation with a
skeptic tend to be extremely high. Radical skeptics are typically unwilling to negotiate
their standards so we must either cooperate by accommodating the skeptic’s standards or
resorting to non-cooperative forms of communication.
Though conversations with skeptics are extreme examples, there are ordinary cases
where it would be perfectly reasonable to accommodate someone else’s high standards.
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Conversation is often used for the purpose of practical decision making. For example, you
may help me decide where to go for vacation. In cases like these, a single conversational
participant is making a decision and it seems prudent to accommodate the standards of
the decision making agent. In cases of joint decision making, the standards are often
less determinate.9 If we try to decide where to travel together, each of our standards are
relevant and we will not acquiesce to the other’s standards if they are unreasonable.
In each case, the standards of the conversation are determined by the purpose of the
conversation. When conversing with the skeptic, the aim of the conversation is an ex-
change of information and what is accepted within the conversation must be accepted by
all the conversational participants. Because one of the participants is an extreme skeptic,
the standards will be unnaturally high. When advising me on my vacation choice, the pur-
pose of the conversation is my practical deliberation and so the standards governing the
conversation will be determined by me. When deciding where to have a shared vacation,
the purpose of the conversation is to deliberate about our shared decision problem. So
the standards of the conversation will be determined by all the agents taking part in the
deliberation.
The purpose of the conversation not only determines the standards of the conversa-
tional context, but it also identiVes whose standards they are. We can make this connec-
tion between the purposes of the conversation and the agent who determines the standards
by appealing to the decision-theoretic account of assertion. On the decision-theoretic ac-
9The linguistic data usually fails to diUerentiate cases of joint decision making contexts from cases of
single-agent decision making contexts. A point made to me in conversation by Isaac Levi.
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count, conversation can always be represented as a type of deliberation. The deliberative
purpose can be theoretical (e.g. an exchange of information) or practical (e.g joint prac-
tical deliberation). Since we can view the conversation as having a deliberative purpose,
we can view the common ground of the conversation as representing the set of cognitive
and conative attitudes and judgments that are relevant for the deliberation. And since the
standards of the conversation are just the standards that govern changes to the common
ground, the conversational standards should be determined by the standards of the decision
maker who uses the shared attitudes and judgments represented in the common ground
as a surrogate for his or her own attitudes and judgments. Call this decision maker, the
conversational agent. When we are conversing about my vacation, I am the conversational
agent and when engaging in joint deliberation about our vacation, we are the conversa-
tional agent. In summary, conversation is purposive and the purposes of the conversation
determines the conversational standards. And the conversational standards are those of
the conversational agent.
2.2 The Semantics of ‘Knows’
No account of the use of ‘knows’ is complete without a semantics and we can appeal to the
stability account to identify the truth-conditions of knowledge attributing sentences.
“S knows that P” is true if and only if in the relevant deliberative context, P
is true and in that deliberative context, S premises that P and her premising is
both objectively and subjectively stable.
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2.3 The Pragmatics of ‘Knows’
The use of ‘knows’ also depends upon some general pragmatic features of knowledge at-
tributions and denials. For our purposes, there is only one pragmatic feature that I will be
concerned with, the presupposition triggering of factive verbs.10
The classic example of presupposition triggering arises from the use of deVnite noun
phrases. And a “sentence S presupposes that P if and only if the use of S would be inap-
propriate in a context in which the speaker was not presupposing that P.”11 For example, if
one successfully asserts “The King of France is bald”, the updated common ground includes
only those worlds at which there exists one and only one King of France. The presupposi-
tion that there exists exactly one King of France is not part of the meaning of the sentence,
but is part of what is expressed. Just as deVnite noun phrases trigger presuppositions,
factive verbs trigger presuppositions as well.
(1) John regrets sending Sally an e-mail.
(1’) John sent Sally an e-mail.
(2) Bill discovered that he was employee of the month.
(2’) Bill was the employee of the month.
(1) and (2) respectively presuppose (1’) and (2’). Since ‘knows’ is a factive verb, it also
triggers the presupposition.
10(Hazlett 2004) has oUered an argument that ‘knows’ is not a factive verb. Since his argument is only
concerned with the semantics rather than pragmatics of ‘knows’, even if he were right, which I’m inclined
to think he is not, my discussion of ‘knows’ would be unaUected.
11p.7, (Stalnaker 1999)
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(3) Kate knows that she passed the test.
(3’) Kate passed the test.
Since (3) entails (3’), we do not need to appeal to the phenomenon of presupposition trig-
gering. However, factive verbs trigger the factive presupposition even when the sentence
is negated.
(4) Kate doesn’t know that she passed the test.
Asserting (4) also triggers the presupposition that (3’) is true. And asserting the negations
of (1) and (2) respectively trigger the presupposition that (1’) and (2’) are true. It is impor-
tant to note that there are cases in which factive verbs do not trigger presuppositions.
(5) If Bob discovers that he is employee of the month, he will stop working hard.
(6) I don’t know that Kate passed the test.12
Neither (5) nor (6) respectively trigger the presupposition that (2’) or (3’) is true. Since I
will only be concerned with the triggering of factive presuppositions, we should be careful
to recognize when the factive presupposition is triggered and when it disappears.13
2.4 Two Standards Governing ‘Knows’
Given the semantics and pragmatics of ‘knows’, we can identify two distinct standards
that govern the use of ‘knows’. The meaning of ‘knows’ entails that the truth-value of
knowledge ascribing and denying sentences depends upon the standards that govern how
strong a subject’s epistemic state must be in order to premise P in the relevant deliber-
13See p. 218-220, (Kadmon 2001) for a more thorough discussion of the presupposition triggering of factive
verbs.
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ative context. And these standards are in part determined by non-epistemic features of
the subject’s situation. The meaning of ‘knows’ also entails that the appropriateness of
a knowledge attribution depends upon whether P can be premised (taken for granted) in
the conversational context. If it is successfully asserted that S knows that P, P is taken
as true in the conversational context. So knowledge attributions should be sensitive to
the conversational standards. In addition, given the presupposition triggering of ‘knows’,
the appropriateness of some knowledge denials, such as “John doesn’t know that P”, also
depend upon whether P can be premised in the conversational context. So two distinct
standards generally govern knowledge attributions and denials: the standards of the sub-
ject of knowledge and the standards of the conversational agent.
2.5 Retractions and Rationality
Before we turn to account for our use of ‘knows’, we must reconsider the retraction data.
As it stands, the retraction data provides strong evidence against SSI. But this crucially
depends upon the fact that a retraction of the knowledge attribution, “S knows that P”,
may be expressed by uttering, “S doesn’t know that P.” Is there any way of explaining this
retraction data without going contextualist?14
One response is to reconsider possible pragmatic explanations of our intuitions. Jessica
Brown has noted that for Vgurative language, we often do account for the appropriateness
of false utterances. In the case of hyperboles, what is literally expressed is false even
though what is pragmatically implicated is true. Brown attempts to extend this type of
14I will be ignoring relativist proposals such as the one presented in (MacFarlane 2006).
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pragmatic analysis to non-Vgurative language and thereby attempts to provide a plausible
explanation of the retraction data in terms of warranted assertibility.15 And Patrick Rysiew
has oUered a very diUerent type of pragmatic explanation in terms of Gricean maxims and
conversational implicatures.16 I will set these aside because each explanation appeals to
controversial pragmatic features of ‘knows’ and I think we can do better. I will argue that
we can account for all our intuitions even if we limit ourselves to simple observations about
conversational standards and the presupposition triggering of factive verbs. To do so, I
propose that we reconsider our retractions by identifying exactly what types of retractions
are appropriate.
The debate has assumed that when speakers retract previous knowledge attributions,
they do by asserting their negation. Call this a straightforward denial. However, this cannot
be right. The best evidence that the retraction data has been misinterpreted comes from
third person denials of knowledge. Asserting “S doesn’t know that P” triggers the presup-
position that P. And in the high stakes bank cases, since the truth of P is exactly what is in
question, the speaker would be unwarranted in making the straightforward denial.
Let’s carefully consider what is going on in the retraction case. Before Clyde becomes
aware of the high stakes of the situation, he asserts of Al that he knows that the bank will
be open the next day. But once Bonnie informs Clyde of the situation, the conversational
standards are raised and Al’s epistemic state is no longer strong enough to justify Clyde’s
15(Brown 2006)
16(Rysiew 2002)
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claim that Al knows. Clyde must now retract his knowledge attribution. If Clyde asserts
that Al knows, then the common ground is updated such that it is true that the bank will
be open on Saturday. And in the conversational context, Bonnie and Clyde are making
a decision for which no one’s epistemic state is strong enough to justify taking this fact
for granted. So however Clyde retracts the knowledge claim, he must retract the truth of
purportedly known proposition as well.
Suppose Clyde retracts by asserting that Al doesn’t know that the bank will be open.
Since third person denials of knowledge trigger the presupposition that its complement is
true, Clyde would fail to achieve his aim. So third person retractions cannot be straight-
forward denials of knowledge.
First person retractions of knowledge do not run into this problem since the presuppo-
sition disappears in present-tense Vrst person denials of knowledge.
Clyde: (Seeing a long line out the door) I was here last week. I know that the
bank will be open. Let’s come back tomorrow.
Bonnie: But banks often change their hours and I must deposit this check by
this weekend or else the bank will foreclose on my house. Do you really know
that the bank will be open tomorrow?
Clyde: Well, no, I guess I don’t.
Clyde’s retraction is typically interpreted as a straightforward denial of knowledge. And
SSI can explain these Vrst person denials. Clyde is part of group that is engaged in a high
stakes decision problem. Since Clyde’s epistemic state is not strong enough, according
to SSI, it is true that he doesn’t know. Moreover, in this case, contextualists typically
assume that the subject’s conVdence and/or belief remains stable between the low and high
2. A Model of our Use of ‘Knows’ 203
stakes situation.17 But given the empirical evidence that supports the constructive view of
deliberative belief, desire and preference, this assumption seems suspect. The change from
a low to high stakes context is a move from one deliberative context to another. So in
Vrst person cases when Clyde’s own stakes shift, he may and perhaps should construct a
diUerent set of beliefs for each context. It is important to note the type of variability that
the constructive view proposes. From this viewpoint, it is false to say of Clyde that he
goes from being conVdent to being less conVdent – because this presupposes a context-
independent notion of conVdence. Rather, Clyde is very conVdent in one context and less
conVdent in the other. And if Clyde is less conVdent when the stakes are high, that may
explain why he counts as knowing in the low stakes situation, but not in the high stakes
situation.
Though these Vrst person cases are unproblematic for SSI, there are cases of Vrst per-
son denials of knowledge where Clyde is neither the conversational agent nor a member
of the group conversational agent. So in these cases, the practical stakes should not af-
fect whether Clyde knows nor should it presumably aUect Clyde’s conVdence. After all,
it would be Clyde’s deliberative context that we are concerned with. And since we have
found reason to question the third person retraction data, there may be reason to recon-
sider the Vrst person retraction data as well. So when would we ever assert straightforward
denials? Consider the oddity of the following utterances.
17DeRose explicitly argues for a stable conception of conVdence where the subject’s conVdence remains
Vxed between low and high stakes contexts. He writes, “I’m about equally conVdent in the truth of [P]
in LOW and in HIGH, but the same level of conVdence that produces conVdent behavior in LOW doesn’t
produce similarly conVdent behavior in HIGH.” p.192, (DeRose 2009)
2. A Model of our Use of ‘Knows’ 204
(7) I do not know that the bank will be open.
(8) I do not know that I fed my dog.
It is hard to imagine cases in which these denials seem natural. A Google and OED search
of the phrase ‘I do not know’ and ‘I don’t know’ reveals that such constructions are usually
associated with the following sentences that are used when the speaker does not know the
answer to a question.18
(9) I do not know whether the bank will be open or not.
(10) I do not know where my dog is.
(11) I do not know how long the bank will be open.
(12) I do not know what I fed my dog.
There do appear to be cases where Vrst person denials are somewhat natural. The Vrst two
are cases in which there is stress on the word ‘knows’.
(13) I don’t KNOW that the bank will be open.
(14) I don’t KNOW that I fed my dog.
(15) I do not know that a drilled acre is superior in produce, at Vrst, to a broad-cast acre.
(OED 1989b)
(16) I do not know that I shall have occasion to return, if I can rent rooms in town to lodge
in. (OED 1989a)
(13) and (14) are complicated by the pragmatics of focus and they seem to be used to
express the lack of absolute certainty or at least the fact that we lack a high degree of
18Though it has become somewhat uncommon, one may answer a question by asserting, “I do not know
that.” But this does not mean that I do not know that P. Rather, it means I do not know what the answer is.
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conVdence. If I assert that I do not KNOW that it will rain rather than assert that I do not
think it will rain, I often mean to express that I lack a high degree of conVdence rather than
a lack of belief altogether. Similarly, (15) and (16) appear to be indications that one does
not believe some proposition or is not every conVdent about its truth. So if we do make
straightforward Vrst person denials, they appear to be expressions of a lack of conVdence.
DeRose has argued that contextualist cases are best represented as cases in which the
subject’s conVdence and belief is unchanged by the practical stakes. So if Vrst person de-
nials typically express a lack of conVdence and these are cases where the subject’s belief
state is supposed to remain stable, Vrst person denials retract too much information from
the common ground. Both the truth of the target proposition and information about the
subject’s conVdence is retracted. However, rationality and rational cooperation demand
that one should retract the minimal amount of information from the common ground when
being concessive to a skeptical challenge.19 The point of the skeptical challenge is to chal-
lenge the truth that P and thereby remove P from the common ground. On one extreme,
Clyde shouldn’t respond by being even more skeptical, uttering that banks might not exist.
On the other extreme, Clyde, insofar as he’s being cooperative, should not dogmatically
insist that banks never change their hours. Once a skeptical possibility has been raised,
one can retract the minimal amount of information by admitting the skeptical possibility
19The principle of minimal change is a principle of rationality governing all types of belief change. It
applies here because assertion and retraction mirror how single person agents expand, contract, and revise
their belief states. For the sake of simplicity, one can view the common ground as the beliefs of a group agent
whose members are cooperating. See (Gardenfors 1988) for a discussion of the role that this principle plays
in a theory of belief revision.
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into the common ground and retracting the truth of the purportedly known proposition.
So neither Vrst person nor third person retractions of knowledge are appropriately
expressed as straightforward denials of knowledge. However, clearly we do retract our
knowledge claims. How should we do so? Though I am not sure there is a clear answer, I
will oUer some suggestions about how to interpret the data. The guiding principle behind
these suggestions is to interpret the retraction data so as to preserve the principle of min-
imal change. Since what is being contracted from the common ground is the truth of the
purportedly known proposition, no more and no less should be contracted by a speaker’s
retraction.
A fruitful place to begin is to return to the beginning of the misunderstanding. What
is most surprising about the standard interpretation of the retraction data is that it simply
fails to take into account the way the cases were actually presented. When the cases were
presented in their most natural and colloquial form, the retractions of knowledge attribu-
tions were never expressed as straightforward denials. Consider the following examples
of retractions: MacFarlane writes, ”No, I suppose I didn’t”, Stanley writes, ”I guess I don’t
really know that the bank will be open”, DeRose writes, ”I guess I didn’t know that they
were zebras.” 20
These retractions are not straightforward denials since they are hedged in some way
or other. And these utterances appear to captured by the assertion “I might not know that
P.” The use of the epistemic modal ‘might’ changes what is expressed in an important way.
20(MacFarlane 2006),(Stanley 2005),(DeRose 1992)
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One simply appears to be expressing that P is epistemically possible in the conversational
context. In the bank cases, this retraction essentially adds back into the common ground
some subset of worlds in which the bank is not open the next day. As in other cases,
the speaker oUers some hypothesis under which not-P would be true. In Bank Case D,
DeRose’s wife suggests the possibility that the bank has changed its hours. The retrac-
tion would place back into the common ground worlds in which the bank is not open on
Saturday because the bank has changed its hours.
In many examples of retractions, the verb phrase of the retraction is left unpronounced.
For example, after the stakes have been raised and he is asked whether he really knows
that the bank will be open, DeRose describes the retraction with the utterance, “Well,
no.”21 It has been assumed that the unpronounced element should be Vlled in by a knows-
that phrase. Given the problems with this interpretation, we can solve them if we Vll in the
unpronounced element of the retraction of knowledge with the subordinate clause, whether
or not P.22 Typically, we can understand whether or not claims as material conditionals.
“Whether or not it rains, I will go to the park” is equivalent to “If it rains, I will go to the
park and if it doesn’t rain, then I will go to the park”. Thus, “S knows whether or not P” is
equivalent to “If P, S knows that P and if not-P, then S knows that not-P”. And “S doesn’t
know whether or not P” means “If P, then S doesn’t know P and if not-P, then S doesn’t
21(DeRose 1992)
22There are some diXcult questions about how we should understand these diUerent constructions such as
‘knows that P rather than Q’ or ‘knows whether or not P’. Some of these diXculties are discussed in (SchaUer
2008). I have proposed one interpretation here, but the main point that I would like to make is that however
we should understand the semantics of these claims, it is clear how they ought to update the conversational
context. The resulting common ground includes both P-worlds and ¬P-worlds.
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know not-P”.
By interpreting the unpronounced element as a whether or not clause, we can preserve
the principle of minimal change since the closest set of worlds in which “S doesn’t know
whether or not P” is true is a set of worlds where P is possible - where there are both P
worlds and not-P worlds. The same is true when we retract our knowledge claims using
epistemic modals: “Maybe I don’t know that p” or “It’s possible that I don’t know that P.”
The modal claims are true just in case there are some worlds in the common ground in
which the subject doesn’t know that P. And the closest set of worlds in which the subject
doesn’t know are the set with both P and not-P worlds.
The general point is that we can use the principle of minimal change as a constraint on
how we can understand knowledge retractions.23 In doing so, we Vnd that straightforward
denials of knowledge simply don’t work. Third person denials retract too little information
and Vrst person denials retract too much information. We must complicate the retraction
data with epistemic modals and subordinate clauses to make it just right.
3 Explaining the Use of ‘Knows’
The framework I have developed identiVes two standards that govern the use of ‘knows’,
the standards of the conversational agent and the subject of knowledge. In addition, we
have corrected the data concerning our retractions of knowledge attributions. Using this
framework, SSI can address the use of ‘knows’.
23In fact, I think this suggests a more general methodological point that our epistemological principles are
always more secure than our linguistic intuitions since we use these general intuitions about rationality to
interpret our linguistic intuitions.
3. Explaining the Use of ‘Knows’ 209
3.1 Practical Variability of Standards
Cases like Bank Case B are thought to be fatal for SSI. For it is inappropriate to attribute
knowledge to Al even though SSI predicts that that Al does know. And we saw that we
normally explain why an utterance is inappropriate when a sentence is true but has a false
implicature. Given our observations about the dual set of standards governing knowledge
attributions, the sensitive invariantist has a simple explanation of this case. The purpose
of the conversation is determined by Bonnie and Clyde’s practical deliberation. Since they
are the conversational agent, their standards determine the conversational standards. As
we noted, both the standards of the conversational agent and the subject of knowledge
are relevant for the appropriateness of knowledge attributions. The attributor’s stakes are
high because the standards of the conversational context are high. Therefore, it would be
inappropriate to attribute knowledge to Al, even though Al is in a low stakes context. After
all, asserting that Al knows that the bank will be open entails that the bank will be open.
Since Bonnie and Clyde may not take this proposition for granted, Clyde may not assert
that Al knows.
Of course, the more serious problem for SSI is the contextualist’s claim that Clyde can
say of Al that he does not know. But here the contextualist is mistaken. In our discussion
of retractions, we found that such straightforward denials were inappropriate and we will
shortly see how the sensitive invariantist can account for hedged retractions/denials.
In Bank Case C, sensitive invariantists have argued that Al’s assertion that Bonnie
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knows the bank will be open on Saturday seems false. This is entailed by the sensitive in-
variantist semantics of ‘knows’. Unfortunately, this intuition is not widely shared.24 What
seems to be fairly clear is that Al’s utterance, whether true or false, seems appropriate
and this needs to be explained. SSI can explain the appropriateness of the assertion. For
whether or not the assertion is false, it seems warranted due to lack of total information.
The assertion is warranted because Al has evidence that is strong enough to justify up-
dating the conversational context with what is expressed when he utters, “Bonnie knows
that the bank will be open on Saturday.” However, if Al knew about Bonnie’s situation
and the practical stakes involved, then he should retract his attribution since Al would no
longer be warranted in claiming that Bonnie knows. So we can conclude that the practical
variability of standards data favors neither contextualism nor SSI.
3.2 Retractions
Now that we have corrected the retraction data, SSI has no problem accounting for the
appropriateness of retractions in high stakes cases. First, retractions of knowledge attri-
butions are not strictly false because they do not express that the subject does not know.
Instead, retractions make a weaker claim that P is epistemically possible. And the retrac-
tion is appropriate just in case the speaker has good reasons to assert that P is epistemically
possible in the conversational context.
Consider Clyde’s retraction of knowledge in Bank Case B. Clyde initially asserts that
Al knows that the bank will be open on Saturday. He then retracts this claim by asserting
24See (DeRose 2007).
4. A New Taxonomy 211
that maybe Al doesn’t know. This retraction is appropriate since Al’s epistemic state is not
strong enough to rule out the possibility that the bank will not be open in the conversa-
tional context. SSI has no problem accounting for the reinterpreted retraction data. Since
SSI is not committed to the falsity of the hedged retraction, it does not attempt to explain
away the appropriateness of a false assertion.25
4 A New Taxonomy
Given our model, it may be helpful to oUer a more accurate and appropriate taxonomy of
the linguistic data. For the new taxonomy will divide cases in terms of the standards of the
conversational agent and these standards can diUer from those of both the attributor and
the subject. Next, we can reVne the old taxonomy in two ways. First, we can diUerentiate
cases in which the truth of the target proposition P is taken for granted in the conversa-
tional context from cases in which the target proposition is not presupposed. This is a
natural reVnement once we realize that the standards of the conversational agent and the
standards of the subject of knowledge both govern knowledge attributions. By consider-
ing cases in which the target proposition is taken granted, we Vlter out the conversational
standards that govern premising that P in the common ground and focus on the subject’s
standards. These cases will become important in dealing with an objection against SSI. The
second reVnement arises from the fact that conversation can be used for joint deliberation.
In these cases, the conversational standards may diUer between the speakers. I call these
25Unlike the solution proposed in (Hawthorne 2006), my solution does not require an error theory.
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cases of mixed standards. So the new taxonomy diUerentiates between six types of cases
(Table 6.2).
Low Mixed High
P is taken for
granted 1 2 3
P is not taken
for granted 4 5 6
Table 6.2: New Taxonomy of Cases
The old taxonomy of cases (Table 6.1) Vts into this next taxonomy by dividing these six
types of cases even more Vnely. For each of the six types of cases represented in (Table 6.2),
we can vary the standards of the subject and attributor independently of the conversational
agent. We can do so by considering cases where the conversational agent is not identical
to either the subject or attributor of knowledge. Instead of tediously considering every
type of case, I will focus on two cases that demonstrate some of the beneVts of the new
taxonomy.
4.1 Low Subject and Attributor, High Conversational Standards
There are cases where the subject and attributor’s standards are low but the standards of
the conversational agent are high. In fact, the conversational agent does not even need to
be part of the conversation. In these cases, when the subject’s epistemic state is only strong
enough to meet the low standard, but not the high, the attributor should not attribute
knowledge to the subject.
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(Bank Case 3A) John and Mary are at the bank on a Friday. John is a friend
from out of town and has driven Mary to the bank to deposit a check. As John
waits in the car outside, Bonnie comes by and sees the line coming out the
door of the bank. She asks John if the bank is open the next day. John replies,
“I’m sorry, I’m from out of town, but my friend Mary is in the bank. I’ll call her
and ask her. I’m sure she knows.” After calling Mary, John replies, “Mary says
that she was at the bank last Saturday and it was open.” Bonnie replies, “Are
you sure the bank doesn’t have any special hours tomorrow, my check must be
deposited by the weekend or else the bank will foreclose on my house.” John:
“Well, I don’t think Mary knows about that. I guess she doesn’t know. You’d
better go in and check.”
In this case, since both John, the attributor, and Mary, the subject, are in a low stakes
situation, John’s Vnal knowledge attribution must be sensitive to Bonnie’s high standards.
This means that there are cases where the standards that govern knowledge attributions
diUer from the standards of the subject and the attributor. For the sensitive invariantist,
knowledge attributions are sensitive to both the subject and the conversational agent. And
this accurately predicts that when Bonnie is the conversational agent and has high stan-
dards, John should not attribute knowledge to Mary.
4.2 Joint Decision Making
The second type of case lies in box 2 of (Table 6.2). These cases show that our intuitions
about knowledge attributions are often murky because there is disagreement about the
conversational standards.26 In the following case of group decision making, the members
26In chapter 4 of (DeRose 2009), DeRose argues for a single scoreboard view of the conversational stan-
dards. And in cases like the one below, he thinks that the standards are indeterminate. I am broadly in
agreement with DeRose and on my decision-theoretic account whereby the standards depend upon the con-
versational agent, these joint decision making context are cases in which the conversational agent has inde-
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of the group have varying standards. George and Nicole have been tracking the notorious
criminal, Bob, for the last two years. They have just arrived at the scene of the crime, the
Vrst time the criminal has come out of hiding in years. Nicole has discovered through a
fairly reliable informant that Bob is going to the train station. They must go now or else
they will lose him - perhaps for good.
Nicole: I know where Bob is. He’s going to the train station.
George: But Bob may have gone to the seaport to take the ferry. Do you know
that he didn’t go there?
Nicole: Why would you think that?
George: Well, it’s possible! I’ll go to the ferry station and you go to the train
station.
Nicole: Stop your nonsense! I told you that I know where he is. Let’s go!
In joint decision making cases, members of the group may often have diUering opin-
ions so there may be some disagreement about the standards that govern premising that P. I
take it that there will be some disagreement on whether or not Nicole knows where Bob is.
And the indeterminacy of our intuitions match the indeterminacy of our standards. These
cases are of some interest because it also shows that the mechanism by which standards
are raised are not so straightforward as some contextualists tend to think. The contex-
tualist sometimes assumes that the raising of skeptical possibilities is suXcient to raise
standards. But in cases like these, George’s assertion that Bob could be at the ferry does
not automatically raise the standards.
terminate standards.
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The model I have proposed has the resources to provide a detailed account of how the
conversational standards are determined. In joint decision-making cases like these, the
conversational standards are determined by all the people that make up the group deci-
sion maker. Since it is not always easy to come to an agreement between multiple agents,
it will be diXcult to identify the standards of the conversation.27 The sensitive invari-
antist account nicely predicts that in joint-decision making cases, the standards governing
knowledge attributions will be up for discussion.
The taxonomy also highlights cases in which P has already been presupposed. These
are cases in which only the subject’s standards count as relevant. These cases will become
central in dealing with the second important objection for SSI and I will return to them
below.
5 Now You Know It, Now You Don’t
Now you know it, now you don’t claims are “claims to the eUect that matters were (or will
be, or would have been) diUerent with regard to whether a subject knows some fact when
(or if) such-and-such was (or will be, or had been) the case, where diUerences in circum-
stances being imagined between the two situations being compared (one of which is often
actual, present situation of the subject) concern only some non-truth-relevant matters.”28
27Another way to account for the indeterminacy is to appeal to the indeterminacy of belief. For it may be
the case that the standards are always Vxed. And they are given by the general decision-theoretic norms that
I’ve discussed. However, there may be some indeterminacy in belief or desire that explain the indeterminacy
in what counts as a warranted assertion.
28p.194, (DeRose 2009)
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(a) I know, but what I said before - ‘I don’t know’ - is true.
(b) I don’t know, but I previously did.
(c) She does know that P, but she wouldn’t have known if more had been at stake.
(d) Clyde doesn’t know that P, but if less were at stake, Clyde would know.
For stylistic purposes, let’s simply call these now-you-don’t claims.29 The classical in-
variantist argues that intellectualism best explains their oddity. Intellectualism is the thesis
that epistemic factors are solely responsible for determining the standards a subject must
meet in order for her true belief to count as knowledge. And if intellectualism is true and
the meaning of ‘knows’ is invariant across contexts of use, these now-you-don’t claims are
always false. Though the contextualist also upholds intellectualism, given her commitment
to the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’, she must allow some of these claims to be true. For
example, what was meant by an early use of ‘knows’ could vary from what is meant now
by ‘knows’. Thus, there could be situations where (a) is true. To explain their oddity, the
contextualist argues that now-you-don’t claims are generally unassertible because of the
ways that context-sensitive terms pick out their referents. I will not discuss the contextu-
alist’s response here because I think that it has been adequately addressed in chapter 6 of
(DeRose 2009).
The sensitive invariantist is also committed to the potential truth of now-you-don’t
claims and DeRose has argued that SSI’s failure to account for their oddity is the second
greatest problem that SSI faces. So DeRose concludes that contextualism fares much better
29(a) and (b) oUer temporal examples and (c) and (d), modal examples.
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than SSI in dealing with these now-you-don’t claims for the simple reason that “contextual-
ism avoids endorsing the problematic [now-you-don’t] sentences that plague SSI.”30 I hope
to reply on behalf of SSI by adopting the same general strategy of showing that now-you-
don’t claims are generally unassertible. But since SSI appeals to an invariantist semantics,
we cannot appeal to features of the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’.31 Instead, my strategy
will be to narrow down the cases in which speaker could potentially be justiVed in making
such a claim. Though there will be one type of situation where now-you-don’t claims may
appear assertible, these will be cases in which attributions and denials of knowledge are
fairly insensitive to practical stakes. And I hope to show that the intuitive pull of intellec-
tualism and the unassertibility of now-you-don’t claims arises from some special features
of these cases.
The four examples above correspond to the four types of now-you-don’t claims that
are relevant for SSI.







Table 6.3: Taxonomy of now-you-don’t Claims
30p.199, (DeRose 2009)
31Both (Stanley 2005) and (Hawthorne 2006) attempt to address now-you-don’t claims by appealing to the
knowledge norm of assertion. However, they agree with DeRose that this strategy only takes us so far. I will
show how to extend this strategy to deal with more cases than has typically been thought.
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Step 1: Rule out HIGH to LOW cases. LOW to HIGH claims are claims to the
eUect that a subject knows in the current low stakes context but wouldn’t if the stakes
were higher. HIGH to LOW claims are claims to the eUect that a subject doesn’t know in
the current high stakes context but would if the stakes were lower. It has typically been
thought that employed by the sensitive invariantist, the appeal to warranted assertibility
only works to rule out Vrst person HIGH to LOW cases. DeRose writes, “The problem
with this escape is that it only helps with some of the problematic sentences that need to
be handled, leaving other, equally troublesome examples untouched.”32 And he states that
LOW to HIGH cases along with third person HIGH to LOW cases are not explained by
SSI’s appeal to unassertibility.
Though DeRose is right about the LOW to HIGH cases, he is wrong about the third
person HIGH to LOW cases. For he has failed to recognize that every now-you-don’t claim
triggers the presupposition that P is true. For example, asserting either (b) or (d) triggers
the presupposition that P. So a speaker may only assert (b) or (d) in cases when she is in
a strong enough position to assert that P. Consider the high stakes bank case and let P be
the proposition that the bank will be open. Since one may not assert that the bank will be
open, one may not assert either (b) or (d), which are respectively examples of Vrst and third
person HIGH to LOW claims. Thus, SSI’s appeal to the unassertibility of now-you-don’t
claims covers all HIGH to LOW cases. All that is left to consider are LOW to HIGH cases:
32p.196, (DeRose 2009)
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Step 2: Rule out attributions to experts. Next, let’s diUerentiate two situations
in which the LOW to HIGH claims are asserted in terms of the relative strength of the
attributor and subject’s epistemic states.
1. The subject’s epistemic state is stronger with respect to P than the attributor’s.
2. The attributor’s epistemic state is at least as strong with respect to P than the sub-
ject’s.
Now-you-don’t claims would certainly be odd in the Vrst type of case. In the bank
case, we would not say of the bank manager that he fails to know that the bank will be
open even if the stakes were fairly high. For it may be the case that even if it were very
important to the manager that the bank will open, perhaps his job depends upon it, he may
still count as knowing. So if the subject has more expertise, we will not be in a position
to judge the exact strength of the subject’s epistemic position. We simply know that the
subject’s epistemic position is stronger with respect to the relevant proposition than our
own. As a result, we would not be in a position to evaluate whether or not the subject’s
epistemic state is strong enough for her true belief to count as knowing in the high stakes
context. It might be objected that the stakes can always be raised to such a extreme level
that according to SSI, the bank manager doesn’t know. I will return to these extreme cases
below.
Step 3: The insensitivity to practical stakes in the remaining case. So we are
now left with a special set of cases with two important features. P must have already been
taken for granted. And the attributor’s epistemic state must be at least as strong as the
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subject’s. Note that these features demarcate cases that philosophers have used to analyze
knowledge. For these are the situations in which we have already assumed that a subject’s
belief is true and we are only asking whether that true belief counts as knowledge. Now
in these types of cases, we will only be concerned with low stakes cases in which we make
LOW to HIGH now-you-don’t claims. These are cases of type 1 in our new taxonomy
(Table 6.2). What I hope to show is that in these special cases, knowledge attributions and
denials are highly insensitive to practical stakes. And this insensitivity will be explained
by the privileged epistemic position of the attributor. Given the attributor’s epistemic
position, evidence, which from the subject’s point of view does not appear to be very
strong, turns out in fact to be quite strong from the attributor’s perspective. The diUerence
in these evaluative perspectives can be used to account for the insensitivity of ‘knows’,
thereby showing that now-you-don’t claims are unassertible in the remaining cases.
Let’s return to Bonnie and Clyde’s high stakes bank case. Before Bonnie reminds Clyde
of their precarious situation, Clyde claims to know that the bank will be open. And he
oUers as evidence the fact that he was at the bank two weeks previously. So at this point,
we can assume that Clyde believes that the bank will be open and would act accordingly
by returning to the bank the next day. Now imagine that we have watched all of this
unfolding. Perhaps, we are FBI agents keeping track of the couple’s whereabouts and
activities. Earlier in the day, we talked to the bank’s manager who informed us that the
bank’s hours have remained unchanged all year and no plans have been made to change
them in the near future. Just as the bank was open two Saturdays ago, it will also be open
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this Saturday. In addition, let’s also assume we know that Bonnie and Clyde must deposit
their paychecks before Monday. In this situation, would we say of Clyde that he knows
that the bank is open?
It seems true to say of Clyde that he knows. Since the bank is operating normally,
Clyde’s evidence justiVes a very high degree of conVdence. He remembers clearly being at
the bank two weeks previously and he remembers that there was nothing special about that
Saturday. Though he can’t rule out the possibility that the bank has changed its hours, from
our more privileged perspective, that is not something that Clyde ought to consider. Just as
he need not consider a host of other highly unlikely and unactualized alternatives. Though
there may be some pull to say that Clyde doesn’t know, I think that can be explained. For
Clyde would not be in a position to assert to someone in his exact position that he knows.
That is why Clyde should retract his attribution once Bonnie reminds him of the practical
stakes.33 For Clyde is neither justiVed in believing that he knows nor does he know that
he knows.
So it would seem that our attributions and denials of knowledge in these cases are
somewhat insensitive to the subject’s practical stakes. What explains this insensitivity is
the evaluations aUorded us by our privileged epistemic position. For what might seem
like an insuXciently strong epistemic state from Bonnie and Clyde’s perspective is in fact
strong enough from our perspective. We can put the point succinctly by using the lan-
33By considering our intuitions before Clyde becomes aware of the practical stakes, we can also test to see
whether or not we think that the salience of the practical stakes might lower Clyde’s conVdence in such a
way so as to account for his lack of knowledge.
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guage of relevant alternatives. Given our privileged point of view, we have determined
what counts as a relevant alternative and what evidence is suXcient to rule out these al-
ternatives. Since the subject has that evidence, his true belief counts as knowledge in most
every situation.34
This restriction to “most every situation” is needed because even in these cases, our
use of ‘knows’ exhibits some sensitivity to practical stakes. This will happen when we
raise the practical stakes inordinately high. What if Clyde’s life depended on the bank’s
being open the next day? Would we say that he knows? In this situation, I think we would
not claim that he knows. For in such a case, one would know only if one were absolutely
certain. And since Clyde’s evidence does not make him infallible with respect to the bank’s
hours, he fails to know. As a result, SSI would allow speakers to assert, “Clyde knows, but
if his life were at stake, he wouldn’t know.” I’m not sure how bad these extreme now-you-
don’t claims sound, but they do not seem particularly troubling because they sound just
like another type of sentence that any plausible account of ‘knows’ should allow one to
assert. In any low stakes situation, a speaker should be able to assert, “Clyde knows, but
if his life were at stake, we wouldn’t say of Clyde that he knows.” If Clyde’s life were at
stake, our privileged epistemic position would not be strong enough to determine whether
or not Clyde knew. To be in that position, we would have to be (close to) infallible with
respect to the bank’s hours and since we are not, we should not say of Clyde that he knows.
For even when Clyde is not part of the conversation, if we are considering how we might
34This way of talking depends upon a very coarse-grained view of evidential support, like the one used
when we talk of ruling out alternatives.
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advise him, he is the conversational agent and so his standards would be relevant for our
attributions of knowledge. This is conVrmed by the fact that if our lives were at stake, we
should not assert that we know. So even though extreme versions of now-you-don’t claims
may sound odd, they don’t appear to be especially problematic.35
6 A Tie?
We have found that SSI can address the two main objections that arise from our use of
‘knows’. Does this mean that we are simply left with a tie between contextualism and
SSI? I think not. For the main arguments for SSI have not come from our use of ‘knows’.
Rather, my arguments as well as those of other sensitive invariantists have been based on
accounts of rational deliberation and the deliberative role of rational belief and knowledge.
In contrast, DeRose has argued that “the best grounds for accepting contextualism come
from how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary,
non-philosophical talk.”36 Since we have concluded that SSI accounts for our use just as
well as contextualism, the main case for contextualism seems to be undermined and the
case for SSI remains.
35I think we should be wary of appealing to intuitions about the oddity of certain sentences. The prob-
lematic cases are sentences that sound odd because they seem like they can never be true or informative.
However, when the sentences involve some degree of complexity, it can be hard to diUerentiate these cases
from cases that sound odd simply because they are far from ordinary.
36(DeRose 2009)
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